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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation is a journey through the legislative changes and case law in order to 
analyse and evaluate the changing nature of South African jurisprudence in respect of 
the notions of equality, discrimination and affirmative action and the manner in which 
these issues are proved and dealt with in our courts. 
 
It focuses firstly on the emergence of the post-Wiehahn labour laws and the developing 
jurisprudence concerning discrimination in South Africa towards the end of a long period 
of isolation from the international world.  
 
It witnesses the growing cognizance which was taken of international guidelines and 
their slow and gradual incorporation into our jurisprudence before the institution of the 
new democratic government, in the days when the country was still firmly in the grip of a 
regime which prided itself on its discriminatory laws. 
 
It also deals in some depth with the new laws enacted after the first democratic 
government was installed, especially in so far as the Constitution was concerned. The 
first clutch of cases dealing with discrimination which were delivered by the 
Constitutional Court and their effects on decisions of the labour courts thereafter, are 
dealt with in great detail, indicating how important those judgments were and still are ten 
years later. A special chapter is devoted to the Harksen case, still a leading authority on 
how to deal with allegations of unfair discrimination. 
 
Having traversed several of the judgments of the labour courts after Harksen, several 
observations are made in the conclusion of the study which, it is hoped, summarize the 
major areas of concern in respect of the task of testing claims of unfair discrimination 
arising in our Courts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From the mid-Nineties in South Africa, our Labour Courts have dealt with 
discrimination and affirmative action claims on a regular basis. It is clear that, as the 
legislative and jurisprudential environment has matured and expanded, definite 
changes in the approaches adopted by the Courts to these matters have become 
evident. 
 
Several watershed cases came before the Courts which facilitated the changes in 
approach, each with a unique contribution to the interpretation and analysis of 
aspects relating to equality, unfair discrimination and affirmative action matters. 
 
Ten years ago, Christoph Garbers1
 
 posed the question as to how South Africa has 
dealt with issues concerning unfair discrimination, especially with regard to 
intractable problems such as: the shifting onus framework, the need for an applicant 
to establish a prima facie case before the onus shifts; the unavailability of evidence to 
establish such a prima facie case, especially in matters concerning alleged indirect 
discrimination and the need to break free from the formal equality paradigm.  
The questions posed by Garbers almost ten years ago are still very relevant today, 
especially given the evolving jurisprudence of our Courts in matters concerning unfair 
discrimination and affirmative action in particular. A very appropriate question is still 
whether the emerging jurisprudence indicates that certainty has been reached by our 
Labour Courts about the substance of the right to equality and the right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against as well as the proof required to substantiate claims of 
employment discrimination, more specifically in cases involving affirmative action as 
a defence. 
                                                 
1 Garbers C “Proof and Evidence of Employment Discrimination under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998” 
(2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 136. 
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Furthermore, the question arises too, as to whether the Courts have been faithful and 
consistent in their application of generally accepted and established principles, if 
such have in fact been formulated precisely. 
 
The very purpose of the equality clause2 itself has proven to be quite controversial 
and as a result the Constitutional Court commenced contextualising and developing 
a framework for the adjudication of discrimination claims in a clutch of cases 
commencing in 1996 through to 1999.3 The test developed in the Harksen4
 
 case by 
the Constitutional Court was viewed thereafter for a period of time as the leading 
authority and became the traditional test in discrimination matters. 
Cooper5
 
 has argued that labour law jurisprudence on unfair discrimination “lacks 
coherence and clarity” and that one of the main reasons for that is the Court’s diverse 
approach to the standing of constitutional jurisprudence in shaping labour law. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate exactly how, within the applicable 
legislative frameworks at the time, our Labour Courts have dealt with discrimination 
and, especially affirmative action matters, prior to Harksen, as well as, whether and 
how the Harksen formula has been applied when the Labour Court considered unfair 
discrimination cases where affirmative action was used as a defence. Leading trends 
in judicial reasoning on these issues will also be considered. 
                                                 
2 Sections 8 and 9 of the Interim and Final Constitutions respectively. 
3 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC); President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); Larbi-
Odam v MEC for Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC); Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 
(2) SA 363 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (NCGLE 1) 1999 (1) 
SA 6 (CC). 
4 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
5 Cooper C “A constitutional reading of the test for unfair discrimination in labour law” 2001 Acta Juridica 121 
at page 129. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
 
In order to assess how the Courts deal with unfair discrimination claims it is important 
to have a clear understanding of the development and structure of modern 
employment discrimination law in South Africa. 
 
2.1 THE CONSTITUTION 
 
On 27 April 1994, the Interim Constitution6
 
 was introduced. Three years later, the 
final Constitution was adopted. 
Our Constitution,7 as the supreme law of South Africa, embraces the value of 
equality. It permeates the Constitution and all laws flowing from it. Central to the task 
of transformation of our society is the concept of equality – both as a value and as a 
right. “The value is used to interpret and apply the right … the right is infused with the 
substantive content of the value.”8 Apart from the specific equality clause, Courts and 
other tribunals are also urged in the Constitution to: “Promote the values that underlie 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, freedom and equality.”9 
These values constitute the “soul” of the Constitution.10
                                                 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993) – Interim Constitution. 
 Included in the concept of 
equality is the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms and, in order to 
promote that goal, measures to protect and advance persons or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, may be taken.  The constitutional 
focus is therefore a forward-looking one. From the precise wording chosen, it is clear 
that the Constitution favours a notion of substantive equality.  
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 249. 
9 Sections 36(1) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
10 Ngcukaitobi T “Adjudicating Transformation in the Labour Courts – An Edifice on the Rise?” (2007) 28 ILJ 
1436 at 1438. 
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In attempting to deal with systemic inequality, proactive measures, coupled with the 
elimination of existing discrimination, constitutes the dualistic approach to the 
creation of a new egalitarian society adopted in the Constitution. As Moseneke, judge 
of the Pretoria High Court, stated in his Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture:11
 
 
“…Courts should search for substantive justice, which is to be inferred from the 
foundational values of the Constitution. After all, that is the injunction of the 
Constitution – transformation. Central to that transformation is the achievement of 
equality.” 
The Constitutional Court requires a purposive approach to interpretation, thereby 
seeking to adopt one which best supports and protects the fundamental values 
enshrined in the Constitution. As stated by Albertyn and Kentridge:12
 
 “The purposive 
approach highlights the fact that the business of   constitutional litigation and 
adjudication is primarily about assessing, weighing and balancing principles, values 
and policy considerations in the context of the broad purposes and commitments of 
the Constitution.”  
Botha13 points out that it has been argued by Pieterse14
 
 that “Section 9 demonstrates 
both the reliance of legal and constitutional discourse on potentially harmful social 
constructs, and the Constitution’s commitment to eradicate the stereotypes arising 
from those constructs.” As stated in the introduction, the purpose and interpretation 
of the equality clause has in itself been very controversial and the Constitutional 
Court has the task of contextualizing the concept of equality and developing a 
framework by means of which Courts can set about their task of dealing with 
discrimination claims – after all, there are many possible conceptualizations of 
equality. 
                                                 
11 Moseneke D “The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture – Transformative Adjudication” (2002) 18 SAJHR 
309. 
12 Albertyn C and Kentridge J “Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim Constitution” (1994) 10 SAJHR 
149. 
13 Botha H “Metaphoric Reasoning and Transformative Constitutionalism (Part 2)” 2003 TSAR 20. 
14 Pieterse “Stereotypes, sameness, difference and human rights: catch 22?” 2001 SA Public Law 92 at 102. 
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It is therefore only appropriate to commence an overview of the legislative framework 
with a brief consideration of each of the provisions contained in section 9, mindful of 
the fact that in Prinsloo15
 
 the Constitutional Court said that it is neither desirable nor 
feasible to divide the equal treatment and non-discrimination components of section 
9 into watertight compartments – the equality right is a composite right. 
The fundamental aim of the elaborate equality clause is the removal of systematic 
discrimination and deeply entrenched patterns of group disadvantage. It is 
transformative and remedial in nature, focussed on the development of opportunities 
and resources for meaningful participation in society, as well as the protection, of 
those who have suffered from historical and systemic disadvantage.16
 
 The very focus 
of the equality theme is to facilitate transformation of our society, to maximise human 
potential and development and to redress material imbalances.  
Section 9 of the Constitution, known as the “equality clause” or provision, 
commences as follows: 
 
“9 Equality 
 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
of the law.” 
 
This sub-section deals with the principle of equality before the law and confers the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law on everyone. It superficially appears to 
reflect a notion of formal equality, which, it is said, connotes sameness of treatment. 
According to De Vos,17
                                                 
15 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
 this section contains little more than a “guarantee of non-
discrimination.” The formal notion entails treating all people in the same way, 
according to a neutral standard regardless of their own particular circumstances and 
16 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 254. 
17 De Vos P “Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court” 
(2000) 63 THRHR 62 at 64. 
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position in society,18 but fails to recognize patterns of deeply entrenched 
disadvantage and inequality in our society, inherited from the past. It entails a view 
that the constitution should be colour blind19
 
 and therefore preferential treatment of 
anyone or any group would be inappropriate. Clearly a substantive notion argues that 
colour blindness would in fact produce inequality. 
However, form must never be elevated over substance in interpretation. If one were 
to consider the context within which the law operates, “equal” treatment can seldom 
denote the “same” treatment. A purposive approach to constitutional interpretation to 
which the Constitutional Court has committed itself on several occasions therefore 
means that the equality clause must be read as grounded on a substantive notion of 
equality.20 Albertyn and Goldblatt21
 
 point out too that the terms “equal benefit of the 
law” entails a recognition of the fact that equality is not only a negative right, but “may 
well require positive measures to ensure that the goal of equality is achieved.” 
A substantive approach to equality pays particular attention to the context in which an 
applicant asks a Court for assistance. The position of the applicant in society, his 
group affiliation and the history and background of his /her particular disadvantage is 
evaluated. The approach emphasizes the need not only to eradicate offending laws, 
but to actively take steps to remedy disadvantage and to facilitate redistribution.22 
“Inequality has to be redressed and not simply removed.”23 The Constitutional Court 
itself has endorsed this understanding of equality.24
                                                 
18 Cooper C “The Boundaries of Equality in Labour Law” (2004) 25 ILJ 813. 
 It stated as follows: “It is 
necessary to comment on the nature of substantive equality, a contested expression 
which is not found in either of our Constitutions. Particularly in a country such as 
South Africa, persons belonging to certain categories have suffered considerable 
19 Harlan J in Plessey v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896) at 559 as quoted by Smith N in “Affirmative Action under 
the new constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 84 at 87. 
20 Dupper O “The Current Legislative Framework” Essential Employment Discrimination Law. 
21 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 267. 
22 Kok A “The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: Why the controversy” 2001 
TSAR 294. 
23 Kentridge J “Equality” in I M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law in South Africa (1999) . 
24 Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
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unfair discrimination in the past. It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, 
through its Bill of Rights, that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair 
discrimination in the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination frequently has 
ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of which is not halted immediately 
when the initial causes thereof are eliminated and unless remedied, may continue for 
a substantial time and even indefinitely. Like justice delayed, equality delayed is 
equality denied.”  
 
Moseneke also quoted Albertyn and Goldblatt25 in his lecture:26
 
 “The contextual 
approach posits that legal enquiry in adjudication should be migrated from ‘abstract 
comparison of similarly situated individuals to an exploration of actual impact of the 
alleged rights violation within the existing socio-economic circumstances’. This is also 
another way of stating that transformative jurisprudence needs to contextualize 
violations within actual live conditions. Decisions on violation of constitutional rights 
must be seen in the context of socio-economic conditions of the groups concerned in 
the light of social patterns, power relations and other systematic forms of deprivation 
which may be relevant. Also the historical context of the case must be heard.” 
However, according to Albertyn and Goldblatt27
 
 too, they view the Constitutional 
Court as having sought to define equality “by placing the value of dignity at the centre 
of the equality right. We do not agree with this, … Dignity should be understood as 
enhancing the value of individual integrity and autonomy …” 
Section 9(1), according to the Constitutional Court, means that everyone is entitled, 
at least, to equal treatment by the Courts and that all are subject to the law which 
should be equally and impartially applied an administered. Section 9(1) was 
addressed by the Constitutional Court in the National Coalition matter28
                                                 
25 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248. 
 where it was 
held that: “…both in conferring benefits on persons and by imposing restraints on 
26 Moseneke D (2002) 18 SAJHR 309. 
27 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 254. 
28 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (NCGLE 1) 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
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state and other action, the state had to do so in a way which results in the equal 
treatment of all persons.”  
 
De Vos29 also points out that even cases of “mere differentiation” (differentiations 
necessary to run society efficiently) such would fall foul of both aspects of section 
9(1) if it can be shown that the state did not act in a rational manner when 
differentiating between individuals or groups of individuals. He quoted the following 
passage from the Prinsloo case:30 “(the state) should not regulate in an arbitrary 
manner or manifest ‘naked preferences’ that serve to legitimate governmental 
purpose.” What is required is that the state must function in a rational manner. The 
Constitutional Court also said in the Prinsloo31
 
 matter: “Accordingly, before it can be 
said that mere differentiation infringes section 9, it must be established that there is 
no rational relationship between the differentiation in question and the government 
purpose which is proffered to validate it. In the absence of such a rational 
relationship, the differentiation would infringe Section 9.” 
The exercise of state power must be rationally connected to the purpose for which 
such power was given. Section 9 requires that the differentiation in laws or conduct 
be rationally related to a legitimate purpose. 
 
De Vos goes on to point out that this requirement of rationality is a very stringent test 
for any complainant to overcome. As long as the state can show a “rational 
relationship” between the purpose sought to be achieved (normally a legitimate 
government objective) and the means chosen, it will not infringe on section 9(1). The 
stringency of the test for section 9(1) therefore, according to De Vos, seems to 
suggest that complainants would be forced to frame their cases in terms of section 
9(3), as a discrimination complaint.  
 
                                                 
29 De Vos P 2000 63 THRHR 62. 
30 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra. 
31 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra. 
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Albertyn and Goldblatt32
 
 point out that in their view, a test for the procedural fairness 
component of “equal protection before the law” has not been developed within the 
Constitutional Court’s equality test 
In section 9(2) the term “equality” is expanded upon to reflect a substantive 
conception thereof in the first part of the section through the wording “full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights.” It is important to note that the second part of the section, 
dealing with measures,  was viewed as standing in opposition to the first. As put by 
Ngcukaitobi:33
 
 “ … to achieve the second objective, one was presumed to be acting 
in breach of the first objective and thus required to justify such breach.” The 
assumption was initially that affirmative action measures were in themselves 
breaches of the right to equality and unfair discrimination which had to be justified. 
“(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.” 
 
The second part of the section makes it clear that taking of measures to advance and 
protect the previously disadvantaged - affirmative action - does not amount to an 
exception to the formal notion of equality, (as viewed by many commentators, 
especially in the early days) but serves as a means to attain it, through the use of the 
term “promote.” Rycroft34 views the right to equality to have been “qualified” in this 
section by the right of the state and employers to implement affirmative action 
policies. He stresses the fact that the provision indicates that such policies “ensure” 
equality, rather than to limit the right to equality. “The measures are entirely 
consonant with a notion of substantive equality.”35
                                                 
32 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 267. 
 
33 Ngcukaitobi T (2007) 28 ILJ 1436 at 1442. 
34 Rycroft A “Obstacles to Employment Equity?: The role of judges and arbitrators in the interpretation and 
implementation of Affirmative Action policies” (1999) 20 ILJ 1411. 
35 Cooper C (2004) 25 ILJ 813 at 832. 
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The words “measures designed” have been grappled with by the Courts and reliance 
has been placed on this section of the Constitution to read the term “designed” into 
the provisions of the Employment Equity Act36 where it is not mentioned, other than 
in the definition section of that Act. The term design and the inference that it meant a 
written affirmative action plan, rapidly became a fertile source for disputes relating to 
the content, interpretation and manner of application of such plans.37 Mureinik 
viewed the words “designed” as ambiguous and felt that a broad interpretation 
thereof should be adopted and that the means and not only the ends should be 
brought under judicial scrutiny. It has also been remarked38 in the American context, 
that the problem of “innocent white victims” of affirmative action programs 
(“jammergevalle” in the South African context and a situation where such persons are 
left with less than what they could have had under conditions of genuine equality)39
 
 
will become an important challenge in the future. The debate encompassed too, 
whether there had to be a rational connection between the measures applied and the 
end they were designed to achieve and what that meant in practice. In addition, who 
the beneficiaries of such measures could be, also became a contentious point. 
Furthermore, a central issue arose relating to whether affirmative action, in addition 
to being a defence for an employer, could become a “sword” in the hands of an 
applicant aggrieved at not being appointed to a position.  
The need for restitutionary and remedial measures has been recognized not only in 
our legislation, but in society in general. It is accepted that identical treatment of 
people would in itself result in inequality. Furthermore, it is also important to note that 
the Constitution in itself only provides a minimum of protection. No constitutional 
complaint can be made if the legislature chooses to provide more protection. It is only 
if the legislature chooses to provide fewer rights than those prescribed in the 
Constitution, that such complaint may validly be made. The issue of the relationship 
between a statutory measure and its normative home, the constitutional mandate, 
                                                 
36 Act 55 of 1998 (Hereinafter referred to as the EEA). 
37 Mureinik E “A Bridge to Where: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 at 47. 
38 Fiscus R The Constitutional logic of affirmative action (1992). 
39 Brickhill J “Testing Affirmative Action under the Constitution and the Equality Act: Comment on Du Preez v 
Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development & others” (2006) 27 ILJ 1811 (E); (2006) 27 ILJ 2004. 
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has not been clearly defined, as pointed out by Du Toit.40 This could be problematic 
with regard to statutes where there is a limitation of a basic constitutional right and 
the reliance to be placed on legislation purporting to give effect to a constitutional 
mandate. Where a basic right is limited in a statute such limitation must be 
interpreted restrictively. However, the constitution states clearly41 that a basic right 
may only be limited by a law of general application and must do so expressly. Such 
limitation must conform to the strict provisions of the limitations clause in Section 36 
of the Constitution. Du Toit42
 
 points out that it appears that many judgments dealing 
with affirmative action and discrimination “have relied heavily on the interpretations of 
s9 of the Constitution on the apparent assumption that such decisions are equally 
and directly applicable in the employment context. In fact, the two provisions are not 
identical.” 
The meaning of the term “disadvantaged” has been intensely debated and was also 
controversial, especially since the target of affirmative action policies in the EEA are 
“designated” groups and, according to Rycroft,43
 
 the question might be posed as to 
whether “the EEA is tailored narrowly enough to meet the declared constitutional 
purpose that affirmative action measures must be ‘designed’ to protect and advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”   
Grant and Small44 have pointed out that in their view, it is problematic “to introduce 
into the concept of discrimination, the idea of alleviation of disadvantage without also 
challenging the very notion of equality in law.” However, Albertyn and Goldblatt45
                                                 
40 Du Toit D “The evolution of the concept of ‘unfair discrimination’ in South African labour law” (2006) 27 ILJ 
1311. 
 
hold the view that: “Disadvantage and difference become key characteristics of 
equality… The intersectional nature of disadvantage (based on more than one 
ground) is therefore complex.” The precise legal status of the term and an evaluation 
41 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
42 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1312. 
43 Rycroft A (1999) 20 ILJ 1411 at 1413. 
44 Grant E and Small J “Disadvantage and Discrimination: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 51 2 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 174. 
45  Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 252. 
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of “disadvantaged” status has had to be considered. The fact that disadvantage plays 
a key role in determining discrimination is a very controversial and problematic one. 
However, it has been accepted that the term as used by the Constitutional Court has 
a wide and inclusive meaning and would encompass all forms of disadvantage – not 
only material deprivation and subjugation. 
 
A further aspect regarded as problematic with regard to the section is that it does not 
distinguish one disadvantaged group or another as being more or less deserving of 
protection. It also links disadvantage to “persons or categories of persons” who have 
been disadvantaged and therefore has been viewed as focusing on collective 
disadvantage rather than on whether an individual at a personal level had actually 
been disadvantaged. Freedman46 refers to an observation by Donald and Galloway47
 
 
that this approach is based upon the idea that laws which single out individuals for 
disadvantageous treatment on the basis of a particular characteristic, contribute to 
the worsening of the lot of the entire group which is defined by that characteristic. An 
important consequence is therefore that the individual who is challenging the law 
begins to disappear from view and the group itself takes over the centre stage. The 
individual is simply seen as an instrument which brings the plight of the group to the 
Court: therefore group equalization rather than protection of individual rights.  
The Constitutional Court in the Van Heerden48
                                                 
46 Freedman W “Understanding the Right to Equality” (1998) 115 SALJ 243 at 251. 
 case dealt with the relationship 
between section 9(1) and 9(2) in the context of affirmative action measures. The 
Constitutional Court held that the high Court had misconceived the nature of the 
equality protection and that it had adopted a formalistic approach. It held that 
affirmative action measures are not a derogation from, but a substantive and 
composite part of the right to equality. If an affirmative action measure passed muster 
under section 9(2), the internal test, it could not be said to be presumptively unfair. 
47 Donald J and Galloway C “Three models of (In)Equality” (1993) 38 Mc Gill LJ 64 at 79 – 80. 
48 Minister of Finance  v Van Heerden supra. 
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However, the view has been expressed that our Courts have not adopted this 
approach consistently.49
 
 
Importantly, whilst it is widely accepted that the constitution encompasses the 
challenge of transformation, the end or means has eluded consensus50 and 
therefore, whether the affirmative action clause constitutes an exception to or 
amplification of the equality provision would significantly affect and influence the 
interpretation of the clause.51
 
 If the clause were to be viewed as an exception to 
legislation conferring human rights, it could lead to a narrow interpretation in line with 
the notion that  such rights should be interpreted broadly in favour of those rights – in 
this case the right to equality. Such a view could also restrict legal and administrative 
measures applied in favour of the disadvantaged and result in a situation where 
privilege is entrenched rather than a situation where the disadvantage suffered in the 
past is remedied. Viewing the measure as an application of the right to equality, 
would lead to a generous and liberal interpretation of the equality clause.  
The onus would also be affected because, if the measures were seen as an 
exception, the sponsors of the measures would have the onus of proving their 
legality. However, if the measures are viewed as a substantive part of equality, as 
they now are, the onus would shift to the complainant to challenge the legality of the 
measure or program. The Van Heerden52
 
 case finally decided this issue. 
“(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.” 
 
                                                 
49 Ngcukaitobi T (2007) 28 ILJ 1436 at 1448. 
50 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 249. 
51 Smith N in “Affirmative Action under the new constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 84. 
52 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
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This section, known as the unfair discrimination provision, comprises a prohibition of 
unfair discrimination on certain listed grounds and analogous grounds. It contains an 
extensive list of prohibited grounds which have been generously construed by the 
Constitutional Court, for example: “Concept sexual orientation as used in section 9(3) 
… must be given a generous interpretation of which it is linguistically and textually 
fully capable of bearing. It applies equally to the orientation of persons who are 
bisexual, or transsexual and it also applies to the orientation of persons who might on 
a single occasion be erotically attracted to a member of their own sex.” 
 
An analogous ground is, objectively, based on attributes or characteristics which 
have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or 
to affect them seriously in a comparably serious manner. 
 
The Court has also given a broad expansive definition of human dignity.53
 
 It is 
impaired when a legally relevant differentiation deals with people as second-class 
citizens, demeans them, treats them as less capable for no good reason, violates an 
individual’s self esteem and personal integrity. According to De Vos, “dignity” is really 
a “catch-all phrase” to capture the idea of humans as equally capable and deserving 
of concern, respect and consideration. 
The subjective feelings of the complainant are not decisive. It seems as if the Court 
regards differentiation as discrimination whenever it is based on a ground that the 
complainant cannot change or cannot reasonably be expected to change e.g. 
citizenship, marital status. 
 
The Court has not hesitated to add to the listed grounds by finding discrimination on 
an analogous ground. It has done so “generously.”54
 
 
 
                                                 
53 De Vos P 2000 63 THRHR 62 at 65. 
54 De Waal J “Equality and the Constitutional Court” (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 141 at 150. 
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The characterization of the grounds in Harksen55
 
 is instructive to repeat here: 
“What the specified grounds have in common is that they have been used (or 
misused) in the past (both in SA and elsewhere) to categorise, marginalise and often 
oppress persons who have had, or who have been associated with, these attributes 
or characteristics. These grounds have the potential, when manipulated, to demean 
persons in their inherent humanity and dignity. There is often a complex relationship 
between these grounds. In some cases they relate to immutable biological attributes 
or characteristics, in some to the associational life of humans, in some to the 
intellectual, expressive and religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a 
combination of one or more of these features. The temptation to force them into 
neatly self-contained categories should be resisted. Section 8(2) seeks to prevent the 
unequal treatment of persons based on such criteria which may, among other things, 
result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage, such as has occurred only too 
visibly in our history.”56
 
 
In the Harksen57
 
 case, the Court postulated an analysis to determine whether 
differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination. In a further section in the dissertation, 
an analysis of the case will be conducted and therefore, the issues will only be briefly 
touched upon here. 
Section 9(3) contemplates two categories of discrimination, of which each should be 
dealt with differently – listed grounds and analogous grounds. DuToit58 usefully 
summarizes the history of the term “discrimination” in our law, as from the first case 
which dealt with it.59 He also dealt with the interpretation of the term “unfair 
discrimination” by the Constitutional Court in terms of section 9 of the Constitution in 
the Hoffmann60
                                                 
55 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
 matter. In that case, the Court regarded the enquiry as to whether the 
56 Harksen v Lane NO supra at para 49. 
57 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
58 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311. 
59 Raad van Mynvakbonde v Minister van Mannekrag (1983) 4 ILJ 202 (T). 
60 Hoffmann v SA Airways [2000] 12 BLLR 1365 (CC). 
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differentiation (on the unlisted ground of HIV status) amounted to unfair 
discrimination as a single stage test and treated the term as a single concept.  
 
In Harksen61
 
 the Court cautioned against a narrow definition of the attributes and 
characteristics. It would look, in cases of analogous grounds, at whether the 
differentiation is based on attributes comparable to the specified grounds as quoted 
above, which have in common the following three characteristics: misuse in the past 
to categorise and oppress persons; the nature of the discriminating act and the 
purpose sought to be achieved by it; the potential to demean persons in their 
inherent humanity and dignity and having sometimes related to immutable biological 
attributes, or the associational life of humans, or to the intellectual, expressive or 
religious dimensions of humanity or a combination thereof. 
The Constitutional Court clearly has in mind an open-ended process in which it might 
discover over time differentiations analogous to the specified grounds. The section is 
not a numerus clausus. Other factors may emerge over time. The intention is that 
factors and cumulative effects are objectively assessed. Proof of the intention to 
discriminate is not required.  
 
As indicated in Harksen,62
                                                 
61 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
 infringement of dignity will be determined in the context of 
considering the impact of the discrimination on complainant. In order to establish 
context, Court will look at past and vulnerable group membership. It will also look at 
nature of the interest adversely affected by differentiation – the more fundamental the 
interest, the more likely that discrimination will be found to be unfair. The Court 
cannot make a determination in abstract, but must take into account the structural 
inequality in our society which protects and perpetuates the subordination of certain 
individual and groups in a society. The complainant cannot purely rely on injured 
feelings, which would not constitute enough to prove a claim of discrimination. 
62 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
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With regard to the “unfairness” aspect too, if the discrimination is based on a 
specified ground and is thus irrebuttably proved to be discrimination, it will be 
rebuttably presumed that the discrimination is unfair until the contrary is proved. The 
complainant must therefore prove on a balance of probabilities that the differentiation 
is on a specified ground for the irrebuttable presumption to kick in. The duty of the 
respondent then is to rebut the presumption of unfairness and to show that 
discrimination was in fact fair. If the discrimination is not internally justified, then the 
Court may proceed to the section 36 limitations clause enquiry where consideration 
of whether there is a legitimate social purpose proportional to the end sought to be 
achieved will be undertaken.  
 
Where the discrimination is alleged to be on an unlisted ground, the applicant not 
only has to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the discrimination is on an 
analogous ground, but will also have to prove its unfairness. 
 
Albertyn and Goldblatt,63 as well as Kok,64 question the presumption of discrimination 
when differentiation is proved to be on a listed ground. In their view, that approach 
“denudes discrimination of its prejudicial connotations by not requiring that prejudice 
be demonstrated” and “negates the pejorative meaning of “discrimination.” This view 
was, according to them, also held by Sachs J in the Walker case65 where he stated: 
“There must be some element of actual or potential prejudice … immanent in the 
differentiation otherwise there is no discrimination.” It is further pointed out by 
Albertyn and Goldblatt that the Court did recognise in its majority judgment in the 
case, however, that discrimination cannot be presumed. De Vos,66
 
 as pointed out by 
Kok, seems to interpret the Constitutional Court judgments so as to never allow for 
the possibility that differentiation on a listed ground may not constitute discrimination. 
                                                 
63 Albertyn C and Goldblatt B (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 at 268. 
64 Kok A 2001 TSAR 294 at 295. 
65 Pretoria City Council v Walker supra at para 64. 
66 De Vos P 2000 63 THRHR 62 at 71. 
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Fagan67
 
 has argued that the unfair discrimination provision does not create an 
independent right of its own but “merely a procedural mechanism, namely a shift of 
onus.” According to him, the prohibition on discrimination is violated when an 
independent or egalitarian right conferred by one of the provisions of the bill of rights 
is conferred on some but not on others. A necessary and sufficient condition 
therefore for unfair discrimination would be that a differentiating act infringed on an 
independent constitutional right or constitutionally grounded egalitarian principle. He 
is of the view that the section enhances the protection of other fundamental rights.  
Grant and Small68
 
 point out to that the term “on one or more grounds” in the section 
contemplates multiple ground applications. However, since discrimination is assumed 
on a single specified ground, it would be unnecessary to investigate any additional 
grounds. They opine that “if the Court were to persist in that approach, there would 
be little point in relying on multiple grounds, especially if additional grounds are 
unspecified.” In their view “it would lead to an impoverished and one-dimensional 
equality jurisprudence which fails to come to grips with the real experience of the 
victims of discrimination.” 
With regard to direct and indirect discrimination, (which is not defined) it would be 
“direct” when law or conduct is, on the face of it, discriminatory. It would be “indirect” 
when the purpose or effect69 of a law or conduct is discriminatory and where its 
impact disproportionately and negatively impacts a certain group of individuals in 
society. According to Dupper70 the inclusion of both direct and indirect discrimination 
indicates that the concern lies not so much with the form of the conduct complained 
of, but with the consequences and impact thereof. Often indirect discrimination lies in 
administrative application of the statute and not in the law itself.71
 
 
                                                 
67 Fagan A “Dignity & Unfair Discrimination: A value misplaced and a right misunderstood” (1998) 14 SAJHR 
220 at 224. 
68 Grant E and Small J 51 (2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 174 at 183. 
69 Pretoria City Council v Walker at para 41. 
70 Dupper O Essential Employment Discrimination Law at 20. 
71 De Waal J (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 141 at 152. 
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Intent plays no role in determining unfairness, as to require proof of intent would 
place an onerous burden of proof on the applicant in such cases. As pointed out by 
McGregor72
 
  “the pursuit of a laudable end does not  preclude a finding of 
discrimination.” It would be sufficient to show that the purpose or effect of the law or 
measure indirectly discriminates. In another matter the Court held that it is necessary 
for the complainant to establish a causal connection between the law and the indirect 
discrimination suffered by the listed group. The complainant would be required to 
show an actual connection between the law and discriminatory impact and not 
merely that the law is “likely to result” in discrimination. Importantly, the Court insisted 
on judging the constitutionality of a statute with references to the circumstances that 
existed at the time of its adoption, in other words if a law is challenged the Court 
expects the complainant to show a causal connection between the law and the 
discriminatory effect without relying on evidence relating to the implementation of the 
law. The complainant had to show that at the time of its adoption, it was clear that the 
act would have discriminatory effects. It therefore did in fact require the applicant to 
show that the discrimination was intentional.  
In the light of the Walker73 case, however, this result should be avoided. The 
implementation of the law should be challenged before the law itself.74
 
 
Finally, as clarified in the Van Heerden75
 
 case, the Constitutional Court has held that 
an affirmative action measure that passes muster under section 9(2) cannot amount 
to unfair discrimination under section 9(3). 
“(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.” 
                                                 
72 McGregor M “An Overview of Employment Discrimination Case Law” (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 157 at 171. 
73 Pretoria City Council v Walker supra. 
74 De Waal J (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 141 at 153. 
75 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden [2004]12 BLLR 1181 (CC) 
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This section of the equality clause clearly further extends the applicability of the 
provisions in proving for horizontal application thereof. It also envisages that 
Parliament shall prepare national legislation to give effect to and to regulate the rights 
in the clause.  
 
“(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.” 
 
It is in this section of the clause that the presumption of unfairness arises when 
differentiation is established as being based on a listed ground. It pertains to both 
direct and indirect discrimination. Once discrimination has been established, the onus 
shift and the defendant must therefore then attempt to establish that that 
discrimination was not unfair.  
 
It has been pointed put that the shifting onus, aids complainants. Very real problems 
exist in establishing even a prima facie case. However, problems do remain 
concerning exactly when the onus shifts.  
 
However, an affirmative action measure cannot, according to the Van Heerden76 
judgment, attract this presumption of unfairness, but must merely pass muster under 
section 9(2). According to Brickhill77 therefore, restitutionary measures should rather 
be approached under section 9(2) as outlined in the Van Heerden78
 
 case, than be 
treated as constitutionally suspicious under section 9(3) and presumed unfair under 
section 9(5). 
Kok79 points out that a burden of rebuttal is seemingly something less than a full 
onus. He refers to Schmidt80
                                                 
76 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
 in support of that contention, but notes that other 
authors disagree, requiring the respondent to prove that the discrimination is not 
77 Brickhill J (2006) 27 ILJ 2004 at 2012. 
78 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
79 Kok A 2001 TSAR 294 at 301. 
80 Schmidt Bewysreg (1990) at 41 – 42. 
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unfair and believe that neither onus nor burden of proof seem appropriate in 
constitutional litigation and that a better term might be the American “showing.” In 
any event, it is viewed by Kok that both parties have to present legal argument as in 
constitutional matters the facts are rarely in dispute. 
 
2.2 DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION) CONVENTION, 
(NO 111) 
 
Three months after the final Constitution took effect in February 1997, South Africa 
ratified the ILO Convention 111 of 1958. However, its impact on our labour 
jurisprudence was evident well before then. “Informally, international labour 
standards were influential during the 1980’s when the Industrial Court developed its 
unfair labour practice jurisprudence. The Court frequently referred to ILO conventions 
and recommendations.”81
 
 
Conventions are not automatically binding and the ILO’s constitution provides that a 
member state may voluntary ratify a convention. Once that is done, as it was in 
South Africa with Convention 111, the state is obliged to take action to give effect to 
the provisions of that convention e.g. through legislation. When South Africa adopted 
the Convention it committed to enacting legislation to promote equality of opportunity 
in employment and the elimination of discrimination in respect thereof. As a result, 
the EEA was enacted. 
 
Convention 111 is known as one of the eight “core” standards identified by the ILO 
and establishes minimum standards in relation to discrimination in the employment 
field. 
 
Our Constitution accords international law special status and requires the 
consideration and regard thereof when interpreting legislation – specifically so in the 
case of the Bill of Rights. Section 233 of the Constitution reads: “When interpreting 
                                                 
81 Van Niekerk A et al “Law @ Work” (2008) at 19. 
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any legislation, every Court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.” 
 
From its commencement, the Industrial Court was consistently guided by the 
meaning of discrimination as ascribed to it in international law. As pointed out by Du 
Toit,82
 
 the convention was “a point of reference in defining discriminatory conduct 
amounting to an unfair labour practice.” 
The Convention defines discrimination as including “any distinction, exclusion or 
preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation.” The wording is clearly 
consistent with the interpretation of our Courts in general.  
 
Article 1 section 1(2) further states: “Any distinction, exclusion or preference in 
respect of a particular job based in the inherent requirements thereof is not deemed 
to be discrimination.” (My emphasis). Du Toit83
 
 comments that affirmative action 
measures and measures dictated by the inherent requirements of a job, interpreted in 
compliance with the convention are not instances of “fair discrimination, but are 
altogether excluded from the ambit of “discrimination, whether “fair” or otherwise. 
These measures therefore derive their authority from statute and are sanctioned by 
Convention 111. 
2.3 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT84
 
  
Discrimination on the basis of sex, race or colour was already outlawed in 1981 by 
amendments to the LRA of 1956 as well as the Wage Act.85
                                                 
82 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1315. 
  
83 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1328. 
84 66 of 1995 (Hereinafter referred to as the LRA). 
85 5 of 1957. 
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“Unfair discrimination” as opposed to “discrimination” was introduced in the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act of 1988 where it was defined as follows:  
 
“ ‘[U]nfair labour practice’ means any act or omission which in an unfair manner 
infringes or impairs the labour relations between an employer and employee, and 
shall include …  
 
the unfair discrimination by any employer against any employee solely on the 
grounds of race, sex or creed.” 
 
Of concern at the time was the introduction of the word “unfair” which gave rise to 
speculation that the legislature was trying to permit employers to discriminate where 
the Court considered it “fair” to do so. The concern proved unfounded. This 
controversial provision was, however, repealed in 1991 and the pre-1988 provisions 
restored. 
 
The Labour Court continued the process and by the time the EEA came into effect 
the meaning of unfair discrimination was clear. According to Du Toit,86
 
 what 
remained to be clarified “was a proper and consistent formulation of what that 
concept embodied” as well as the use of consistent terminology in that regard. 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”) was the centrepiece in the 
government’s five-year program to restructure and reform South Africa’s labour laws. 
It abandoned the open-ended unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court 
and redefined the term “unfair labour practice”.  
It contains a number of provisions dealing with discrimination: 
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Section 187(1) 
 
(1) ”A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer in dismissing the employee 
acts contrary to section 5 or if the reason for the dismissal is- 
… 
(e) the employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to her 
pregnancy 
… 
(f) that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, 
on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility. 
… 
Section 187(2) 
 
Despite subsection (1)(f)- 
 
a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on an inherent 
requirement of the particular job; 
a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or agreed 
retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.” 
 
Before it was repealed by the Employment Equity Act on 9 August 1999, schedule 7 
item 2(1)(a) of the LRA prohibited discrimination against employees, except for 
discriminatory dismissals. Importantly, applicants for work also received protection 
against discrimination under that section. It contained as the core of the residual 
unfair labour practice definition the prohibition of “unfair discrimination, either directly 
or indirectly, against an employee on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited 
to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or 
family responsibility.” 
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It is important to note that the Act did not define “unfair” or “arbitrary”. It was 
remarked at the time87
 
 that the term “unfair” in the context appeared to refer to the 
effect of the discrimination on the employee and that the term “arbitrary” implied a 
test as to whether the reason for the discrimination was sufficiently related to the 
“protectable interests” of the employer. 
Item 2(2)(b) provided that an employer “is not prevented from adopting or 
implementing employment policies and practices that are designed to achieve the 
adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.” 
 
A number of significant judgments dealing with the term “unfair discrimination” 
emanated from the Labour Court during the short period of time Item 2(1)(a) was 
applicable, however, the judgments were often inconsistent, the terminology used 
diverse and confusing, and the meaning of “unfair discrimination” has to be gleaned 
from an overview of the case law at the time. 
 
As remarked by Dupper,88
 
 there was a “tight fit” between the anti-discrimination 
provisions in the LRA, the Schedule and the equality provisions of the Constitution. 
Support for the notion of substantive equality, the prohibition of both direct and 
indirect discrimination, as well as the provisions relating to affirmative action 
measures and inherent job requirements as justification grounds were apparent. 
Cooper mentions the following areas of concern regarding labour law jurisprudence 
on unfair discrimination:89
                                                 
87 Du Toit D et al The Labour Relations Act of 1995 – a Comprehensive Guide, 2nd Ed Butterworths (1998) 
Durban 432. 
 By the year 2001 it lacked coherence and clarity; the Court 
had a diverse approach to constitutional jurisprudence and its role in shaping labour 
law; sometimes only cognisance of the constitutional unfair discrimination test was 
88 Dupper O Essential Employment Discrimination Law 22. 
89 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121 at 129. 
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taken and in other instances the test was followed closely; sometimes the 
commercial needs of the employer were privileged. In all it appeared at that stage as 
if there was still uncertainty as to the degree to which constitutional jurisprudence 
should influence labour law. It has to be pointed out, however, that in labour law the 
approach to the establishment of grounds of discrimination was complicated at the 
time by the requirement that they be “arbitrary”. 
 
A further very important difference between the Constitutional Court and the Labour 
Court has been in their analysis of justification for discriminatory conduct. For the 
Constitutional Court the impact on the individual and his dignity has been of primary 
importance. The Labour Court had neglected, according to Cooper,90
 
 “properly to 
interrogate the impact of the conduct on the employee and to allow commercial 
reasons for the impugned conduct to outweigh employee interests.” 
Dikgang Moseneke, Judge of the Pretoria High Court (as he then was), stated during 
his delivery of the Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture in 2002,91
 
 that: “Until 1994, 
the South African legal culture has been homogenous, conservative and predictable 
… Courts should search for substantive justice which is to be inferred from the 
foundational values of the Constitution. After al that is the injunction of the 
Constitution – transformation. Central to that transformation is the achievement of 
equality. An egalitarian society would not be possible unless there is a total 
reconstruction of the power relations in society … Transformative jurisprudence 
would support commitment to substantive equality.” 
2.4 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
The preamble to the act describes the purposes thereof “to promote the constitutional 
right of equality and the exercise of true democracy, to eliminate unfair discrimination 
in employment, to ensure the implementation of employment equity to redress the 
                                                 
90 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121 at 139. 
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effects of discrimination, to achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative of our 
people, to promote economic development and efficiency in the workforce and to 
give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a member of the International Labour 
Organization. The purpose of the EEA is further set out in Section 2 as being the 
promotion of equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and the implementation of affirmative action 
measures to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated 
groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce. 
  
All the above suggests that the main thrust of the act is transformative in nature and 
the end goal is the achievement of substantive equality – nothing more and nothing 
less and that steps taken and measures employed to achieve the objectives should 
be proportionate to the goal. 
 
Cooper92
 
 notes that the purpose of the act places it more centrally within the notion 
of equality as developed by the Constitutional Court, although the wording of the 
provision does not specifically state as an objective, the giving of effect to the 
constitutional equality right. The notion of substantive equality is, however, explicitly 
stated in the definition of affirmative action in section 15(10 of the act, as one of its 
goals.  
Section 3 states that the act must be interpreted in compliance with the constitution 
so as to give effect to its purpose and also in compliance with the international law 
obligations of South Africa, in particular those contained in the ILO Convention 111. 
The EEA consists of two main parts. The first (Chapter 2) replaces and refines item 
2(1)(a) of schedule 7 of the LRA and the second (Chapter )imposes an obligation on 
designated employers to adopt and implement affirmative action programmes. 
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Chapter 2 of the act applies to all employees and employers as envisaged in the LRA 
and chapter 3, only to designated employers and people from designated groups. 
Importantly, through the provisions of section 9 applicants for employment are also 
included in respect of sections 6, 7 and 8 of the act. 
 
Section 5 of Chapter 2 contains the prohibition of unfair discrimination which derives 
from the basic right to equal protection and benefit of the law contained in Section 9 
of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional injunction that national legislation 
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. It reads as follows:  
 
“Every employer must take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by 
eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.” The extent of 
the positive measures to be taken, however, has been the subject of some 
controversy. The fact too, that section 5 states that employers must take steps to 
promote equal effort by eliminating unfair discrimination in policies and practices 
implies proactive action by an employer and militates against passivity until actual 
disputes are declared. Garbers93
 
 is of the view that the absence of action in 
anticipation may well found liability. 
Section 6 contains the prohibition of unfair discrimination and reads as follows: 
 
“(1) No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility,  ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth. 
 
It is not unfair discrimination to- 
take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or 
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distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a 
job. 
 
Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited on 
any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1). 
 
A non-exhaustive list of nineteen grounds is provided. To the sixteen grounds listed 
in the Constitution, the EEA adds three – family responsibility, HIV status and political 
opinion. 
 
Garbers94
 
 postulates that the omission of the term “arbitrary” in the prohibition implies 
that an alleged ground must be specified in order to determine whether it is 
analogous and comparable to any of the listed grounds – as is required in cases 
contemplated by the constitutional prohibition.  
Grogan,95
 
 however, is of the view that the question as to whether the criterion relied 
upon must be analogous to a listed ground or whether it need merely be “arbitrary” 
and unjustifiable, is still unclear. He points out that if they have to be analogous, 
grounds such as “nepotism and “cronyism” would therefore not, without more, be 
linked to one of the listed grounds and would, as a result, not be embraced by 
section 6 of the Constitution.  
McGregor96 is of the opinion, that unlisted grounds must be analogous to the listed 
grounds and that they should not have “a life of their own”, unrelated to impairment of 
dignity. This, she contends, would be in violation of the basic requirements set out in 
the Harksen97
 
 test.  
                                                 
94 Garbers C (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 136 at 144. 
95 Grogan J Workplace Law, 9th Ed at 280. 
96 McGregor M (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 157 at 170. 
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Cooper98 views the omission of the word “arbitrary” as wise and proposes that the 
common denominator of the grounds – listed and unlisted – should be ”that the 
grounds are constitutive of human identity, and if manipulated, are capable of 
undermining an employee’s worth and value or his or her treatment as an equal or of 
causing harm in a comparably serious manner.  In another paper,99
 
 Cooper states 
that the omission of the term “arbitrary” places it beyond doubt that labour law should 
follow the constitutional approach, with important consequences for the interpretation 
of “unfair discrimination” and meaning in fact that the range of conduct that will be 
proscribed would be narrower than when discrimination was still part of the LRA’s 
unfair labour practice regime. 
McGregor100
 
 argues that there is no reason why an equality rights analysis is 
incapable of applicability to the labour field or that the employment context requires a 
different kind of approach. As far as determining unfairness is concerned, she states 
that in balancing the rights of employers and employees at this stage of an analysis 
into fairness, the Court could neglect to properly interrogate the impact of the conduct 
on the employee and to allow commercial reasons to outweigh employee interests. 
Du Toit101
                                                 
98 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121 at 138. 
 has contended that there has been lack of clarity in our labour law with 
regard to the relationship between a statutory provision and its underlying 
constitutional mandate in respect of the interpretation of statutory limitations on basic 
constitutional rights and the reliance to be placed on legislation giving effect to basic 
rights. He also argues that many Labour Court judgements have relied heavily on 
interpretations of section 9 of the constitution on the apparent assumption that such 
decisions are equally and directly applicable in the employment context and in 
section 6 of the EEA. He points out that the sections are not identical in the sense 
that the EEA is premised on the realities of the world of work, especially in regulating 
the defences available to an employer more precisely and more strictly than would be 
99 Cooper C (2004) 25 ILJ 813 at 825. 
100 McGregor M (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 157 at 170. 
101 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1311. 
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possible or appropriate at the level of constitutional rule-making. He further states 
that the provisions of the EEA must be interpreted in compliance with the ILO 
Convention 111 and that “viewing the prohibition contained in s6 exclusively through 
the prism of S9 would thus obscure an important part of its meaning; it would (in the 
language of the Constitutional Court) bypass the legislation by seeking to construe 
the statutory prohibition on the basis of the constitutional provision that is being given 
effect to by the legislation, and to that extent is impermissible.”102 He states that 
interpreting the EEA in compliance with Convention 111, it must be concluded that 
the term “unfair discrimination” in section 6 “signifies nothing less, or more, than the 
term “discrimination” (on prohibited grounds) in Convention 111. “Unfair” in other 
words, emerges as an adjective describing the open-ended range of discriminatory 
grounds listed and unlisted, that are or might be prohibited in terms of section 6.”103
 
 
Ngcobo J,104
 
 however, has said: “Our Constitution is unique in constitutionalizing the 
right to fair labour practice. But the concept is not defined in the Constitution. The 
concept of fair labour practice is incapable of precise definition. The problem is 
compounded by the tension between the interests of the workers and the interests of 
the employers that is inherent in labour relations. Indeed, what is fair depends upon 
the circumstances of a particular case and essentially involves a value judgment. It is 
therefore neither necessary nor desirable to define this concept.” It is submitted that 
for the stated reasons, Ngcobo is indicating that the employment context is unique 
and specialized and may very well require different measures to effect fair outcomes. 
For that very reason, specific legislative enactments have been drafted to deal with 
employment related disputes as required by the constitution itself. 
Nevertheless, the judgment in Van Heerden105
                                                 
102 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1313. 
 emphatically states that affirmative 
action measures are not a derogation from equality but a substantive component 
thereof. Courts are instructed that whenever they interpret the law, they should do so 
103 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1331. 
104 In NEHAWU v UCT (2003) 24 ILJ 905 (CC) at para 33. 
105 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
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with a clear understanding that affirmative action measures are part and parcel of the 
right to equality and should be interpreted as such. To not do so would produce an 
absurd result. There can be no clearer indication that in affirmative action cases, 
interpretation should therefore be guided by Constitutional Court precedent and 
guidelines. 
 
It has been held106
 
 that although the phrase “act or omission” is not used in section 6, 
it may be read into the term “employment policy or practice” as used in section 6 on 
the basis that it is in fact used in section 10(2) in describing the subject matter of a 
dispute about unfair discrimination. 
Section 6 does not speak of an “employer”, but of “no person.” This indicates that the 
prohibition is not merely restricted to “employers” and would include other 
employees, colleagues, and persons related to the complainant in his/her broader 
employment environment. McGregor107
 
 is of the view though that such a party would 
have to be one that can apply policies or practices because section 6 clarifies that 
discrimination in policies and practices is what is outlawed. 
The exact meaning of the term “unfair discrimination” in specifically the context of the 
EEA and employment has been the subject of much debate in the light of the 
definition thereof contained in ILO Convention 111 and that given to it by our 
Constitutional Court. The distinction between “differentiation” and “discrimination” too 
has also not been clarified adequately. Du Toit, in reviewing the judgment in the 
Hoffmann v SA Airways108 matter submits that the approach of the Court in that case 
was “a model of clarity which avoids the complexities encountered”109
                                                 
106 NUMSA v Gabriels (Pty) Ltd [2002] 12 BLLR 1210 (LC) at par 47. 
 in other 
judgments by treating “unfair discrimination” as a single concept. He points out that 
the ILO Convention 111 only concerns itself with discrimination that is impermissible, 
demeaning or subversive of human dignity. It takes only cognizance of “unfair 
107 McGregor M (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 157. 
108 Hoffmann v SA Airways supra. 
109 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at 1323. 
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discrimination.” This issue, being central to the subject matter of this dissertation, will 
be addressed more fully below. 
 
With regard to the elaborate provision (now repealed) which was contained in Item 
2(2)(b) relating to measures designed to achieve adequate protection and 
advancement of the disadvantaged, the EEA has replaced the item with section 
6(2)(a). The specific omission of the words “designed to” appear to indicate that the 
existence of a policy or plan no longer seems a pre-requisite for affirmative action 
measures to be deemed valid. 
 
Section 11 of the EEA provides that whenever unfair discrimination is alleged, the 
employer against whom the allegation is made must establish that it is fair. However, 
as opposed to claims brought in terms of the Constitution and the manner in which it 
has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court, the EEA seems to provide for the 
onus to shift, also in cases where the allegation is not based on a listed ground. It 
appears therefore that the provision is in conflict with that provided for claims based 
on the Constitution. McGregor110 however is of the view that, as provided for in 
constitutional matters, where an applicant tries to establish a case on an unlisted 
ground in terms of the EEA, he has to prove not only the discrimination, but also its 
unfairness. Cooper111
 
 submits that by shifting the onus, the legislature has 
“reinforced the notion that any ground of discrimination has the ability to harm the 
employee or impair his dignity and therefore that the employer must accept the 
responsibility of proving that the actions are not unfair.” 
Garbers112
 
 maintains that the “broad sweep” of the obligation on designated 
employers to implement affirmative action “will remove many a (potential) complaint 
of unfair discrimination from the sphere of litigation.” 
                                                 
110 McGregor M (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 157 at 175. 
111 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121 at 145. 
112 Garbers C (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 136 at 140. 
  
 
 
 39 
Given the difficulties of proving a discrimination claim, especially in so far as the 
availability of proof is concerned, (more so in cases of indirect discrimination) the fact 
that information sharing and disclosure is part of the consultative processes at the 
workplace envisaged by the act (in sections 21,22 and 25), applicants may very well 
be enabled to properly consider their prospects and access relevant information. 
 
It is also pointed out by Garbers113
 
 that the EEA does not differentiate between direct 
and indirect discrimination in so far as the available grounds for justification is 
concerned – in contrast with the United Kingdom and the United States where more 
stringent justification tests are imposed on employers in cases of direct 
discrimination. However, he points out that: “the defence of an inherent requirement 
of the job shows a close resemblance to the stricter tests in America and Britain.” 
Indirect discrimination in policy or practice at the workplace and proof of disparate 
impact may very well prove difficult to identify and substantiate. However, Garbers,114 
referring to comments by Dupper,115 believes that the requirement should not 
constitute a problem as the use of the words “policy” and “practice” “already implies a 
broad approach” and an emphasis on decision-making. Furthermore, the definition of 
the terms is not exhaustive, providing the flexibility to complainants to identify 
particular offending provisions or conditions. The fact that the provision refers 
specifically to discrimination in an employment “policy” or “practice” demarcates the 
scope of the prohibition for purposes of the act, but as McGregor points out, the 
definition of policies and practices raises a number of questions e.g. does a once off 
decision by an employer qualify? She also refers to Dupper116
 
 in support of the view 
that the definition is flexibly worded to give effect to the EEA outlawing discriminatory 
decision-making in the workplace rather than only within formal policies or practices. 
A practice can be founded on a single act or omission. 
                                                 
113 Garbers C (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 136 at 144. 
114 Garbers C (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 136 at 145. 
115 Dupper O “Disparate Impact and Substantive Justice: The Lessons of comparative discrimination law for SA 
(unpublished doctoral thesis” Harvard Law School (1999) at 243 – 247. 
116 Dupper O Harvard Law School (1999) at 243 – 247. 
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Grogan117
 
 also raises the issue of efficiency. He points out that apart from a fleeting 
reference to efficiency in the objectives and purpose of the act, its provisions do not 
deal with how efficiency must be reconciled with representivity or how much weight is 
to be attached to either concept if they happen to clash. Case law shows that there 
are indeed limits to a defence of affirmative action and that the constitutional 
obligation of efficiency, at least in the public service, must not be undermined through 
irrational pursuit of other objectives, such as representivity. The question is one of 
relativity. 
A question which still remains to be finally answered is whether an employee has an 
enforceable right against an employer for allegedly failing to consider its obligations 
to affirmative action under the EEA and also whether the employer’s failure to 
consider specific affirmative action measures to retain an employee who was 
“suitably qualified” in the context of a retrenchment would offend the provisions of the 
EEA. This issue, it has been remarked by Rycroft,118
 
 “has a significance and history 
beyond South Africa” 
He also remarked119
 
 with reference to the EEA: “What appears to be happening is 
that the intentions of that Act are being diluted in the adjudicative process. Whilst this 
interpretative role of the judicial or arbitral process is ordinarily seen as an important 
one, the social and political implications of this will play out in the years to come.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Grogan J Workplace Law, 9th Ed at page 285. 
118 Rycroft A “Affirmative Action in Retrenchment: Thekiso v IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd” (2007) 28 ILJ 81 at 
85. 
119 Rycroft A (2007) 28 ILJ 81 at 1429. 
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2.5 THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION ACT120
 
  
PEPUDA (the provisions of which take precedence over any other act, other than the 
Constitution)121 was enacted in 2000, flowing from the Constitution’s section 9(4) and 
the dictate contained therein. PEPUDA came into effect on 16 June 2003. As is the 
case with the EEA, it was also enacted to promote equality and prevent unfair 
discrimination. Pursuant to the enactment, there was much controversy about the 
act, but according to Kok122
 
 the controversy was misplaced as “there is nothing that 
the constitution does not cater for” contained in the act. 
PEPUDA defines discrimination as: 
 
“Any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation 
which directly or indirectly: 
 
imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or 
withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from,  
 
any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.” 
 
The prohibited grounds contained in PEPUDA are the following:  
 
“race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth; or 
 
any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground 
causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
undermines human dignity; or 
                                                 
120 4 of 2000 hereinafter referred to as PEPUDA. 
121 At section 5(2). 
122 Kok A 2001 TSAR 294 at 294. 
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adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious 
manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a).” 
 
It is apparent that the definition of discrimination has been extracted from 
Constitutional Court judgments. The test contained in subparagraph (b) is “slightly 
wider”123 than that proposed in the Harksen124
 
 matter. 
PEPUDA applies to all spheres of social activity, but specifically does not apply to 
any person to whom and the extent to which the EEA applies. This provision seems 
to mean that those employees excluded from the EEA e.g. members of the services, 
would be able to utilize PEPUDA with regard to workplace unfair discrimination 
claims. Independent contractors too, would be included. Chapter 3 of the EEA only 
applies to “designated” employers and their employees. Employees working for non-
designated employers, it seems, would therefore have recourse to PEPUDA as well 
in respect of aspects of the EEA from which they are excluded.  
 
It is this area – the extent to which the EEA applies – which may very well lead to 
confusion. 
 
PEPUDA contains very detailed provisions relating to unfair discrimination – more so 
than the EEA. PEPUDA states that the discrimination complained of must be of a 
pejorative nature and could involve any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, 
practice, condition or situation which directly or indirectly imposes burdens, 
obligations or disadvantages on, or withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages 
from any person on one or more of the listed or unlisted grounds of discrimination. 
However, the provisions contained in the EEA, whilst not this detailed, are open-
ended and capable of interpretation to provide a similar end. 
 
                                                 
123 Kok A 2001 TSAR 294 at 295. 
124 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
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With regard to the listed grounds, the EEA has nineteen whereas PEPUDA contains 
only the sixteen also contained in the Constitution. However, section 34 of PEPUDA 
requires that HIV status, family responsibility, family status, nationality and socio-
economic status must be given special consideration for inclusion in the general list 
of prohibited grounds. Despite that, in both the acts the lists of prohibited grounds are 
open-ended. Kok125
 
 expresses the view that it would have been preferable to include 
the grounds in the definition of “prohibited grounds” rather than to have dealt with 
them via a directive principle 
PEPUDA gives a detailed description of the grounds of race, gender and disability 
and also provides a detailed list (informative and exemplary in nature) of 
discriminatory practices, many of which relate to workplaces. 
 
PEPUDA also provides the criteria to be taken into account in weighing up fairness. 
The list is extensive and includes elements of the constitutional test for fairness, as 
well as an enquiry into whether the discrimination justifiably differentiates between 
people according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the job concerned. It 
is anticipated that those factors may very well form part of the weighing up of fairness 
in matters based on the EEA. 
 
Cooper and Lagrange126 expressed concern regarding the importance of the 
development of a “coherent” labour jurisprudence. They submit that it would be 
important for section 5(3) of PEPUDA to be interpreted in a manner which would 
ensure that coherence, and for it to be clarified which forum would have the 
jurisdiction to define the scope of that provision. They also express concern about the 
possibility that “differences of interpretation of fairness between the two acts may 
emerge in relation to the nature and scope of economic arguments.”127
 
 
                                                 
125 Kok A 2001 TSAR 294 at page 295. 
126 Cooper C and Lagrange R “The Application of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act and the Employment Equity Act” (2001) 22 ILJ 1532 at 1533. 
127 Cooper C and Lagrange R (2001) 22 ILJ 1532 at 1539. 
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In respect of affirmative action, the EEA, geared specifically at the workplace, deals 
much more in detail and depth with the subject and supports the notion that PEPUDA 
does not play a major role in that regard. However, PEPUDA provides at Section 
14(1): 
 
“It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the 
members of such groups or categories of persons.” 
 
It further provides the following at section 14(2): 
 
“In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair, the 
following must be taken into account: 
 
the context; 
the factors referred to in subsection (3); 
whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons 
according to objectively determinable criteria intrinsic to the activity to the activity 
concerned.” 
 
Section 14(3) reads as follows: 
 
The factors referred to in subsection (2)(b) include the following: 
 
Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; 
the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns 
of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of 
disadvantage; 
the nature and extent of the discrimination; 
whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
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whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
whether there are less restrictive and less advantageous means to achieve the 
purpose; 
whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being 
reasonable in the circumstances to –  
address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of the 
prohibited grounds; or 
accommodate diversity.” 
  
A further issue pointed out by Cooper and Lagrange128
 
 is the fact that PEPUDA’s 
provisions on the promotion of equality are not as detailed as is the case in the EEA. 
It merely places a general responsibility of the State and all persons to promote 
equality. However, the issue, especially where the State is concerned, has already 
been addressed by the provisions of the EEA. Similarly, Section 27(2) of PEPUDA 
places an obligation on the state to develop regulations and other measures to 
promote equality. However, this is qualified through the statement that it would be 
required only where appropriate. 
With regard to evidence to be led, PEPUDA expects less from an applicant than is 
expected in terms of the constitution. The applicant need only make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination before the onus shifts to the respondent. 
 
It is imperative to note that the legislature chose not to draft one omnibus piece of 
equality or anti-discrimination legislation. As has been seen, it has followed a 
fragmented route, with several pieces of legislation dealing with the issue – the 
Constitution itself, the Labour Relations Acts, the Employment Equity Act and the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act. However, it is 
important that, with international developments in equality jurisprudence, our 
international law obligations (in particular in this context the ILO Constitution 111 of 
                                                 
128 Cooper C and Lagrange R (2001) 22 ILJ 1532 at 1543. 
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1958) and parallel legislation, there must be a convergence between all the sources 
in order to ensure a coherent body of law governing equality and anti-discrimination 
issues. No individual piece of relevant legislation must be studied in isolation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PRE-HARKSEN 
 
Having reviewed the legislative framework within which our courts have had to deal 
with matters relating to discrimination and affirmative action, the manner in which this 
was done prior to Harksen129
 
 forms the subject matter of this chapter. 
It is important that case law relating to affirmative action is not reviewed in isolation 
as it emanates directly from and is inextricably linked to the ideal of equality and non-
discrimination. Therefore, cases relating to matters concerning discrimination are 
also reviewed. 
 
In the days prior to the new democratic dispensation, the country was characterized 
by a deeply polarized society. Discrimination and inequality were the most pertinent 
aspects of that polarization. It is a well recorded fact that the political scenario 
negatively impacted on the functioning of the legal system and the application of the 
law, but it is also a fact that in the sphere of industrial relations and labour law, 
positive developments and the application of egalitarian and democratic notions 
preceded similar changes in the socio-political sphere and significantly impacted 
upon the transformation process in general, but more specifically, on the content of 
eventual human- and labour rights legislation which were enacted after the adoption 
of our Constitution. 
 
Despite the generally positive developments in the field of labour law and 
discrimination after the Wiehahn Commission130
                                                 
129 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
 in the late Seventies, the heritage of 
the past clearly played a significant role during the transition period. Courts had to 
grapple with competing influences of the past, principles which up to that time had 
130 Wiehahn Commission of Enquiry 1977. 
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simply been ignored by the legislature and hardly ever even mentioned in judgments, 
as well as new values and principles of the future. 
Discrimination was dealt with initially, as will be seen, under the Industrial Court’s 
unfair labour practice jurisdiction, which evolved through a case by case analysis as 
to whether alleged discrimination constituted an unfair labour practice.  
 
3.1 Raad van Mynvakbonde v Minister van Mannekrag 
 
The matter Raad van Mynvakbonde131
 
 in which judgment was delivered during 1983, 
was a very early case dealing with the issue of discrimination in the context of the 
payment of sick leave for the first three days of illness. The granting of leave was at 
the discretion of the mine manager which resulted in mine officials being paid from 
the first day of illness whereas union members were not. It was alleged that often 
times no discretion was exercised by mine managers and that the issue constituted 
an unfair labour practice because of alleged discrimination between members of the 
trade union and officials at the mines. 
The respondent indicated that the dispute was purely one about an improvement in 
conditions of employment, not an unfair labour practice.  The matter had been the 
subject of negotiation and an agreement was reached that union members would not 
qualify for sick leave for the first three days.  
 
The Court held that any “differentiation” in terms and conditions of employment could 
not, without more, be classified as unfair. 
 
The case was decided at the time in terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 as 
amended. The definition of an unfair labour practice then provided for the “impact” of 
an alleged unfair labour practice to be assessed. 
 
                                                 
131 Raad van Mynvakbonde v Minister van Mannekrag supra. 
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The Court also considered the intention of the parties as a factor in deciding whether 
or not less favourable conditions of service in the case of one group of employees 
would constitute discrimination and therefore an unfair labour practice. It held that 
conditions of service of one particular group may inevitably differ in certain respects 
from those of another group in the same industry because of differing work 
circumstances and duties. Today of course, intention plays no role in determining 
fairness or otherwise of a discriminatory action. 
 
The test used by the Court to determine as whether a labour practice was unfair was 
to consider whether there was any injustice, prejudice, jeopardy or detriment in the 
given circumstances. It concluded that in that instance, the differentiation did not 
constitute an unfair labour practice. It is important to note that at that time, impact of 
an action was viewed as important, as it is still today. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Court did not refer at all to the very important Article 1.2 of ILO 
Convention 98 which viewed acts calculated to cause prejudice by virtue of union 
membership as discriminatory and unfair. Clearly, since South Africa was not a 
member of the ILO at the time and not bound by the ILO’s Conventions and 
Recommendations, that was probably the reason for no reference to those 
instruments. 
 
3.2 MAWU v Minister of Manpower 1983 (3) SA 238 
 
Another early important case, also dealt with in 1983 was MAWU v Minister of 
Manpower.132
                                                 
132 MAWU v Minister of Manpower 1983 (3) SA 238. 
 The question to be decided was whether the Labour Relations Act 28 
of 1956 as amended permitted the registration of a trade union on a sectional or 
racial basis. The registrar could limit the “interests” for which a union was to be 
registered to a class of employees identified by race, provided that such employees 
had industrial interests in common which were distinct from interests of other 
employees. 
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The Court found that mere difference in race did not justify the inference that each 
race had different industrial interests. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
industrial interests would be taken to be common to all employees, irrespective of 
race.  
 
Consequently, the Court held that uniracial registration could not be granted on the 
basis of race alone. 
 
3.3 SACWU v Sentrachem (1988) 9 ILJ 410 (IC) 
A matter which received widespread public attention and consequent debate was 
that of SACWU v Sentrachem.133
 
 It concerned alleged wage discrimination based on 
race. Employees doing the same work were discriminated against in pay by race 
resulting in a situation where, in some cases, whites were earning twice as much as 
their colleagues of other races. It was found to be an unfair labour practice because 
any differentiation, if based on any criteria other than skill, would be unfair.  
Remarkably, despite the fact that at the time there was no prohibition against 
discriminatory wage policies, the Industrial Court would not accept it and supported 
its findings by referring to the Wiehahn report: “There is no doubt that wage 
discrimination based on race or any other differences between the workers 
concerned, other than their skills and experience, is an unfair labour practice.”134
 
 
Furthermore, the Court referred to ILO Convention 111 and for the first time there 
was established, through the utilization of and reference to the ILO Convention, a 
general framework for identifying prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
 
Upon reading the judgment, it seems clear that the basis of the decision is reflected 
in the following: “Discrimination has both a pejorative and a non-pejorative sense - 
                                                 
133 SACWU v Sentrachem (1988) 9 ILJ  410 (IC). 
134 SACWU v Sentrachem supra. 
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the adjective ‘unfair’ settles the ambiguity. Not all forms of discrimination are 
prohibited. Employment is replete with distinctions made in the criteria for hiring, 
training, treatment, promotion and termination. Only the unacceptable face of 
discrimination is targeted by this unfair labour practice. The distinction between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of discrimination is premised in comparative 
labour law on the inherent requirements of the particular job.” 
 
The judgment also reflects that counsel for the applicant actually made very useful 
submissions in assisting the Court to arrive at a decision, e.g. referring to ILO 
Convention 111 of 1958 and its definition of unfair discrimination, also referring to the 
Wiehahn Commission and that the conventions and recommendations of the ILO 
would be useful guidelines in developing domestic labour legislation. Counsel also 
pointed out the Wiehahn Commission enjoined the State, employers and employees 
neither to practice nor allow discrimination or inequality in the field of labour and that 
the Commission had recommended that practices based on the principles of non-
discrimination and equality be accepted and implemented. 
 
The matter was subsequently taken on review to the Supreme Court135 which, in 
respect of the acceptance of the “equal pay” principle, categorically affirmed per 
Coetzee J: “It was common cause between the parties that any practice in which a 
black person is paid a different wage than a white person doing the same job having 
the same length of service, qualifications and skills is a labour practice of wage 
discrimination based on race and it constitutes an unfair labour practice. Like them I 
have no doubt that that is a correct exposition of the law.”136
 
 It was clear that any 
difference in pay between white and black would be unfair if they had the same level 
of seniority, qualification or skills. It was also pointed out that a difference in pay 
would not be unfair if such difference was justified by a relevant reason, such as 
length of service, skill, qualification or productivity. 
                                                 
135 Sentrachem v John NO (1989) 10 ILJ 249 (T). 
136 Sentrachem v John NO supra at 253. 
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It is correct that the Sentrachem137 decisions serve as authority for the principle of 
equal pay for equal work in South Africa. Meintjes-Van der Walt138
 
 warns, however, 
that the definition limits its own application because it does not cater for occupations 
where certain groups e.g. blacks or women predominate. In such situations and 
occupations downward pressure is exercised on wages. Therefore “equal pay for 
equal work” does not overcome discrimination in a situation where there is a 
concentration of women in jobs considered to be typically female or typically black. In 
those situations there may simply be no comparator with which to prove wage 
discrimination.  
3.4 Chamber of Mines of SA v Council of Mining Unions (1990) 11 ILJ 52 (IC) 
 
The matter Chamber of Mines of SA v Council of Mining Unions139
 
  was decided on 
the then “new” (but short lived) definition of Unfair Labour Practice which came into 
effect on 1 September 1988, and which at par (i) of Section 1 of that Act prohibited 
unfair discrimination based on race, sex or creed. 
The matter concerned Rule 20(1) of the Rules of the MEPF (Mine Employees 
Pension Fund) which defined “employee”, for the purpose of the Rules, as: “Any male 
or female European person in the service of one of the employers represented by the 
Chamber.” What was discriminatory was the fact that some employees could not be 
members of the fund, solely on the basis of their race.  
 
The Court faced, for the first time, the task of applying the new concept of unfair 
discrimination as contained in the LRA Amendment Act of 1988. The assumption was 
that racial discrimination, once established, was ipso facto unfair. The Court held that 
the doctrine of “separate but equal” (a notion upon which the philosophy of the 
government at the time was based) was inherently unequal, and that any labour 
practice resting on that doctrine amounted to racial discrimination. It held that there 
                                                 
137 Sacwu v Sentrachem supra and Sentrachem v John NO supra. 
138 Meintjes-Van der Walt L “Levelling the ‘paying’ fields” (1998) 19 ILJ 22 at 25. 
139 Chamber of Mines of SA v Council of Mining Unions (1990) 11 ILJ 52 (IC). 
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was no scope for any notion of “fair racial discrimination” and considered racial 
discrimination absolutely impermissible, with or without the adjective of “unfair”. 
 
The Court found that no reasons, other than racial, had been given for the fund to 
refuse to admit black, coloured and Asian skilled blue collar employees. It was also 
satisfied that the potential effect of the racially discriminatory practice could indeed 
create labour unrest. The Court also quoted, interestingly, from the judgment in the 
Mine Surface Officials Association of SA140
 
 matter where it was held that: “The 
Industrial Court is enjoined to consider the potential effect of the labour practice or 
change in labour practice under review.” Once again, the importance of the impact of 
the discriminatory practice was viewed as of cardinal importance and the Court held 
that it had a duty to strive, under its Unfair Labour Practice jurisdiction, to eradicate 
racial discrimination. 
In addition, the Court also referred to and endorsed the views expressed in Baxter:141
 
 
“It was enunciated when the ‘separate but equal’ standard was still regarded as a 
reasonable political creed. But the second half of the twentieth century has witnessed 
a rejection of this notion and it has become accepted that, in matters of racial 
equality, separate can never be equal.” 
3.5 Mineworkers’ Union v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 
1070 (IC) 
 
The case Mineworkers’ Union v East Rand Gold and Uranium Co Ltd 142
                                                 
140 Mine Surface Officials of SA v President of the Industrial Court (1987) 8 ILJ 51 (T) at 67 E-F. 
 was 
interesting for several reasons. It dealt with an employer’s refusal to conclude a 
recognition agreement with a racially exclusive union. The Court held that the 
principle in workplace should be equal advancement based on equal opportunities 
and merit without emphasis on race, colour or creed. The deciding factor had to be 
141 Baxter Administrative Law at 527. 
142 Mineworkers Union v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1990) 11 ILJ 1070 (IC). 
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the person’s ability to do the job. Once again the matter reflected the thinking of the 
time – non-racialism rather than equality was emphasized. Similarly, it is interesting 
to note that respondent’s philosophy at the time was a “non-racial employment policy 
and equal opportunity philosophy.” No hint of notions of substantive equality and 
affirmative action were evident at the time. 
 
Counsel for the respondent submitted quite aptly that non-discrimination was the 
norm in contemporary developing industrial relations practice and that an 
examination of legislative changes to labour laws over the Eighties indicated an 
irreversible shift away from race-consciousness to non-racialism. The value of 
substantive equality was not part of the mind set at the time. 
 
The Court aptly commented as follows: “South Africa stands on the threshold of a 
new future. Developments in the field of labour law and industrial relations during the 
1980’s, together with the current dynamic political and constitutional trends to 
establish a non-racial democracy, presage an era of hope and enlightenment for all 
our peoples. The governing principle in the work place must be equal advancement 
based on equal opportunities and merit without emphasis being placed on race, 
colour or creed. The deciding factor has to be a man’s ability to do the job.” Non-
racialism, as opposed to equality in the substantive sense, was nevertheless still the 
goal. 
 
It is quite evident from a reading of the cases during the Eighties, that as the decade 
drew to an end, courts were quite vociferous in their rejection of discriminatory 
practices, working towards non-racialism and willing to take into account international 
guidelines and practice to justify landmark decisions. However, the notion of 
substantive equality although evident in international jurisprudence and in the writing 
of authorities, especially in the USA, was not touched upon. 
 
An important case, in the sense of sustaining the prevailing deference to an 
employer’s operational requirements and reflecting an insensitivity to the imbedded 
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and pernicious discrimination against females on the grounds of sex, pregnancy and 
family responsibility in society and even within the courts at the time, was the 
Collins143
 
  case. 
3.6 Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonarea Branch) a division of ABSA Bank 
Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC) 
 
The applicant employee was pregnant and therefore legally obliged to take three 
months’ maternity leave in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.144
 
 A 
collective agreement between the trade union and respondent contained a policy 
condition that prohibited employees from taking maternity leave within a period of 2 
years after the termination of a previous period of maternity leave. The applicant’s 
pregnancy fell within this period and after a request to be considered for maternity 
leave was rejected by the respondent, the applicant was forced to tender her 
resignation.  
The Court held that conditions negotiated collectively are binding and enforceable 
against union members. In this case, maternity leave conditions were part of those 
terms of employment. Further, the court held it had a discretion to intervene or refuse 
to uphold agreements, but would only do so if an agreement resulted in a manifestly 
gross unfair labour practice. Today, it is submitted, a collective agreement on terms 
and conditions of employment, which permits or condones discrimination on any of 
the listed grounds would be viewed as grossly unfair, save where such discrimination 
could be justified on inherent requirements of a job, which in themselves would be 
subjected to the strictest of scrutiny. 
 
It was held that commercial rationale existed to limit maternity leave because the 
respondent employed a large number of female employees. If there were no 
                                                 
143 Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonarea Branch) a division of ABSA Bank Ltd (1994) 15 ILJ 1398 (IC). 
144 75 of 1997 (Hereinafter referred to as BCEA). 
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limitation, it could significantly disrupt the employer’s operations. The Court therefore 
found that if a female’s dismissal were justified by an employer’s operational 
requirements then, although her dismissal would be indirectly discriminatory, it would 
not amount to unfair discrimination within the meaning of section 8(2) of the Interim 
Constitution. 
 
It is submitted that if the matter came before the Labour Court today, the outcome 
would be entirely different. The finding that discrimination on the basis of sex and 
family responsibility would not be unfair if it were justified on grounds of operational 
requirements is highly questionable. The fact that sex discrimination is one of the first 
three listed grounds of prohibited discrimination in the Constitution is an indication of 
just how seriously it is viewed by the legislature. It is therefore only reasonable to 
believe that sex discrimination can never be justified on the grounds of operational 
requirements such as raised in this matter. However, this aspect of the judgment 
would not have been surprising at the time it was delivered, since great deference to 
employer prerogative and commercial rationale was still the norm.  At the time too, 
family responsibility and pregnancy were not yet grounds “listed” as they currently 
are in both the EEA as well as PEPUDA. Nevertheless, the judgment reflects the 
prevalent insensitivity of that time to the fact that discrimination on the basis of family 
responsibility and pregnancy had become so entrenched into the bedrock of our 
society, that even courts did not hesitate to uphold practices which were clearly 
unfairly discriminatory on those grounds. 
 
Business necessity and operational requirements, it would seem, are enough to turn 
discrimination into acceptable or fair discrimination in international codes and 
practice. However, it is the ease with which it was done in this case and the lack of 
absolutely compelling operational needs to justify it which, in hindsight of course, is a 
cause of concern. Clearly, only exceptional cases where factors constituting inherent 
requirements of a job are shown, should justify any form of discrimination.  
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However, just a year later, in 1995, the Court delivered an extremely well constructed 
and reasoned judgment in the case of Association of Professional Teachers v 
Minister of Education.145
 
  
3.7 Association of Professional Teachers v Minister of Education (1995) 16 
ILJ 1048 (IC) 
 
The crux of the case was that married women teachers were excluded from an 
entitlement to housing allowances, based purely on their sex and marital status. The 
court held that such considerations were wholly irrelevant. The Court adopted a strict 
approach and stressed that differentiation on those grounds should be allowed only 
in very limited circumstances. 
 
The Court remarked that it lacked Constitutional jurisdiction, but was nevertheless 
obliged, in terms of the Interim Constitution, to interpret the unfair labour practice 
definition with due regard to Chapter 3 of that Constitution, its spirit, purport and 
objects. It also held that it must have due regard to limitations placed on fundamental 
rights by the limitations clause in the Interim Constitution and had to strive to uphold 
the democratic values enshrined in the Interim Constitution.  
 
It embarked on an extensive analysis of section 8 of the Interim Constitution, in 
particular the section dealing with the prohibition of unfair discrimination and also 
referred extensively to international case law and authorities on unfair discrimination. 
It viewed the insertion of the word “unfair” as a type of qualifier with the intention of 
limiting forms of discrimination which are outlawed, to those which are unfair.  
 
It held that “in the employment relationship, discrimination or differentiation on the 
basis of what an employee is instead of what he or she does, should not be 
condoned”146
                                                 
145 Association of Professional Teachers v Minister of Education (1995) 16 ILJ 1048 (IC). 
 and explained its reasoning in great detail and reverted to the 
146 Association of Professional Teachers v Minister of Education supra at page 1085. 
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distinction between differentiation and discrimination: “Where the effect of the 
differentiation is not based on an objective ground and such differentiation has the 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons 
on an equal footing of all rights and freedoms, it would constitute discrimination.”147
 
  
Differentiation based on immutably personal characteristics e.g. sex or gender, would 
be permitted where it was prescribed by inherent requirements of a particular job. 
Where criteria for differentiation or classification are reasonably justifiable and 
objective, such differentiation would not necessarily constitute discrimination. 
However, if the differentiation had the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, by all persons on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms, 
it would constitute discrimination. The intention is to eliminate unjustified and arbitrary 
discrimination based on immutable personal characteristics. Differentiation 
prescribed by the inherent requirements of the job, however, should only be allowed 
in very limited circumstances. The Court held that the Constitution confirmed the view 
that not all forms of differentiation were outlawed, but only those branded as unfair. 
The drafters of Constitution intended a distinction between permissible and 
impermissible discrimination and unfair discrimination amounted to prejudicial 
differentiation. 
 
The Court also dealt with the nature of direct and indirect discrimination. 
 
It held further that a complainant is not required to prove an intention to discriminate. 
 
This judgment extensively referred to case law, various authorities and ILO 
Conventions with regard to discrimination in employment and referred to the 
introduction of the Interim Constitution as signifying the birth of a free and democratic 
South Africa, with the new order placing a high emphasis on the freedom, equality 
and dignity of every individual citizen.  
 
                                                 
147 Association of Professional Teachers v Minister of Education supra at page 1080. 
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Court enquired too, as to whether the Interim Constitution and its values were 
applicable to the case and found that the intention was that the values in the 
Constitution were universal and that therefore recourse to these values could not be 
ignored. 
 
3.8 Motala v University of Natal 1995 3 BCLR 374 (D) 
 
In Motala v University of Natal148
 
 the Court held that it was not unfair to restrict the 
number of Indian students at the university’s medical school on the basis of a quota 
which favoured black students. The university’s affirmative action program attempted 
to take into account the educational disadvantages to which students had been 
subjected to in certain school education departments. The policy was directed at 
determining the potential of each aspirant student and to evaluate the potential a 
student had to succeed in university studies. Accordingly the medical faculty 
evaluated the performance at school of African students in a different way to other 
students schooled under other education departments. This was viewed as unfair 
discrimination by the applicant party. 
The court held that there was no doubt that Indians were decidedly disadvantaged by 
the apartheid system,  however, evidence before the court established clearly that 
the degree of disadvantage to which African pupils were subjected under the four-tier 
system of education, was significantly greater than that suffered by their Indian 
counterparts. The Court therefore found that a selection system which compensates 
for that discrepancy would pass muster in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2). 
 
It was held that all courts are custodians of fundamental rights and that the effect of 
the constitution was to alter the relevant priorities of some entrenched fundamental 
rights. The right of equal access to educational institutions was guaranteed, but 
limited by the validation of otherwise unequal treatment on one of the listed grounds 
in the Interim Constitution. 
                                                 
148 Motala v University of Natal (1995) 3 BCLR 374 (D). 
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The Court was satisfied that the policy of the university constituted a “measure 
designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of … a group … of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”149
 
 within the meaning of that 
expression as used in section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
In so far as the onus was concerned, the Court stated that applicants had to establish 
the existence of a prima facie right, open to some doubt. 
 
As stated above, the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on equality and 
discrimination was espoused in a “clutch” of early judgments150 relating thereto. The 
first of these was the Brink 151
 
 matter, handed down on 15 May 1996 - the 
Constitutional Court’s first case on equality. 
3.9 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) 
 
The matter concerned the constitutionality of section 44 of the Insurance Act152
 
 and 
alleged discrimination against married women by depriving them in certain 
circumstances of all or some of the benefits of life insurance policies ceded to them 
or made in favour of them by their husbands. 
Mr Brink (the deceased husband of the applicant) ceded a life insurance policy to his 
wife, the applicant, in 1990. He died in 1994. Kitshoff, the executor of the estate and 
the respondent in the matter, demanded (in terms of the provisions of the Insurance 
Act) that the insurer pay into the estate of the deceased all but R30 000 of the 
proceeds of the life insurance. The assurer refused to do so.  
 
The Insurance Act draws a distinction between married men and married women in 
that the provisions applied only to transactions in which husbands ceded policies to 
                                                 
149 Motala v University of Natal supra at page 383C. 
150 Supra at fn 2. 
151 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC). 
152 27 of 1943 (Hereinafter referred to as the Insurance Act). 
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wives. It did not apply to similar transactions by wives in favour of husbands. The 
reason advanced by the respondent for the provision, was to avoid fraud or collusion. 
 
The Court held that equality had a very special place in the South African 
Constitution. Section 33(1) states that rights entrenched in chapter 3 may be limited 
only to the extent that it is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality, a recurrent theme in the Interim Constitution. Furthermore, the 
Interim Constitution required regard to international law to interpret the rights it 
entrenched.  
 
The Court referred to  concepts of equality before the law and discrimination which 
are widely used in international instruments e.g. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women 1980, The Convention Against Discrimination in Education 1960 and 
the ILO Discrimination Convention 1958. It also referred to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of The Constitution of the United States of America which protects the 
right to equality – in fact, a precursor to equality provisions in many constitutions in 
the world.  
 
The Court considered and explained the fact that the United States of America 
imposed different levels of scrutiny on different categories of legislative classification, 
the most stringent level of scrutiny being reserved for classifications based on race or 
nationality or those that invade fundamental rights. The intermediate level of scrutiny 
is applicable to gender or socio-economic rights and the third level merely requires a 
rational relationship to the legislative purpose. It was pointed out too that the Indian 
constitution protects equality and outlaws discrimination as does the Charter on 
Rights and Freedoms Article 15 of Canada. 
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The Court therefore stressed that the prohibition of discrimination is an important 
goal of governments and the international community. Importantly however, it held 
that interpretation of national constitutions reflected different approaches to the 
concepts of equality and non-discrimination. This is because of different textual 
provisions and different historical circumstances which resulted in different 
jurisprudential and philosophical understandings of equality.  
 
The Court held that section 8 (of the Interim Constitution) was the product of our own 
particular history of inequality, stating that “the deep scars of this appalling program 
are still visible in our society. It is in the light of that history and the enduring legacy 
that it bequeathed that the equality clause needs to be interpreted.”153 The drafters of 
section 8 recognised that “systematic patterns of discrimination on grounds other 
than race have caused and may continue to cause considerable harm. For this 
reason section 8(2) lists a wide and not exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination”154
 
  It was thus recognised that discrimination can lead to patterns of 
group disadvantage and harm, is unfair and builds and entrenches inequality. The 
drafters thus proscribed such forms of discrimination and permitted positive steps to 
redress the effects. 
The Court held that the Insurance Act disadvantaged married women and not 
married men. That constituted discrimination based on sex (a specified ground) and 
marital status (an unspecified ground).  
 
Importantly too, the Court held that since sex was a specified ground, it was 
unnecessary to consider whether marital status would be a ground. It is submitted 
that this approach, might lead to there being little point in relying on multiple grounds, 
especially if any additional grounds are unspecified. The consequence of this, at the 
stage of the enquiry where fairness is considered would be that circumstances 
relevant to the overall experience of the applicant might not be taken into account. 
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The undesirable effect of this may well be an impoverished and one-dimensional 
equality jurisprudence which fails to come to grips with the real experience of victims 
of discrimination.  
 
Furthermore, it appears from the judgment155
 
 that the Court views discrimination on 
the grounds of sex and race as more serious than other grounds of discrimination. 
The Court held that discrimination based on sex had resulted in deep patterns of 
disadvantage, particularly acutely in the case of black women. Legal rules which 
discriminated against women, as they did in casu, were in breach of section 8(2), 
unless it could be shown that they fell within the terms of section 8(3). It had not been 
argued that they could be saved on that ground, but the question remained whether 
the rule could be justified in terms of section 33 (the limitations clause in the Interim 
Constitution).  
 
Section 33 involved a proportionality exercise in which the purpose and effects of the 
provisions had to be weighed against the nature and extent of the infringement. In 
casu it was found that no reasonable basis for the constitutional breach caused 
existed, the purposes sought to be achieved did not require a distinction to be drawn 
between married women and married men and it could not be said to be reasonable 
and justifiable in the light of the purpose of the legislation. 
 
O’Regan J156 stated that: “ … the Constitution is an emphatic renunciation of our past 
in which inequality was systematically entrenched.” She stressed too157
 
 that: “Section 
8 was adopted … in the recognition that discrimination against people who are 
members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and 
harm. Such discrimination is unfair: it builds and entrenches inequality amongst 
different groups in our society.”  
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O’Regan also commented on the disadvantages suffered by black people in the past, 
showing that disadvantage did not relate solely to material matters, but may be 
suffered in relation to education, job opportunities and access to public amenities. 
 
This dictum, it has been said, has been often used to indicate that the reversal of 
systemic discrimination and patterns of group disadvantage are the central 
characteristics of substantive equality. It is often invoked to support an argument that 
the term “unfair” was specifically inserted in the equality clause to provide a means of 
distinguishing mere discrimination (which may affect both advantaged and 
disadvantaged applicants) and discrimination against historically disadvantaged 
groups, which is unfair. Therefore discrimination is unfair when it is perpetrated 
against persons or groups of persons who have suffered historical or systemic 
disadvantage.  
 
However, the Hugo158 and Prinsloo159
 
 judgments thereafter, provided a more detailed 
analysis of the unfairness requirement in which the notion of historical disadvantage 
was not given such a perceived exclusive or controlling role. 
Other commentators have held the view that in Brink160
 
 the Court does appear to 
accept group based historical disadvantage as the sole criterion relevant to the 
assessment of discrimination, but that, nothing in the judgment precluded other 
criteria from being relevant, and that such other criteria do emerge in subsequent 
cases. 
On 3 June 1996 (two weeks after the Brink161 judgment) the Industrial Court handed 
down the George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd162
 
 judgment.  
 
                                                 
158 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
159 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra. 
160 Brink v Kitshoff NO supra. 
161 Brink v Kitshoff NO supra. 
162 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 571 (IC). 
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3.10 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ  571 (IC) 
 
In that matter, the applicant, an employee of the respondent company, had applied 
for appointment, but was unsuccessful because an affirmative action candidate had 
been selected. 
 
The Court held that affirmative action, in its effect against the advantaged could not 
be held to be unfair. Affirmative action is a means to an end and not an end in itself. 
However, in casu, the applicant was successful because the respondent had 
advertised the position involved as “corporate only.” The respondent was to recruit 
firstly inside its own employee complement in accordance with its stated policy on 
recruitment. However, an affirmative action candidate from outside its ranks was 
appointed. The applicant had contended that he was suitable for the position and that 
the post should never have been advertised outside.  
 
The Court found, in reviewing the placement policy of the respondent,  that 
appointing a candidate from outside was inappropriate. The respondent was not 
entitled to have appointed an outsider when an internal candidate (such as the 
applicant) was suitable.  
 
However, the court made no formal determination on the application of affirmative 
action in the case and only held that the failure to follow a placement procedure was 
an unfair labour practice. It stressed and emphasized the importance of proper 
“process.” 
 
 
Until this case, neither the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court (at the time) 
had had to decide a situation where there was an apparent conflict between the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination and measures to advantage the disadvantaged. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that affirmative action was not a racially based remedial 
action, but a process of ensuring equal employment opportunities. Affirmative action 
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outweighed the injunction not to discriminate on basis of race and gender and was 
justified despite other candidates being discriminated against.  
 
The Court also dealt with the notions of “positive” and “negative” discrimination, 
holding that negative discrimination constituted an unfair labour practice. It held that 
section 8(3) of the Interim Constitution created a right to be a beneficiary of 
measures designed to achieve the purpose set out in that section. That did not 
constitute a right to advancement of the disadvantaged.  The specific wording of the 
section was of critical importance to the Court. It also mentioned that it would be 
necessary to see how the Constitutional Court would set about balancing the right 
not to be discriminated against on the grounds of race, with measures designed to 
restore equality and held that it would be highly unlikely that the Constitutional Court 
would conclude that the limitations clause, (which provided that section 3 rights may 
only be limited  to the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality) does not apply to section 8 
where the limitations of these rights is encompassed within the same section. 
 
The Court held that affirmative action measures were to be designed to eliminate 
inequality and to address systemic and institutionalized discrimination. Such 
measures are mechanisms to ensure eventual equal opportunities, a socio-political 
priority.  
 
The Court was not inclined to view affirmative action as a universal value. It saw it 
strictly as a procedure, a strategy, a means to an end: “a measure to achieve a 
goal,”163
                                                 
163 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd at page 593E.  
 a pragmatic necessity of temporarily accommodating a limited exception to 
the value of non-discrimination. Fairness and equity as well as other considerations 
including economic considerations, dictated that affirmative action in South Africa 
was an imperative which had to be permitted to outweigh the injunction not to 
discriminate on the basis of race and gender. The previously disadvantaged had to 
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be assisted to overcome their disadvantages so that society could be normalized. It 
held that if the status quo were maintained, in-built inequalities would be perpetuated. 
 
The Court held further that even “grades of disadvantage” could be accommodated 
and quoted from M Banton164
 
 (a quote worth repeating): “As a means of combating 
discrimination, law works through the creation of protected classes; this may result in 
only rough justice, since not all members of a class are equally placed. One of the 
main criticisms of affirmative action in the United States has been that it has primarily 
benefited middleclass women and black people who were well able to look after their 
own interests and less deserving assistance than those trapped in the under class. 
The creation of privileged classes benefiting from quota hiring has been intended to 
secure equal treatment for individuals in the long run, but as it is never possible to 
define classes so exactly that only the most deserving benefit, the short-run results 
may be open to criticism.” The Court held that personal circumstances (relating to 
personal disadvantage in the past) are relevant. 
Managerial prerogative in appointment and its gradual erosion was also dealt with by 
the Court. It held that managerial prerogative was not unfettered and that there were 
procedural and substantive limitations to it. If a company undertook to follow certain 
processes in recruitment, it had to follow them. 
 
3.11 PSA v Minister of Justice (1997) 18 ILJ 241 (T) 
 
The PSA v Minister of Justice165
                                                 
164 Banton M Discrimination (1994). 
 matter was the first important Supreme Court 
decision on affirmative action policies and plans. It was handed down one month 
after the coming into effect of the final Constitution on 4 February 1997 and 
concerned the filling of thirty vacant posts in the offices of the Sate Attorney. The 
matter was extremely complex due to the multitude of legislative prescriptions, policy 
documents and provisions contained in subordinate legislation which had a bearing 
165 PSA v Minister of Justice (1997) 18 ILJ 241 (T). 
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on the matter and which outlined the powers of functionaries with regard to 
appointment.  
 
The Public Service Commission had issued directives granting the respondent a 
special dispensation to promote representivity in the department.  The posts were 
advertised, indicating that the public service is an equal opportunity affirmative action 
employer. It indicated that it was the intention of the respondent, through the filling of 
the posts, to promote representivity in the public service and that preference would 
be given to candidates whose transfer/promotion/appointment would contribute 
thereto. The respondent decided to promote the constitutional objective of creating a 
representative public service by earmarking certain of the posts for representative 
candidates. Sixteen white male employees applied and were not interviewed. Female 
employees with significantly less seniority were appointed and as a result, the 
applicants alleged unfair discrimination and that their applications were not 
considered past the point of determining their race and gender.  
 
As remarked by the Court, the facts relied on by the applicants were “starkly 
simple.”166 None of the posts were created in terms of measures introduced for 
purposes of any process of making the public service more representative. Despite 
the qualifications and extensive experience of the applicants in the dispute, none had 
been appointed and none even interviewed. If their applications were considered at 
all, it was merely to reject them out of hand. The only persons employed by the 
respondent at the time and who were invited for interviews were three women, one of 
which had only qualified five years previously and who had only one year’s 
experience at the office of the State Attorney. If appointed she would jump several 
officers on the merit list. Furthermore, there was no indication from the respondent 
that any of the candidates actually recommended had similar or better qualifications 
than the applicants. To the Court, that created a picture which on the basis of logic, 
merit, efficiency and sensible administration was “astonishing.”167
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The respondents sought to justify its actions on the basis of affirmative action. 
 
The Court held that the Constitution provides that there must be a public service that 
is “career orientated”, functions according to “fair and equitable principles”, and 
promotes an “efficient public service broadly representative of the South African 
community.” Qualifications, level of training, merit, efficiency and suitability of 
persons who qualified for appointment had to be taken into account. Despite that, 
measures to promote the objectives of section 212 of the Constitution were not 
prohibited. It was argued that the Public Service Act168
 
 set out criteria for 
appointment and that the term “suitability” permitted the identification and subsequent 
appointment of affirmative action candidates. 
The Court held that the Constitution prohibited unfair discrimination, but did not 
preclude measures to achieve adequate protection and advancement of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in the past. It viewed section 8(3) as an 
exception to section 8(2)  and held that “measures” must be adequate and had to 
take into account the rights and legitimate expectations of the present incumbents. 
 
The Court set aside the directives on administrative law grounds and on the basis 
that they did not constitute “designed measures”, but measures which were 
haphazard, random and over-hasty. It was found that the special dispensation 
amounted to nothing more than giving the department an untrammelled discretion to 
earmark posts for blacks, women and disabled people without any overall policy or 
plan. To the Court, representivity did not mean a mathematical percentage, but that, 
on a broad basis, all communities should be represented. The earmarking of posts 
was not expressly called for by the Constitution. 
 
A special dispensation with no overall plan to promote representivity was found not to 
constitute “designed measures” and therefore gave the employer the unfettered 
discretion to earmark posts for blacks. In that regard, the respondent referred to 
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figures to demonstrate that the public service inherited by the present government 
was notoriously unrepresentative of the South African community as a result of past 
discriminatory practices, particularly on the grounds of race and gender. There was 
thus an urgent need to make the public service in general and the Justice 
Department in particular more representative, particularly with regard to race and 
gender. As a result, it was argued, posts especially identified for the purpose would, 
by way of exception to the PSA’s section 11 be filled in a way to promote greater 
representivity.  
 
The Court found that the Public Service Commission’s interpretation of section 11 
could not be used to create greater representivity and that the department could not 
use other mechanisms because the rationalization process had at that time not yet 
been completed. That meant that the department would have had to continue making 
appointments in the old way without regard for the greater representivity. The 
department’s view was that it would clearly have perpetuated and aggravated the 
lack of representivity and therefore the department obtained special dispensation to 
apply chapter B Special for the staffing of vacant posts on the pre-rationalized 
structures. It was noted too that at that time, the department had not registered a 
departmental program or management plan. 
 
The Court held that there was no evidence that the respondent had complied with the 
requirements of a policy framework, no steps had been taken to promote the public 
service as a career among under-represented groups, there was no evidence of 
bursaries to the disadvantaged to enable recruitment into the public service and no 
attempt to promote appointments at entry level. Furthermore, there was no targeted 
recruitment or preference given to equal merit cases on the basis of representivity. 
There was also no evidence of special ad hoc measures formulated to provide for the 
appointment of candidates who were more suitable, if such appointment would 
improve representivity. No special training courses to enable prospective and serving 
members to meet the prescribed requirements and operational standards had been 
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provided or initiated. Also no explanation of any rational basis upon which a quota 
was used to fill the positions in question was provided to the Court. 
 
The respondent had concluded that Section 11(1)(b) of the PSA, which provided that 
in making appointments or filling posts in the public service “only the qualifications, 
level of training, merit, efficiency and suitability of the persons who qualify for the 
appointment promotion or transfer in question and such conditions as may be 
determined or prescribed or as may be directed or recommended by the commission 
for the making of the appointment or the filling of the post shall be taken into account”  
permitted and required race and gender to be taken into account whenever 
necessary or appropriate to do so in order to promote a public administration broadly 
representative of the SA community. It was of the view that the constitutional 
imperative of representivity was one of the factors to be taken into account when 
considering suitability for appointment. 
 
The Court, however, held that “suitability” in the public service did not go to race and 
gender. Only merit was required to be taken into account. 
 
The Court referred to section 8 of the interim constitution and held that without 
discrimination there can be no unfair discrimination. The Constitution prohibited 
unfair discrimination.  
 
The respondent’s case was that there was discrimination but that it was fair in the 
circumstances. The applicants had been discriminated against and therefore what 
was required was to rebut the unfairness of the discrimination. 
 
A passage from Smith was quoted: “The literal wording of the South African clause 
does not appear to express an exception … At the level of principle, the problem is 
that if affirmative action is an exception to the right to equality which does not require 
affirmative action and then sub-sec 8(3)(a) cannot be justified in terms of the 
principles that the constitution is based on. Moreover, our affirmative action clause 
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specifically states that its purpose is to enable people to enjoy all rights and freedoms 
fully and equally. That would be a strange claim for an instrument of social policy 
which effected a deviation from equality.”169
 
 However, the view held by the Court was 
that the express wording indicated it is an exception. The section laid down the limits 
to affirmative action and that it would not offend section 8(2). Affirmative action had to 
be judged against the requirements of sec 8(3)(a). 
The respondent had argued that the applicants were not treated unfairly. However, 
the applicants’ applications were never considered past the point where their race 
and gender did not meet up with the preference established for the posts. 
Consideration of their applications went no further than refusing them on the basis of 
race and gender. The respondent argued that the process gave preference to black 
people and women because of section 212(2)(b) of the Constitution and the fact that 
black people and women were notoriously under–represented in the public service in 
general and in the department in particular. It was therefore of the view that the 
process accordingly constituted “a measure” as envisaged in section 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution. Measures of that kind did not offend the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination.  
 
The Court referred to Chaskalson et al:170
 
 “The words ‘the adequate protection and 
advancement’ indicate that the end envisaged as well as the means employed is 
reviewable; that the measures adopted are not permitted to go beyond what is 
adequate. Naturally what is considered to be adequate is open to interpretation.” It 
was therefore held that to merely label certain measures as falling within the meaning 
of the constitutional provision would not suffice.  
The respondent had also argued that the process followed by it was permissible and 
required by section 212 to promote a broadly representative public service. 
Furthermore, any public authority was entitled to adopt a policy and needed no 
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statutory authorization to do so. The adoption of a guiding policy was not only legally 
permissible but in certain instances might be both practical and desirable. The Court 
referred to authorities from which it was clear that three principles governed policies 
of public authorities – they must be compatible with the enabling legislation; they 
must not totally preclude the exercise of a discretion; they must be disclosed to the 
person affected by the decision before the decision is reached. 
 
The Court accordingly held that a public authority cannot adopt a policy in vacuo and 
stated that the question was what role policy can and did play in the affirmative action 
steps in casu. It stated that it was important to assess whether the requirements of 
section 8(3)(a) had been met. Submissions had been made with reference to 
authorities that despite equality clauses, the Court was nevertheless capable of 
accommodating affirmative action within the concept of equality and that the scope 
for review of the program actually adopted or the policies actually adopted was 
extremely narrow. The Court found that the authorities, however, did not exclude the 
possibility of review and that the Court’s role was to decide whether the limit imported 
on a right or freedom was reasonable and justifiable.  The Court quoted Chaskalson 
in the matter S v Makwanyane171
 
 where he stated that: “In the balancing process the 
relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited and its 
importance in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, the 
purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a 
society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and particularly where the limitation 
has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved 
through other means less damaging to the right in question. “ 
The Court held that “measures” cannot go beyond what is reasonable. The rights and 
interests of those persons affected by measures had to be taken into account.  
It held that the test was whether affirmative action measures qualified as reasonable 
limitations on the prohibition of unfair discrimination. The Court therefore had to 
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establish whether a measure was reasonable when tested against the strict scrutiny 
standard favoured by American jurisprudence. 
 
The Court confirmed that restitutionary measures would be justified as fair 
discrimination and would be beyond the ambit of the constitutional prohibition against 
unfair discrimination. 
 
It also considered the purpose of the provisions for restitutionary measures as 
identifying the limits of what may be justified as legitimate and devised a series of 
qualifications for determining whether an affirmative action policy would qualify as 
legitimate and as reasonable administrative action: 
 
An affirmative action measure had to be designed to achieve adequate 
advancement; 
There had to be a causal connection between the designed measures and the 
objectives and further, the measures adopted could not exceed what is adequate; 
The goals and means employed had to be subject to review; 
Due consideration had to be given to the rights of members outside the designated 
beneficiaries; and 
Promotion of representation could not be at the expense of efficiency. 
 
The decision in this case became the preferred authority for using the standard of 
reasonableness to qualify affirmative action policies as justifiable. “The measures 
must be designed to achieve something. This denotes ... a causal connection 
between the designed measures and the objectives.”172
 
  
The test connected to the strict scrutiny approach requires a demonstration that the 
differentiation on the grounds of race is a necessary means for the promotion of an 
overriding state interest. The strict scrutiny standard favours the standard of 
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necessity, a rational relationship between the differentiation and a state interest 
would be inadequate. 
 
The Court accordingly held that a rational connection was lacking when affirmative 
action resulted in the appointment of applicants whose manifest unsuitability would 
compromise another constitutional imperative that rested on the public service, e.g. 
to promote efficiency . The initiators of the policy bore the onus to prove that it did not 
constitute unfair discrimination: “The onus comes into operation as soon as there is 
prima facie proof of discrimination. This would also include discrimination in 
attempting to promote a more representative administration.”173
 
 The enquiry into the 
policy was held to be important because there had to be a rational basis for 
affirmative action to be fair. The manner of execution of the policy had to be 
scrutinised and both the end and means had to be reviewed. 
The Court tried to balance three factors in its judgment: a) efficiency of the 
department; b) aspirations of the complainants; and c) the affirmative action policy. 
 
The judgment has been viewed as illustrating a “parsimonious approach”174
 
 to 
affirmative action measures. The Court’s interpretation of the right to equality was 
both disjunctive and oppositional and the principle established was that affirmative 
action measures were in themselves unfair discrimination which had to be justified in 
order to be found to be fair. A failure to justify them rendered them unfair 
discrimination. 
In the second of the “clutch” of cases, the Constitutional Court in Hugo175
 
 began to 
set out its understanding of a substantive equality right and the test for whether that 
right had been violated. The Court made many significant pronouncements in this 
case. 
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3.12 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) 
 
The applicant was a widower male prisoner with one son. The case was about the 
granting of a remission of sentence by the state president only to women prisoners 
with children under the age of twelve. The applicant would have qualified for 
remission, but for the fact he was a father not a mother. 
 
The Constitutional Court handed down a majority judgment by Goldstone J, with 
Kriegler and Didcott JJ dissenting in their own separate judgements. Mokgoro and 
O’Regan JJ gave their own reasons for concurring, also in separate judgments. 
 
Goldstone J held in the majority judgment that: “Where the power of pardon or 
reprieve is used on general terms and there is an ‘amnesty’ accorded to a category 
or categories of prisoners, discrimination is inherent. The line had to be drawn 
somewhere as there would always be people on the side of the line who did not 
benefit and whose positions were not significantly different from others who have 
benefited.”176 It had been argued that there was discrimination on the ground of sex 
but the discrimination was actually on combined grounds – sex and family 
responsibility. The Court referred to Brink,177
 
 where it was held that it was sufficient, if 
the discrimination is largely based on one of listed grounds, only to deal with that 
ground. 
The Court held that because the alleged discrimination was on a listed ground, there 
was a presumption of unfairness. The respondent therefore had to rebut the 
presumption. In that regard it was submitted that the discrimination in favour of 
women was fair because mothers have a nurturing and caring role and it is generally 
accepted that mothers are the primary nurturers and care givers of young children. 
Primary bonding is with a child’s mother and extends well into childhood. Given that 
the wellbeing of children is a particular concern generally in South Africa and given 
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that, in the experience of the National Director of the South African National Council 
for Child and Family Welfare, only a minority of fathers are actively involved in the 
nurturing of and caring for their children, (particularly with pre-adolescents) the 
purpose of the discrimination was fair.  
 
The Court found the submissions to be based on generalizations, but accepted them 
as true – mothers did bear an unequal share of the burden of child rearing in South 
Africa. The Court found, however, that it could not ordinarily be fair to discriminate 
between women and men on that basis. The failure by fathers to shoulder their fair 
share was a primary cause for the situation which made it difficult for women to 
compete in job market. It was the cause of deep inequality experienced by women. 
The generalization on which the president relied was therefore a fact which is one of 
the causes of women’s inequality.  
 
It was held that it is unlikely that South Africa would achieve a more egalitarian 
society until such time that responsibilities were more equally shared between men 
and women. The generalization by the respondent did not answer the question as to 
whether the discrimination was fair. To use the generalization that women bear a 
greater proportion of the burdens of child rearing for justifying treatment that deprives 
women of benefits or advantages or imposes advantages upon them would therefore 
be unfair.  
 
However, the Court found that that was not the case in casu. The fact that the 
individuals who were discriminated against by a particular action were not individuals 
who belonged to a class which had historically been disadvantaged, did not 
necessarily mean that the discrimination was fair. The prohibition against unfair 
discrimination sought not only to avoid discrimination against people who were 
members of a disadvantaged group. It sought more – that all human beings would be 
accorded equal dignity and respect, regardless of their membership of a particular 
group.  That goal of the constitution should not be forgotten. 
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It was held that there is a need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognizes that although society affords each human being equal treatment on the 
basis of equal worth, that goal cannot be achieved by insisting upon identical 
treatment in all circumstances. A thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned was essential to assess 
whether the overall impact was one which furthered the constitutional goal of equality 
or not. A classification which was unfair in one context might not necessarily be unfair 
in a different context. 
 
The fact that there was no intent to discriminate unfairly and that the welfare of 
children was the goal was held not to be sufficient to establish that the impact of the 
discrimination upon fathers was not unfair. It was necessary to look not only at the 
group which had been disadvantaged, but at the nature of the power in terms of 
which the discrimination had been effected and also the nature of the interests which 
had been affected by the discrimination. The president had taken into account the 
perceived interests of the public as well and made his decision believing it would be 
in the public interest to do so.  
 
The Court found that it is true that fathers of young children in prison were not 
afforded early release, but that did not restrict or limit their rights or obligations as 
fathers in any permanent manner and the effect of the discrimination was not to deny 
them their freedom. They could also still apply individually for the remission of 
sentence in any event. It could not be said that the president’s action fundamentally 
impaired their rights of dignity or sense of equal worth. 
 
The court thus agreed that the president’s act in question discriminated on a 
specified ground, sex. It also agreed regarding the test for unfairness, but there were 
strong dissents based on the application of the test to the facts of the case. The 
majority held that men were not a historically disadvantaged group and that the aim 
of the provision was to benefit women who had been disadvantaged in the past and 
  
 
 
 79 
that the action did not impair the fundamental dignity of the men concerned. 
However, the findings followed an almost mechanical application of the test. 
 
Kriegler J was highly critical in his dissenting judgment. He acknowledged that the 
case was a hard and awkward one and commented that there was a critical of lack of 
evidence and reliance on perceptions and generalizations. He remarked that the 
president’s act had “impressive provenance and charitable appearance”178
 
 but he 
was critical, especially in relation to the prominence given in the majority judgment to 
the conclusion that the act would benefit women on the assumption that women were 
the primary caregivers – an assumption which had in the past been the cause of 
women’s inequality. Thus instead of reversing patterns of disadvantage, the 
provisions had the effect of perpetuating a particular view of women which had in the 
past operated to their detriment. 
His view was that sex discrimination was a serious concern of the drafters of the 
constitution and that sex discrimination was “presumed” to be unfair as a result. That 
made it automatically a questionable action which required a persuasive rebuttal. It 
was pointed out that although in South Africa there were no levels of scrutiny as in 
the USA, it was nevertheless worth noting that race/sex/gender were given special 
mention in the Preamble of the Constitution and headed the list of grounds of 
discrimination therein. Therefore, it cannot be permitted that the burden be 
discharged with relative ease. The basis of Kriegler’s dissent was that the rebuttal 
needed to “establish” fairness and that therefore rebutting factors could not in 
themselves be discriminatory. That would be objectionable and a perpetuation of 
discrimination or inequality could never be justified. An act which presupposed such 
conduct or relied on such conduct could never pass muster.  
 
Kriegler J also pointed out that the further facts which could justify the actions were to 
be considered under the limitations clause and had to be distinguished from the 
section 8(4) (of the Interim Constitution) “fairness enquiry.” Justification and fairness 
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were two different things. The vindication of the perceived role of mothers in South 
Africa and the stereotyping in that regard cannot be accepted. “It is a relic and a 
feature of the patriarchy which the constitution so vehemently condemns.179”  Again, 
the importance of equality in South Africa was stressed. Equality is at the centre of 
the constitution and its “focus and organizing principle.”180
 
 
Mokgoro J emphasised that treating men as less able parents constituted an 
infringement on their equality and dignity. Society should no longer be bound by the 
notions that a woman’s place is in the home and that fathers do not have a significant 
role to play in the rearing of young children. She was unpersuaded by the majority 
judgment’s emphasis on the vulnerable position of young mothers in South Africa 
and acknowledged that whilst they may generally be disadvantaged, there is no 
evidence that they are disadvantaged in the penal system in particular.  
 
With regard to the limitations clause and the decision as to whether the limitation was 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, the temporary denial of 
parenthood to fathers was justifiable with reference to the interests of the children 
whose mothers were released. There was no doubt that the aim of ensuring that 
young children were looked after was legitimate and fathers could still apply for 
remission of sentence on an individual basis. The issue was the impossibility of 
releasing all mothers and fathers at once. 
  
In this case the court stated its understanding of the equality clause as follows: “The 
prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim constitution seeks not only to avoid 
discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It seeks 
more than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity 
and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The achievement of 
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such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that 
that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.”181
 
  
The Court therefore was viewed as shifting its approach from group disadvantage to 
dignity as the centre of the right. In addition, it is thought that the law was 
inconsistently applied without distinguishing between the categories of people. 
Furthermore, the Court held that it was necessary to show intent to apply the law 
unequally. 
 
Goldstone J’s description of equality as “according equal dignity and respect” tended 
to reduce the meaning of equality to the right to dignity, according to Albertyn and 
Goldblatt.182
 
 The right to equality, according to Goldstone J, is defined by the value of 
dignity rather than the value of equality. 
O’Regan’s focus on the severity of harm on the individual within the group suggested 
the correct method of enquiry into equality violations. She stated that the unequal 
division of labour between fathers and mothers was a primary source of women’s 
disadvantage in our society. It was therefore necessary to look at the group or groups 
which have suffered discrimination in the particular case and at the effect thereof on 
the interests of those concerned. The more vulnerable the group adversely affected, 
the more likely the discrimination would be held to be unfair. The more invasive the 
nature of the discrimination upon the interests of the individuals affected by 
discrimination, the more likely it would be to be held unfair. Profound disadvantage 
lay in the social fact of the dominant role played by mothers in child rearing and in the 
inequality which resulted from it. Putting an end to it is a major challenge to be faced 
in our society. The harmful impact however, was not experienced by mothers in this 
case, but by fathers. That impact was far from severe and the effect of the 
discrimination was not a cause of substantial or permanent harm. 
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In this case, the Court adopted the contextual analysis approach with an emphasis 
on investigating the impact of the discriminatory action on the people concerned 
when determining the unfairness of the discrimination. 
 
The major flaw of the judgments, according Albertyn and Goldblatt,183
 
 was that they 
were unable to locate the complainant as a single father, within his social context and 
that they lost sight of the overlapping nature of social groups. A further problem was 
the lack of appropriate evidence in that regard. 
In summary, Goldstone J at 729 G-H held: “Each case … will require a careful and 
thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular 
people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the 
constitutional goal of equality or not, a classification which is unfair in one context 
may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.” 
 
3.13 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 6 BCLR 759 (CC) 
 
The judgment in Prinsloo184 was handed down on 18 April 1997, the same date as 
the judgment in Hugo.185 It was the third Constitutional Court matter in which the 
notions of equality and discrimination were dealt with prior to the Harksen186
 
case. 
The matter concerned differentiation between defendants in veld fire cases as 
opposed to those in other delictual matters. Allegedly there was no rational basis to 
account for the difference. A second differentiation was argued to be the fact that the 
presumption of negligence applied only in respect of fires in non-controlled areas and 
not those spreading into controlled areas. 
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The Court held that our country has diverse communities with different historical 
experiences and different living conditions. The impact of structured and vast 
inequality was still with us, despite the arrival of the new constitutional order and 
“While our country, unfortunately has great experience in constitutionalizing 
inequality, it is a newcomer when it comes to ensuring constitutional respect for 
equality – therefore court should be wary of laying down sweeping interpretations, 
but should allow the equality doctrine to develop slowly and hopefully surely”187
 
 
The Court emphasised that the equality clause in the Interim Constitution was the 
product of our own particular history – a history which was particularly relevant to the 
concept of equality. When the clause is read, the concept of equality is referred to in 
different ways. Firstly, equality before the law seemed to be concerned with equality 
in treatment in the courts, the notion that no one is above or beneath the law and that 
all persons are subject to law impartially applied and administered.  The equality 
clause described equality in the first section in the positive and in the second as a 
negative: –“No person shall be unfairly discriminated against …”188
 
 
It stated that the idea of differentiation (employing a neutral descriptive term) seemed 
to lie at the heart of the equality jurisprudence in general and of section 8 in 
particular. The clause dealt with equity in two ways – differentiation which does not 
involve unfair discrimination and differentiation which does. Differentiation of itself did 
not constitute discrimination. The term discrimination carried negative connotations 
which distinguished it from differentiation which is acceptable and very often 
essential. However, the use of the word ‘unfair’ to qualify discrimination in section 
8(3) of the Interim Constitution begged the question as to whether, in that context, 
the term discrimination is not viewed as pejorative. 
 
The Court held that an overview of the constitutional right to equality revealed that 
there are two categories of differentiation namely: differentiation “which does not 
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involve unfair discrimination (‘legitimate differentiation’ and ‘differentiation which does 
involve unfair discrimination.’”189 It used the example of bona fide classifications by 
the government for the purpose of efficiency and the common good to identify the 
first category of differentiation. It held that it was impossible to govern effectively 
without differentiation and classifications which treat people differently and which 
impact on people differently – that constituted “mere differentiation”. Mere 
differentiation would be invalid only if there is no rational connection between the 
differentiation and a legitimate purpose. “In regard to mere differentiation the 
Constitutional State is expected to act in a rational manner. It should not regulate in 
an arbitrary manner or manifest ‘naked preferences’ that serve no legitimate 
governmental purpose, for that would be inconsistent with the rule of law and the 
fundamental premises of a constitutional state. The purpose of this aspect of equality 
is therefore to ensure that the State is bound to function in a rational manner … 
Accordingly, before it can be said that mere differentiation infringes section 8 it must 
be established that there is no rational relationship between the differentiation in 
question and the government purpose which is proffered to validate it. In the absence 
of such rational relationship the differentiation would infringe section 9”190
 
 
The Court also pointed out that while rationality was necessary, it was not sufficient 
because the differentiation might still constitute unfair discrimination if the element in 
8(2) were present. 8(2) was a section which dealt only with unfair discrimination by 
distinguishing two forms thereof and dealing with them differently.  
 
The first form is discrimination on listed grounds. When there is prima facie proof of 
discrimination on a listed ground, the presumption of unfairness applies until the 
contrary is proved.  
 
The second form is discrimination unlisted grounds and no presumption of unfairness 
applied. When read “in its full and historical context and in the light of the purpose of 
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s8 as a whole and s8(2) in particular, the second form cannot be given such an 
extremely wide and unstructured meaning. Proper weight must be attached to the 
use of the word discrimination in 8(2). The section proscribes ‘unfair 
discrimination.’”191
 
 
The court however, firmly rejected a suggestion that discrimination has become a 
neutral term because of the addition of the word unfair. “The proscribed activity is not 
stated to be ‘unfair differentiation’ but is stated to be ‘unfair discrimination’. Given the 
history of this country we are of the view that ‘discrimination’ has acquired a 
particular pejorative meaning related to the unequal treatment of people based on 
attributes and characteristics attaching to them … the humanity of the majority of the 
inhabitants of this country was denied. They were treated as not having inherent 
worth; as objects whose identities could be arbitrarily defined by those in power 
rather than as persons of infinite worth. In short they were denied recognition of their 
inherent dignity.”192
 
 
“In our view unfair discrimination when used in this second form in s8(2), in the 
context of section 8 as a whole, principally means treating persons differently in a 
away which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently 
equal in dignity.”193
 
 
It further held that other forms of differentiation, which in some other way (not a 
fundamental dignity impairment) affected persons adversely in a comparably serious 
manner, may well constitute a breach of section 8(2) 
 
This case was a rationality review under section 8(1) - the rule of law. In respect of 
“rule of law” there must be a rational relationship between the legislative scheme and 
achievement of a legitimate government purpose. In this matter the Court used a low 
level of scrutiny – the rational scrutiny review. It was however, not sufficient for the 
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complainant to show that the differentiation did not achieve its purpose. It had also to 
be shown that there was no rational basis for holding that the law could achieve its 
purpose. As long as the government could identify a purpose and as long as there 
was a rational basis for believing that the purpose could be achieved, there was no 
basis in arguing it could have been achieved in a different way. Also as long as there 
was a rational relationship between the method and object, it was irrelevant that the 
object could have been achieved in a different way. This did not mean that the 
particular differentiation might still not constitute unfair discrimination under the 
second form of unfair discrimination in section 8(2). However in casu the 
differentiation could not be seen as impairing the dignity of the applicant and there 
was no basis for concluding that the differentiation in some other “invidious way”194
 
 
adversely affected such person in a comparably serious manner. It was clearly a 
regulatory matter to be adjudged according to whether or not there was a rational 
relationship between the differentiation and the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
act in question. The Court found that there had been no breach of the constitutional 
right to equality. 
It has been stated that the court did not employ a two-stage analysis to the term 
unfair discrimination. It appears therefore that the court confused or conflated the two 
terms.  
 
Fagan195
 
 is of the view that O’Regan and Sachs JJ in essence claim that dignity is at 
the heart of unfair discrimination based on their three point argument which goes as 
follows:  
“1. Unfair discrimination and not unfair differentiation is proscribed;  
2.  In South Africa discrimination is not synonymous with mere differentiation, to 
discriminate is not merely to differentiate, but rather to differentiate in a 
manner which impairs people’s dignity;  
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3.  Unfair discrimination is if a person is treated differently in a way that impairs a 
person’s dignity.”  
 
Fagan posed the question: “What makes differentiation unfair?” He stated that 
according to the judges, it is a sufficient condition for unfair discrimination that the 
differentiating action impairs dignity. 
 
Didcott J’s remarks at that time were indeed apt196
 
: “Not even then … have we 
developed a complete and coherent jurisprudence on the subject of equality. Sooner 
or later, no doubt, we shall have to enunciate one. But so complex, so subtle and so 
delicate a task ought not to be undertaken in a case inappropriate for it. We may 
otherwise overlook nuances and implications of the principle to which our thoughts 
are not immediately attuned…It suffices for our purposes there, I consider, to say no 
more than this. Mere differentiation can never amount, in itself and on its own, to 
discrimination or unequal treatment in the constitutional sense.” 
The Court too pronounced on onus in civil cases and Didcott J quoted197
 
 extensively 
from authorities e.g. Wigmore: “The truth is that there is not and cannot be any one 
general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on 
experience in the different situations … There are merely specific rules for specific 
classes of cases, resting for their ultimate basis upon broad reasons of experience 
and fairness.” The location of onus in specific cases depends not on doctrinaire 
considerations but on wholly pragmatic ones. 
Didcottt J further also asked: “The first question concerns the relationship between 
the right to equality and equal protection under the law and the prohibiting of unfair 
discrimination on the other. It is whether the prohibition forms a corollary to the right 
which amplifies that or an independent and self contained provision.”198
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fairness fitted only the prohibition or whether both criteria were apt for each. He did 
not answer the questions as the case had failed and therefore the matter was not 
decided in that regard. 
 
3.14 Leonard Dingler ER Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 285 
(LC) 
 
On 3 October 1997, three days before the Harksen199 judgment was handed down, 
the Labour Court delivered its extremely lengthy and well-reasoned judgment in the 
Leonard Dingler200
 
 matter. Three retirement funds allegedly operated along racial 
lines. It was alleged that the company therefore practised direct and indirect 
discrimination on racial grounds. The indirect discrimination claim between weekly 
and monthly paid employees was conceded during argument. 
The Court noted that some discrimination is permissible while other discrimination is 
impermissible. The notion of permissible discrimination was found to be in keeping 
with a substantive rather than formal approach to equality. The factors to be 
considered in a determination as to whether discrimination was unfair were 
considered by the Court. It conducted a lengthy and detailed review of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to the question and focussed extensively on the case 
background: “… the case by case approach to equality emphasising the actual 
context in which each dispute arises seems as appropriate to unfair labour practice 
disputes as to cases testing the constitutionality of legislation. With this in mind, 
testing the legitimacy of discrimination requires more than an enquiry into the group 
that suffered the discrimination. The effect of the discrimination on the group must be 
considered and also the power in terms of which the discrimination was effected.”201
 
 
                                                 
199 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
200 Leonard Dingler E R Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC). 
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Careful consideration of the context in which the dispute arose was also evident with 
the Court indicating that there was no fixed formula to apply mechanically to any 
given situation. 
 
The Court held that the onus was on the applicant to show that discrimination 
existed. If it was indeed shown, the onus shifted to the respondent employer to show 
that the object of the practice was legitimate and the means of achieving it rational 
and proportional. 
 
It also stated that the presence or absence of intention might be relevant only when 
the court decided on relief. 
 
It is postulated by many commentators that a general fairness test for affirmative 
action was envisaged in the following statement by the Court:202
 
  “Discrimination is 
unfair if it is reprehensible in terms of the society’s prevailing norms. Whether or not 
society will tolerate the discrimination depends on what the object is of the 
discrimination and the means used to achieve it. The object must be legitimate and 
the means proportionate and rational.” It appears to many to suggest that affirmative 
action measures which satisfy requirements are a complete defence to unfair 
discrimination. 
The Court held that there was no objective justification for only permitting monthly 
paid staff to join the staff benefit fund. It constituted discrimination on an arbitrary 
ground and had the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of rights and freedoms by all persons on an equal footing. In the judgment, 
the Court referred extensively to academic authorities and  Constitutional Court 
judgments in its discussion of the meaning to be given to the inclusion of the term 
“unfair” in item 2(1)(a) of ULP definition contained in the LRA. It held that the 
provisions sorted permissible from impermissible discrimination and noted that what 
is less clear is where to draw the line between permissible and impermissible 
                                                 
202 Leonard Dingler E R Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd at 295H. 
  
 
 
 90 
discrimination. A case by case approach and an emphasis on the actual context in 
which a case arose would be deemed appropriate. Testing the legitimacy of 
discrimination required more than an enquiry into the group that suffered – the effect 
of the discrimination on the group had to be considered, as well as the power in 
terms of which the discrimination was effected. The “justification” enquiry lay at the 
heart and involved a consideration of context. However, the Court also pointed out, 
as had the Constitutional Court, that there was no fixed formula to apply 
mechanically. 
 
The Court quoted Cameron J in Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd,203
 
 a defamation 
case, where it was held that the Constitution plants new values at the roots of our 
legal system, including values of equality, democracy, transparency of government 
and accountability. 
The Court did not share counsel’s views that the mere willingness to right past 
wrongs made discrimination fair. It was the Black group that was discriminated 
against, a group that was and still is disadvantaged. No explanation had been offered 
for the object of the conduct and there was thus no objective justification for the 
discriminatory treatment or impact that resulted from the conduct. 
 
The Court also noted that the European Court of Justice, in applying equality 
provisions in European law, had consistently held that equality rights may not be 
infringed by collective labour agreements. 
 
The Court in addition discussed the serious and possibly insurmountable difficulties 
which would ensue if applicants in discrimination cases were required to prove that 
discrimination was unfair. Such an approach would eventually undermine the 
constitutional commitment to eradicate inequality. It was doubtful that the legislature 
intended that. Therefore the employer had to show that the object of the practice or 
policy was legitimate and that the means used were rational and proportional. 
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In this case, the Court did not require a restrictive statistical analysis which had 
marked indirect discrimination cases in the United States. The Court did not assess 
the size of the base-group of employees excluded from the fund but found that the 
number of black employees who qualified for membership was disproportionately 
low. 
 
Du Toit204
 
 at page 1325 stated that this case was arguably the most closely-reasoned 
judgment to be handed down in terms of Item 2(1)(a) and that it became the leading 
authority on concept of indirect discrimination thereafter. 
More controversially however, the case has been cited as authority for the 
proposition that an employer, despite the two permitted grounds for discrimination in 
the ILO Convention, also had a general or residual fairness defence – a view not 
shared by many commentators, however. 
 
Having reviewed the most important cases prior to Harksen205
 
, it is clear that during 
that period, the courts grappled with a number of notions – differentiation as opposed 
to discrimination; “fair” and “unfair” discrimination; an understanding of a substantive 
equality right; employer prerogative, commercial rationale and operational 
requirements as factors justifying discrimination; the supremacy of a collective 
agreement and discriminatory provisions contained in them; degrees of 
disadvantage; whether affirmative action constituted an exception to the right to 
equality or not; the limits of affirmative action and more. 
Despite grappling with notions of equality and discrimination, an excellent example of 
the fact that even our Courts were blind to certain embedded forms of discrimination, 
was the Collins206
                                                 
204 Du Toit D (2006) 27 ILJ 1311 at page 1325. 
 case where discrimination on the ground of pregnancy appeared 
205 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
206 Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonarea Branch) a division of ABSA Bank Ltd supra. 
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not to have been seen as grossly unfair and where the employer’s needs were 
deferred to. 
 
It has also been pointed out by Cooper207
 
that: “The notion of fairness under the old 
labour law regime was one in which the employer and the employee were held in a 
strict balance. The old Industrial Court developed a body of rules in which equity was 
seen broadly as encompassing a balancing of employer and employee interests in 
order to achieve the Act’s objective of labour peace.” The notion of impartiality was 
emphasised.  
Although impartiality is still central to the Act’s provisions, the same scrupulous 
formalism is not required and would, in fact, derogate from the achievement of the 
objectives of equality through failing to take into account disadvantage. The Act’s 
purpose is to balance interests between employer and employee. Cooper also points 
out208 that the Labour Courts now also need to take into account constitutional norms 
and values, including substantive equality, when considering the notion of parity. 
Generally, the old Industrial Court sought to balance the interests of employees and 
employers in order to achieve the goal of labour peace through “even-
handedness.”209
 
 
Initially, clearly in an environment where South Africa had been ‘cut off’ by the rest of 
the world, ILO Conventions and Recommendations and international law were not 
taken into account in arriving at decisions. It did not take long, however, for those 
foresighted judges and counsel increasingly to look to the outside world for guidance, 
despite the country not yet having emerged from its isolation and insular focus. The 
most noteworthy of these judgements must be the Chamber of Mines210
                                                 
207 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121. 
 where the 
Court emphatically renounced any form of racial discrimination in a time where the 
separate but equal philosophy was the position of the very repressive government. 
208 Cooper C 2001 Acta Juridica 121. 
209 Brassey The New Labour Law: Strikes, dismissals and the unfair labour practice in South African Law (1987) 
at 63. 
210 Chamber of Mines of South Africa v Council of Mining Unions supra. 
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Gradually, the courts appeared to become comfortable in dealing with equality in a 
substantive manner as opposed to the rigid focus on formal equality and pure merit in 
appointment, and the mere elimination of overt discrimination from laws and policies. 
 
Du Toit211
 
 remarked that: “In the often painstaking enquiry and incisive insights 
reflected in various judgments, many, if not all, of the elements of a concept of 
impermissible discrimination, subsumed in the subsequent constitutional mandate, 
were delineated.”  
Once the Constitutional Court had delivered its first three discrimination judgments it 
was as if the South African jurisprudence on equality and discrimination in a 
constitutional state was rightly being positioned at a level equal to international 
standards. The judgments, grappling with very profound concepts, seemed to set a 
new tone for judicial thinking, lifting our jurisprudence out of its past with a new 
direction and emphasis on giving very real effect to the constitutional mandate of 
equality, dignity and freedom. 
 
At that point in time, just prior to the Harksen212
 
 judgment, and most aptly so, the 
Constitutional Court pointed out on more than one occasion that the equality doctrine 
had to be allowed to develop slowly and that the Court had to be wary of laying down 
sweeping interpretations or prematurely laying down tests. 
However, soon thereafter, the Constitutional Court, did just that. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HARKSEN v LANE 
 
In this extremely important judgment, the Constitutional Court did not state that it was 
giving effect to the intention of the Constitutional Assembly or that it was assigning an 
official meaning to the Constitutional text, but it is evident from the decision that the 
court was setting out what it considered to be the true meaning of the sections in 
question. In so far as its interpretation of the equality right was concerned, it was clearer 
in its directives, as the court clothed its findings as an authoritative guideline for the 
correct approach to and interpretation of section 8 of the Interim Constitution. In 
interpreting the section it referred extensively to especially its two earlier judgments in 
the Prinsloo213 and Hugo214
 
 matters, expanding on those dicta. 
It is clearly to be expected that a newly established Constitutional Court would attempt 
to develop jurisprudence and to create a measure of clarity and certainty about the new 
Constitution, particularly about contentious issues such as equality. In this matter, it did 
so, resulting in the Harksen test, which became the guideline for the interpretation of 
cases concerning equality and discrimination. 
 
Judge Goldstone J delivered the judgment on 7 October 1997, with Chaskalson P, 
Langa DP, Ackermann J, Kriegler J, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O'Regan J and Sachs J 
concurring. O'Regan J (Madala J and Mokgoro J concurring) and Sachs J delivered 
separate judgments, dissenting in part from the majority's judgment and holding that 
section 21 was an unconstitutional violation of section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution. 
 
The matter concerned the right to equality before the law and the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against in terms of section 8 in chapter 3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. It had been alleged that section 21 of the 
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Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 differentiated between the solvent spouse of an insolvent and 
other persons who might have had dealings with that insolvent.  
 
The context of the case was the sequestration of the estate of Mr Jürgen Harksen. The 
applicant, Mrs Jeanette Harksen, was at that time married out of community of property 
to Mr Harksen. The first and second respondents were the trustees in the insolvent 
estate of Mr Harksen. 
 
Mrs Harksen alleged that the provisions of section 21 were in violation of the equality 
clause of the Interim Constitution. More particularly it was contended that the vesting 
provision constituted unequal treatment of solvent spouses and discriminated unfairly 
against them; and that its effect was to impose severe burdens, obligations and 
disadvantages on them beyond those applicable to other persons with whom the 
insolvent had dealings or close relationships or whose property is found in the 
possession of the insolvent. Counsel for Mrs Harksen suggested that the provisions of 
section 21 constituted a violation of both section 8(1) (a denial of equality before the law 
and equal protection of the law) and section 8(2) (unfair discrimination). 
 
The Court held that the differentiation did not infringe the right to equal protection of the 
law because the purpose of the impugned section was legitimate and the  differentiation 
had a rational connection to that purpose, However, section 21 did constitute 
discrimination against solvent spouses, since the differentiation between a solvent 
spouse of an insolvent and other persons having dealings with that insolvent arose from 
attributes or characteristics as solvent spouses which had the potential to demean 
persons in their inherent humanity and dignity  
 
The discrimination was held as not to be unfair because it was not affecting a vulnerable 
group which had suffered discrimination in the past. The purpose of the measure was 
not inconsistent with the underlying values protected by section 8(2) and because the 
inconvenience and the burden imposed by the section did not lead to impairment of 
  
 
 
 
96 
fundamental dignity and did not constitute an impairment of a comparably serious 
nature. 
 
The Court considered an argument that section 21 was an unconstitutional violation of 
section 8(1) (right to equal protection of the law) and of section 8(2) (right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against) of the interim Constitution. It was contended that the 
vesting provision contained in the Insolvency Act constituted unequal treatment of 
solvent spouses and discriminated unfairly against them; and that its effect was to 
impose severe burdens, obligations and disadvantages on them beyond those 
applicable to other persons with whom the insolvent had dealings or close relationships 
or whose property was found in the possession of the insolvent. 
 
It was held that section 21 differentiated between the solvent spouse of an insolvent and 
other persons who might have had dealings with the insolvent. It therefore became 
necessary to consider the governmental purpose of the section, whether that purpose 
was a legitimate one and, if so, whether the differentiation had a rational connection to 
that purpose.  
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that while section 21 might have caused inconvenience, 
potential prejudice and embarrassment to a solvent spouse, and while those 
consequences might be described as drastic, they were not arbitrary or without 
rationality. The legislature had acted rationally in taking the view that the common law 
and the statutory remedies relating to impeachable transactions were insufficient to 
enable the Master or a trustee to ensure that all the property of the insolvent spouse 
found its way into the insolvent estate.  
 
There was therefore found to be a rational connection between the differentiation 
created by section 21 of the Act and the legitimate governmental purpose behind its 
enactment. Moreover, reasonable procedures had been introduced to safeguard the 
interests of the solvent spouse in his or her property. It followed that section 21 did not 
violate s 8(1) of the interim Constitution. 
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As to whether section 21 violated section 8(2) of the Interim Constitution, it was held 
that, because the differentiation between solvent spouses and other persons was not on 
one of the specified grounds in s 8(2), there had to be an objective enquiry into whether 
it constituted discrimination on one of the unspecified grounds. This enquiry yielded an 
affirmative result. Other persons who had dealings with the insolvent or whose property 
was found in the possession of an insolvent were not affected in the same way. Their 
property did not become vested in the Master or the trustee and they were not burdened 
with the onus of proving what was their property before it was released to them. The 
differentiation did arise from their attributes or characteristics as solvent spouses, 
namely their usual close relationship with the insolvent spouse and the fact that they 
usually lived together in a common household. These attributes had the potential to 
demean persons in their inherent humanity and dignity. 
 
With regard to the question as to whether discrimination was unfair, it was held that 
solvent spouses, was not a group which had suffered discrimination in the past and was 
not a vulnerable one. The measure gave effect to Parliament's duty to protect the public 
interest by protecting the rights of the creditors of insolvent estates. The purpose of the 
measure was not inconsistent with the underlying values protected by section 8(2). As to 
the effect of the discrimination on the solvent spouses, it was held that, while the 
statutory vesting of the property of the solvent spouse gave rise to inconvenience and 
burden, it was the kind of inconvenience and burden that any citizen may face when 
resort to litigation became necessary. The inconvenience and burden of having to resist 
such a claim was found not to lead to an impairment of fundamental dignity or to 
constitute an impairment of a comparably serious nature.  
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The Court laid down the following test215
 
 to determine the presence or otherwise of 
unfair discrimination: 
Section 8(1) must be used to attack legislative provisions or executive conduct where it 
resulted in differentiation between groups in a manner that amounted to unequal 
treatment or unfair discrimination. Therefore, the first enquiry must be:  Does the 
provision differentiate between groups? 
 
If yes, then:  
 
Is there a rational connection between the differentiation and a legitimate governmental 
purpose it is designed to achieve? 
Is the purpose consistent with the underlying values protected by the equality clause? 
Is there no evidence of arbitrariness or manifestations of “naked preferences” without 
legitimate government purpose? 
 
If yes, then: it does not amount to a breach of s 8(1), but may nonetheless constitute 
unfair discrimination for the purposes of s 8(2).  
 
Extensively referring to the judgment in the Prinsloo216
 
 the Court at this stage expressed 
its understanding of “mere differentiation” and stated that it is essential for government 
to regulate the affairs of its citizens extensively. It is impossible to do so without 
differentiation and without classifications which treat people differently and which impact 
on people differently. Differentiation which fell into this category very rarely constituted 
unfair discrimination and amounted to governmental action relating to a defensible vision 
of the public good. While the existence of such a rational relationship was a necessary 
condition for the differentiation not to infringe s 8, it was not a sufficient condition, for the 
differentiation might still constitute unfair discrimination.  
                                                 
215 Hereinafter referred to as “the Harksen test”. 
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The enquiry would therefore proceed as follows: 
 
Is the differentiation based on one of the listed grounds? 
 
If yes, it is discrimination and presumed to be unfair, a presumption which may be 
rebutted. 
If no, is the differentiation based on an alleged unlisted ground? 
 
If yes, to constitute an unlisted ground, the ground would have to be analysed 
objectively against the following characteristics, analogous to the listed grounds: 
- the differentiation is based on attributes or characteristics attaching to a group, 
used and abused in the past to marginalize and oppress such group or attributes 
related to immutable biological characteristics, the associational life of people, 
their intellectual, expressive or religious dimensions as persons or a combination 
thereof; 
- the differentiation would have to have the potential to demean members of the 
group in their inherent humanity and dignity 
- the group is a vulnerable group 
- the group has been discriminated against in the past,  
- the impact of the differentiation constitutes an impairment, (in comparison with 
the listed grounds) of a comparably serious nature 
- the differentiation imposes severe burdens, obligations and disadvantages on the 
members of the group; 
- the perpetuation of the discrimination could result in the construction of patterns 
of disadvantage. 
 
If yes, it constitutes discrimination on an unlisted ground, but there is no presumption of 
unfairness. The applicant will have to prove unfairness. 
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According to the Court, again referring extensively to the Hugo217 case, “the prohibition 
on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution sought not only to avoid discrimination 
against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It sought more than that. At 
the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lay a recognition that the purpose of 
our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all 
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their 
membership of particular groups. The achievement of such a society in the context of 
our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is the goal of the Constitution 
should not be forgotten or overlooked. … To determine whether that impact was unfair it 
is necessary to look not only at the group who has been disadvantaged but at the nature 
of the power in terms of which the discrimination was effected and, also at the nature of 
the interests which have been affected by the discrimination.”218
  
 
The Court further held that the prohibition of unfair discrimination in the Constitution 
provided “a bulwark against invasions which impair human dignity or which affect people 
adversely in a comparably serious manner.”219
 
 It was made clear that the unfairness 
stage of the enquiry focused primarily on the experience of the 'victim' of discrimination. 
In the final analysis, it is the impact of the discrimination on the victim that would be the 
determining factor regarding the unfairness of the discrimination. 
In order to determine unfairness, various factors relating to the impact of the 
discrimination must be considered. The equality clause seeks to avoid discrimination 
against disadvantaged groups and that all persons be afforded equal dignity – dignity 
being the underlying consideration: 
 
In looking at the group discriminated against, the following must be evaluated to 
determine fairness or otherwise: 
 
- The nature of the power in terms of which the discrimination was effected 
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- The nature of the interests affected; 
- The experience of the “victim.” 
- The adverse impact effected – it must be of a comparatively serious nature.  
 
Impact is the determining factor at this stage of the enquiry and there is a specific “test” 
comprising of a number of considerations and factors to evaluate it. The cumulative 
effect of the factors must be examined and it is in respect of them that a determination 
must be made as to whether the discrimination is unfair: 
 
- The position of the complainant and whether he/she has suffered from patterns of 
disadvantage in the past; 
- The nature and purpose of the provision or power; 
- The purpose sought to be achieved 
- Whether there is a worthy and important social goal involved; 
- The extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of the 
complainant(s); 
- Whether there is an impairment of the fundamental dignity of the complainant(s); 
- Whether the impairment is of a comparatively serious nature. 
 
The Court held that the factors, assessed objectively, would assist in giving 'precision 
and elaboration'220
 
 to the constitutional test of unfairness. They did not constitute a 
closed list. Other factors may well emerge as the Court’s equality jurisprudence 
continued to develop.  
If the discrimination is held to be unfair then the provision in question will be in violation 
of s 8(2).  
 
One would then proceed upon the final leg of the enquiry as to whether the provision 
can be justified under s 33 of the interim Constitution, the limitations clause.  
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This will involve: 
 
1. a weighing of the purpose and effect of the provision in question and; 
 
2. a determination as to the proportionality thereof in relation to the extent of its 
infringement of equality. 
 
It is apt to end the analysis of the case with reference to the separate judgments of 
O’Regan and Sachs. O’Regan referred to the Kitshoff221
 
 judgment where it was held as 
follows: 
“Section 8 was adopted then in the recognition that discrimination against people who 
are members of disfavoured groups can lead to patterns of group disadvantage and 
harm. Such discrimination is unfair: it builds and entrenches inequality amongst different 
groups in our society. The drafters realised that it was necessary both to proscribe such 
forms of discrimination and to permit positive steps to redress the effects of such 
discrimination. The need to prohibit such patterns of discrimination and to remedy their 
results are the primary purposes of s 8 and, in particular, ss (2), (3) and (4).” 
 
She also quoted from the Prinsloo222
  
 judgment as follows: 
“Given the history of this country we are of the view that ''discrimination'' has acquired a 
particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of people based on 
attributes and characteristics attaching to them. We are emerging from a period of our 
history during which the humanity of the majority of the inhabitants of this country was 
denied. They were treated as not having inherent worth; as objects whose identities 
could be arbitrarily defined by those in power rather than as persons of infinite worth. In 
short, they were denied recognition of their inherent dignity.”223
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She remarked224
 
 that the Court had interpreted s 8(2) as “a clause which is primarily a 
buffer against the construction of further patterns of discrimination and disadvantage. 
Underpinning the desire to avoid such discrimination is the Constitution's commitment to 
human dignity. Such patterns of discrimination can occur where people are treated 
without the respect that individual human beings deserve and particularly where 
treatment is determined not by the needs or circumstances of particular individuals, but 
by their attributes and characteristics, whether biologically or socially determined.” 
Judge Sachs, in his separate judgment, 225
 
 remarked that: “the path which this Court 
embarked upon in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another and President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another v Hugo, and as confirmed in the judgment of Goldstone J in 
the present matter, requires it to pay special regard to patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage experienced in real life which might not be evident on the face of the 
legislation itself.” 
He continued by stressing that “the incremental development of equality jurisprudence 
presaged by Prinsloo requires us to examine on a case by case basis the way in which 
a challenged law impacts on persons belonging to a class contemplated by s 8(2). In 
particular, it is necessary to evaluate in a contextual manner how the legal 
underpinnings of social life reduce or enhance the self-worth of persons identified as 
belonging to such groups.”  
 
It is submitted that contrary to the view expressed by many, the test laid down by the 
Court in this matter, is not a simple two-part test. It comprises of a number of separate 
enquiries, each with its own set of complicated and unlimited criteria for consideration. 
Because the Constitution peculiarly prohibits “unfair” discrimination rather than 
discrimination per se, the Constitutional Court in Harksen developed an enquiry or test 
to determine unfair discrimination. Initially, it must be decided whether the provisions 
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challenged actually amount to discrimination and finally, the question of unfairness must 
be decided.  
 
According to Goldstone J, differentiation on a specified ground renders it immediately 
discriminatory because “what the specified grounds have in common is that they have 
been used (or misused) in the past (both in SA and elsewhere) to categorise, 
marginalise and often oppress persons who have had or who have been associated with 
those attributes or characteristics. These grounds have the potential, when manipulated 
to demean persons in their inherent humanity and dignity.”226
 
 
Past disadvantage was not the only factor highlighted by court as common to specified 
grounds. It also highlighted the potential to demean persons in their inherent humanity 
and dignity. In fact, the court identified the latter as central to the determination of 
discrimination on an unspecified ground when it formulated the test as follows: “there will 
be discrimination on an unspecified ground if it is based on attributes or characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings 
or to affect them adversely in a comparatively serious manner.”227
 
 Just what may affect 
someone in a manner comparably serious to the impairment of fundamental dignity or 
comparable to the effects of the listed grounds is yet to be fully worked out. 
It may be argued that one of the strengths of the enquiry is that formal equality is 
determined firstly, while the unfairness enquiry later, is an opportunity to assess 
substantive equality. The absence of any real opportunity to consider disadvantage at 
the first stage is not significant, since it has greater relevance to the substantive impact 
which takes place at the later stage. However, this argument fails to take account of the 
potential impact of decisions at the first stage on the second. Because the first stage 
determines the scope and substance of the enquiry into unfairness at the second stage, 
decisions at the first stage have the potential to limit the substantive analysis.  
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In the evolving approach of the Constitutional Court, it is the impact on the victims of 
discrimination which must be examined to establish unfairness. The Court specifically 
stated that it was the cumulative effect of the factors which was to be considered in 
deciding the unfairness question.  
 
To some commentators the Harksen test represented a shift in focus to a perceived 
privileging of the concept of dignity at the expense of equality. There was little 
discussion on the meaning of disadvantage, despite the fact that different types of 
disadvantage arise in the cases. 
 
The judgment represented an attempt by the court to explicitly and emphatically reflect a 
substantive approach to equality. The proposed test or enquiry in itself is not, however, 
without problems. The identification of the range of factors which would be relevant to 
claims under the equality provision renders it vulnerable to criticism as both over-
inclusive and imprecise.  
 
According to McGregor228
 
, it appears from the case that dignity is the underlying 
consideration in determining the reasons or grounds for making differentiation 
illegitimate and consequently discrimination. 
Cooper229 indicated that the Constitution provides for the separate justification for the 
limitation of a right in the limitations clause. This involves an objective weighing up of the 
nature of the right against the nature, extent and purpose of the limitation and the less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. This justification process lies outside the 
determination of unfairness. She referred230 to Kentridge’s view231
                                                 
228 McGregor M 2002 14 SA Merc LJ 157 at 168. 
 that it would be 
difficult to envisage circumstances in which unfair discrimination could subsequently be 
justified. The distinction between the two enquiries (unfairness and the justification of 
229 Cooper C 2004 25 ILJ 813. 
230 Cooper C 2004 25 ILJ 813 at 820. 
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unfairness) is that the former involves questions of political morality, whereas the latter 
involves prudential considerations. 
 
The test for unfairness in labour law, according to Cooper232
 
, is similar to that in 
constitutional jurisprudence, with one main difference – the weighing up of the 
unfairness against the justification for the conduct takes place within a single enquiry. 
Thus the Court would examine the effect of the conduct on the complainant together 
with the justification for the conduct in order to decide finally whether there is unfair 
discrimination.  
The Labour Court appears to have accepted that the role played by unfairness is to 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible discrimination e.g. in Leonard 
Dingler.233
 
 
According to Van der Walt,234 the Court in Harksen235
 
 did not state that it was assigning 
an official meaning to the interim constitutional text, but that it is evident from the 
decision that the court was setting out what it considered to be the true meaning of 
section 8 of the Interim Constitution. The Court clothed its findings in this regard as an 
authoritative guideline for the correct approach to and interpretation of section 8.  
It now remains to be assessed whether, after Harksen236
                                                 
232 Cooper C 2004 25 ILJ 813 at 828. 
 the Courts remained faithful to 
the test.
233 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd supra. 
234 Van der Walt A “Striving for the better interpretation – A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s 
Harksen and FNB Decisions on the Property Clause” SALJ 854 
235 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
236 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
POST-HARKSEN 
 
Since the Harksen237
 
 judgment, the Constitutional Court has dealt with several 
matters concerning discrimination and affirmative action. It is important to review 
them in some depth as they indicate how the Court has elaborated upon the 
elements of the Harksen test, the applicable considerations and the relative weight to 
be attached to each. 
5.1 Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North-West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 
(CC) 
 
The first of these cases was the Larbi-Odam matter, decided on 26 November 1997. 
Mokgoro J delivered the judgment, with all the other judges concurring. 
 
The essence of the matter was that teachers were denied permanent appointments 
because of their status as non-citizens of South Africa. Regulation 2(2) of the 
Regulations regarding the Terms and Conditions of Employment of Educators was 
viewed as being ultra vires its enabling legislation, the Educators’ Employment Act 
138 of 1994. The material portion of the Regulation provided  that no person shall be 
appointed as an educator in a permanent capacity, unless he or she is a South 
African citizen. 
 
The respondent had advertised the posts held by foreign teachers who were 
temporarily employed and issued such teachers with notices purporting to terminate 
their employment.  The appellants submitted that the restrictions on their eligibility for 
permanent appointment amounted to unfair discrimination. 
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The eight appellants were foreign teachers temporarily employed in the North-West 
Province. Some of the appellants were permanent residents of South Africa.  Some 
were married to South African citizens and had children born in South Africa.   
 
The Court held that it was necessary to consider the issue of unfair discrimination in 
the light of the judgments dealing with equality and discrimination which it had 
previously handed down. The principles laid down in those cases had to be applied 
to the facts of this case.   
 
The disadvantaged group in this case was foreign citizens.   Because citizenship is 
an unspecified ground, the first leg of the enquiry required the Court to consider 
whether differentiation on that ground constituted discrimination. It involved an inquiry 
as to whether, in the words of Harksen: 
 
“ … objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to 
affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.”238
 
 
The Court held that it had no doubt that the ground of citizenship did.  Foreign 
citizens were a minority in all countries, and had little political muscle.  Citizenship 
was a personal attribute which was difficult to change.  The general lack of control 
over one’s citizenship had particular resonance for the Court in the South African 
context, where individuals were deprived of rights or benefits, ostensibly on the basis 
of citizenship, but in reality in circumstances where citizenship was governed by race.  
“Many became statutory foreigners in their own country under the Bantustan policy, 
and the legislature even managed to create remarkable beings called  ‘foreign 
natives’. Such people were treated as instruments of cheap labour to be discarded at 
will, with scant regard for their rights, or the rights of their families”239
 
 
The Court also noted that some of the respondent’s staff had received threatening 
telephone calls and remarked that such incidents indicated the vulnerability of non-
citizens generally.  In addition, the overall imputation seemed to be that because 
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persons were not citizens of South Africa they were for that reason alone not worthy 
of filling a permanent post.   
 
Given the above, the Court was of the view that the differentiating ground of 
citizenship in Regulation 2(2) was based on attributes and characteristics which had 
the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of non-citizens hit by the 
Regulation. 
 
It further held that to determine whether the discrimination in the case was unfair, 
regard had to be had primarily to the impact of the discrimination on the appellants, 
which in turn required a consideration of the nature of the group affected, the nature 
of the power exercised, and the nature of the interests involved.   
 
The power exercised in this case was a general power to prescribe regulations 
governing the terms and conditions of employment of educators nationwide.  
Regulation 2(2) affected employment opportunities, which were undoubtedly a vital 
interest.  A person’s profession was an important part of his or her life.  Security of 
tenure permitted a person to plan and build his or her family, social and professional 
life, in the knowledge that he or she could not be dismissed without good cause.  
Conversely, denial of security of tenure precluded a person from exercising such 
personal life choices.  
 
The Court therefore held that the unfair discrimination was not justified under section 
33(1) of the interim Constitution. At this stage, it elaborated on the two factors 
mentioned in the limitation stage of the Harksen test which were the purpose and 
effect of the provision and a determination of the proportionality thereof.  
 
The Court held in casu that the application of section 33(1): “. . . involved the 
weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality. . . . In the balancing process the relevant considerations will include 
the nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and 
the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its 
efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the 
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desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to 
the right in question.”240
 
 The Court therefore indicated what has to be taken into 
account in the balancing process. 
The Court found that it was “simply illegitimate”241
 
 to attempt to reduce 
unemployment among South African citizens by increasing unemployment among 
permanent residents.  Moreover, depriving permanent residents of posts they had 
held, in some cases for many years, was too high a price to pay in return for 
increasing jobs for citizens. 
The Court also held that differentiation on the ground of citizenship had the potential 
to impair dignity. The Court recognised that black non-citizens had been historically 
disadvantaged. Therefore historical disadvantage was used as a factor in 
determining the potential to impair dignity, thereby establishing discrimination.  
 
In the Harksen test, the consideration as to whether a group had been discriminated 
against historically was listed as an independent factor to take into account whether 
there was discrimination. It was not listed as an indicator of impairment of dignity. 
 
5.2 Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security & others (1998) 19 ILJ 240 
(T) 
 
This judgment was indeed a very disappointing one. The matter concerned direct 
discrimination on the basis of marital status against gay and lesbian people. The 
Court did not address the issue, but based its judgment in the common law, simply 
ignoring any developments in equality law. 
 
5.3 Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) 
 
In this case, the applicants alleged that the City Council had discriminated against 
them on race. The discrimination claim was based on fact that residents in previously 
white areas were paying more for electricity than residents in previously black areas. 
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The respondent invoked a constitutional provision, the right not to be the unfairly 
discriminated against.  The Court found that the full implications of this right, which 
was an aspect of the right to equality contained in section 8 of the interim 
Constitution, were complex. The section 8 right had been discussed in four prior 
judgments of the Court, namely, Prinsloo v Van der Linde,242 President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo,243 Harksen v Lane NO244 and Larbi-Odam v MEC 
for Education (North-West Province),245
 
 but was viewed by the Court as a subject 
which was still in need of further elaboration. 
The Court held that the dispute had to be seen in the light of changes which had 
come about as a result of the adoption of a new constitutional order. The difficulties 
were compounded by the disparities and imbalances inherent in society which were 
the result of policies of the past.   
 
The challenge facing the council from the beginning was to provide services and to 
treat all the residents within its jurisdiction equally. Those pre-existing disparities and 
the limited resources which the council had at its disposal meant that the task would 
be fraught with difficulties.   
 
The Court found that it was clear that the council treated the respondent, together 
with the other residents of old Pretoria, in a manner which was different to the 
treatment accorded to the residents of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville, but held that the 
differentiation was, at least partly, an inherited one.  The amalgamation that occurred 
resulted in a new relationship between areas which had been administered 
differently. “It was however a meeting of contrasts.”246
 
 
The Court also stressed that not all differentiation amounted to discrimination as 
envisaged in section 8.  It remained to be determined whether the differentiation 
constituted a violation of the right protected by section 8. 
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The Court quoted247 from Prinsloo248
 
  where the following was stated: 
“In regard to mere differentiation the constitutional state is expected to act in a 
rational manner.  It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest ‘naked 
preferences’ that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that would be 
inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental premises of the constitutional 
state.   The purpose of this aspect of equality is, therefore, to ensure that the state is 
bound to function in a rational manner.” 
 
The Court stated that the two foci of section 8(1), the right to equality before the law 
and the right to equal protection of the law,  were referred to in Prinsloo  where it was 
stated, as had been said by Didcott J speaking for the Court in S v Ntuli,249
 
 that “the 
right to equality before the law is concerned more particularly with entitling 
‘everybody, at the very least, to equal treatment by our courts of law.’ . . . no-one is 
above or beneath the law and that all persons are subject to law impartially applied 
and administered.”    
In the Court’s view, the rationality criterion adopted in Prinsloo250
 
 should be equally 
applicable whether one were dealing with “equality before the law” or “equal 
protection of the law.”   The Court was satisfied that the differentiation in the present 
case was rationally connected to legitimate governmental objectives.   Not only were 
the measures of a temporary nature but they were designed to provide continuity in 
the rendering of services by the council while phasing in equality in terms of facilities 
and resources, during a difficult period of transition. 
However, the Court stressed, that was not the end of the enquiry as differentiation 
that did not constitute a violation of section 8(1) might nonetheless constitute unfair 
discrimination for the purposes of section 8(2). 
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The Court referred to Harksen251
 
 where it was held that the enquiry as to whether 
differentiation amounted to unfair discrimination was a two-stage one. It stated that 
section 8(2) prohibited unfair discrimination which took place “directly or indirectly” 
and pointed out that this was the first occasion on which the Court had had to 
consider the difference between direct and indirect discrimination and whether such 
difference had any bearing on the section 8 analysis as developed in the four 
judgments to which it had referred. 
The Court held that the inclusion of both direct and indirect discrimination within the 
ambit of the prohibition imposed by section 8(2) evinced a concern for the 
consequences rather than the form of conduct.  It recognised that conduct which may 
appear to be neutral and non-discriminatory may nonetheless result in discrimination, 
and if it did, that it fell within the purview of section 8(2).   The emphasis which the 
Court placed on the impact of discrimination in deciding whether or not section 8(2) 
had been infringed was consistent with this concern. 
 
It was found that the fact that the differential treatment was made applicable to 
geographical areas rather than to persons of a particular race might have meant that 
the discrimination was not direct, but it did not alter the fact that in the circumstances 
of the case it constituted discrimination, albeit indirect, on the grounds of race.  It 
would be artificial to make a comparison between an area known to be 
overwhelmingly a “black area” and another known to be overwhelmingly a “white 
area,” on the grounds of geography alone. The effect of apartheid laws were that 
race and geography were inextricably linked and the application of a geographical 
standard, although seemingly neutral, may in fact be racially discriminatory.  Its 
impact in the case was clearly one which differentiated in substance between black 
residents and white residents. 
 
The Court held, with regard to the separate judgment of Sachs J in which the view 
was expressed that the differentiation in the present case was based on “objectively 
determinable characteristics of different geographical areas, and not on race”  that it 
could not subscribe to that view or to the proposition that this was a case in which, 
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because of history, a non-discriminatory policy had impacted fortuitously on one 
section of the community rather than another.   
 
The Court found that the impact of the policy that was adopted by the council officials 
was to require the residents of old Pretoria to comply with the legal tariff and to pay 
the charges made in terms of that tariff on pain of having their services suspended or 
legal action taken against them, whilst the residents of Atteridgeville and Mamelodi 
were not held to the tariff, were called upon to pay only a flat rate which was lower 
than the tariff and were not subjected to having their services suspended or legal 
action taken against them.  It was held that the racial impact of the differentiation 
could not be ignored and that to do so was to place form above substance. 
 
The council officials, according to the Court, knew that the effect of the policy would 
be discriminatory and that the residents of old Pretoria would be likely to object to it.  
The council did not rely on section 8(3) of the interim Constitution at the trial and did 
not then suggest that its officials had adopted the policy to which objection was taken 
in order to address the unfair discrimination of the past. It sought to justify the policy 
on the grounds that it was reasonable and the only practical way of dealing with the 
situation in the circumstances which existed.  That was, the Court found, relevant to 
the enquiry whether the discrimination was “unfair.” It is submitted that it was really 
relevant to the justification stage of the enquiry, not the unfairness stage. 
 
Differentiation on one of the specified grounds referred to in section 8(2) gave rise to 
a presumption of unfair discrimination.  The presumption which flowed from section 
8(4) applied to all differentiation on such grounds. 
 
According to Sachs J, however, section 8(2) was triggered only by differentiation 
which imposed “identifiable disabilities” or threatened “to touch on or reinforce 
patterns of disadvantage” or “in some proximate and concrete manner threaten(s) the 
dignity or equal concern or worth of the persons affected”252
 
 and in the absence of 
such consequences, the presumption under section 8(4) did not arise.  
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In the Court’s view, that was contrary to the decisions of the Court in the four cases 
to which were referred, in which it was held that differentiation on one of the specified 
grounds set out in section 8(2) gave rise to a presumption of unfair discrimination.   
The Court could see no reason for distinguishing in that regard between 
discrimination which was direct and that which was indirect.  Both were covered by 
section 8(4) and both were subject to the same presumption. 
 
The Court then held that the enquiry into whether the presumption of unfair 
discrimination had been rebutted involved an examination of the impact of the 
discrimination on the respondent.   The Court quoted from its judgment in Hugo253
 
 
where the following was stated: 
“The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to 
avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups.  It 
seeks more than that.  At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity 
and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.  The achievement of 
such a society in the context of our deeply  inegalitarian  past  will  not  be  easy,  but  
that  that  is  the  goal  of  the Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.”254
 
 
To determine whether the impact was unfair, the Court stated that it was necessary 
to look not only at the group which had been disadvantaged but at the nature of the 
power in terms of which the discrimination was effected and, also at the nature of the 
interests which have been affected by the discrimination. 
 
With regard to the question whether intention had any relevance in the determination 
of unfairness, the Court noted that in none of the four judgments it had been 
suggested that intention to discriminate was an essential element of unfair 
discrimination.   
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Consistent with the purposive approach that the Court had adopted to the 
interpretation of provisions of the Bill of Rights, it was held that proof of such intention 
was not required in order to establish that the conduct complained of infringed 
section 8(2). 
 
The Court held of importance the interplay between the discriminatory measure and 
the person or group affected by it. It pointed out O’Regan J’s remarks in Hugo:255
 
   
“The more vulnerable the group adversely affected by the discrimination, the more 
likely the discrimination will be held to be unfair.  Similarly, the more invasive the 
nature of the discrimination upon the interests of the individuals affected by the 
discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be unfair.”256
 
 
It held, however, that the respondent did belong to a racial minority which could, in a 
political sense, be regarded as vulnerable.  It was precisely individuals who were 
members of such minorities who were vulnerable to discriminatory treatment and 
who, in a very special sense, had to look to the Bill of Rights for protection.  When 
that happened, it held, a Court had a clear duty to come to the assistance of the 
person affected.   
 
It was stressed however, that Courts should always be astute to distinguish between 
genuine attempts to promote and protect equality on the one hand and actions 
calculated to protect pockets of privilege at a price which amounted to the 
perpetuation of inequality and disadvantage to others, on the other.   
 
There was however, no reasonable alternative to be pursued by the Council.  The 
respondent did not suggest either that there was a better method of levying the 
charges nor did it challenge the validity or the amount of the flat rate in the tariff in 
question. 
    
The Court was satisfied that the operation of the flat rate did not impact adversely on 
the respondent in any material way.  There was no invasion of the respondent’s 
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dignity nor was he affected in a manner comparably serious to an invasion of his 
dignity. 
 
Section 8(3), the Court held, permitted the adoption of special measures which may 
be required to address past discrimination.   In the present case, however, it was not 
part of the council’s case that the policy of selective enforcement of arrear charges 
was a measure adopted for the purpose of addressing the disadvantage experienced 
in the past by the residents of Atteridgeville and Mamelodi.   The reasons given for 
the policy were pragmatic.    
 
The Court noted that the respondent and other residents of old Pretoria were not 
victims of past discrimination.  A properly formulated policy to promote a culture of 
payment in areas in which there had been a culture of boycott would not have been 
aimed at impairing the respondent’s interests in any way.   If carefully formulated and 
implemented it could have been directed to the achievement of the “important 
societal goal”257
 
 of transforming both the living conditions and culture of non-payment 
in Atteridgeville and Mamelodi, and that might well have been consistent with the 
goal of furthering equality for all.   If such a policy had been formulated a court would 
have been in a position to evaluate it, to determine whether it met the requirements 
of fairness, and also to monitor its implementation.  The ratepayers of Pretoria would 
also have been aware of and able to monitor the implementation of the policy. 
It held that no members of a racial group should be made to feel that they were not 
deserving of equal “concern, respect and consideration”258
 
 and that the law was likely 
to be used against them more harshly than others who belong to other race groups.  
The impact of such a policy on the respondent and other persons similarly placed, 
viewed objectively in the light of the evidence on record, would in the Court’s view 
have affected them in a manner which was at least comparably serious to an 
invasion of their dignity. This was exacerbated by the fact that they had been misled 
and misinformed by the council. 
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In the circumstances, the Court held that the presumption had not been rebutted and 
that the course of conduct of which the respondent complained of in this respect, 
amounted to unfair discrimination within the meaning of section 8(2) of the interim 
Constitution. 
 
The Court then addressed the rights guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the interim 
Constitution and that they could be limited in terms of section 33(1) of the interim 
Constitution. A requirement of section 33(1) was that a right may only be limited by a 
law of general application. Since the respondent’s challenge was directed at the 
conduct of the council, which was clearly not authorised, either expressly or by 
necessary implication by a law of general application, section 33(1) was found not 
applicable to the case. 
 
Sachs J made the following points in his separate judgement: 
 
For a question of indirect unfair discrimination under section 8(2) to be raised, 
something more had to be shown than differential impact on persons belonging to 
groups specified in section 8(2).  To establish that the impact of the indirect 
differentiation was prima facie discriminatory on grounds specified in section 8(2), the 
measure had at least to impose “identifiable disabilities, burdens or inconveniences,  
or threaten to touch on or reinforce patterns of disadvantage, or in some proximate 
and concrete manner threaten the dignity or equal concern or worth of the persons 
affected.”259
 
  
He failed to see how the decision not to issue summonses against persons in 
Atteridgeville and Mamelodi in any way threatened or was capable of imposing 
burdens or reinforcing disadvantage for the complainant, withholding benefits from 
him or undermining his dignity or sense of self-worth.  It did not discriminate against 
him; it did not even reach him.  
 
The concept of indirect discrimination, as Sachs J understood it, was developed 
precisely to deal with situations “where discrimination lay disguised behind 
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apparently neutral criteria or where persons already adversely hit by patterns of 
historic subordination had their disadvantage entrenched or intensified by the impact 
of measures not overtly intended to prejudice them.”260
 
 . 
He explained that an undue enlargement of the concept of indirect discrimination 
would mean that “every tax burden, every licensing or town planning regulation, 
every statutory qualification for the exercise of a profession, would be challengeable 
simply because it impacted disproportionately on blacks or whites or men or women 
or gays or straights or able-bodied or disabled people.”261  If the state in each such 
case were to be put to the burden of showing that differentiation was not unfair, the 
courts would be tied up interminably with issues that had nothing to do with the real 
achievement of equality and protection of fundamental rights as contemplated by 
section 8.  Judicial review would “lose its sharp cutting edge and become a blunt 
instrument invocable by all and sundry in a manner that would frustrate rather than 
promote the achievement of real equality.”262
 
   
With regard to the application of the Harksen test,  Sachs J stated that the less 
directly invasive the discrimination, the more substantial its legitimate social function, 
and the less it reinforced or created patterns of systematic disadvantage, the less 
likely was it to be unfair.  The differential debt recovery measures were not taken 
because the inhabitants of old Pretoria were white.  Nor did they in fact impose new 
burdens or disadvantages on the white inhabitants of Pretoria, who, as it happened in 
the circumstances were not a politically vulnerable minority, if that were relevant.  
Furthermore, looked at objectively, those measures could not be said to have 
impacted unfairly on them by reinforcing negative stereotypes or patterns of 
disadvantage associated with their skin colour, nor did they affect their dignity or 
sense of self-worth.  “The fact that a complainant chose to wear the cap of a victim of 
race discrimination, does not mean that the cap fits.”263
 
 
The judgment in this case shows that determining whether an applicant’s claim is 
based on a specified or unspecified ground has important procedural implications 
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because of the reversal of the burden of proof in section 9(5). As the judgment shows 
too, evidence, scope of enquiry and outcome may be very different in the case of 
discrimination on a specified ground and in the case of an unspecified ground. The 
extent to which disadvantage features as a relevant consideration may differ 
depending on the ground being analysed. 
 
The Court held that the respondent belonged to a racial minority, which could, in a 
political sense, be regarded as vulnerable. This was said in almost the same breath 
as noting that the applicant belonged to a group which had not been economically 
disadvantaged. The question then arises as to what exactly is the relationship 
between vulnerability and disadvantage. 
 
Whilst the Court applied the Harksen test and explored additional features of the 
equality clause, it found there was a violation of the equality right on the basis of an 
invasion of personal individual dignity, not on the basis of material disadvantage, 
therefore it appears that the Court conflated dignity with equality. 
 
Albertyn and Goldblatt264
 
 have indicated their agreement with Sachs J where he 
argued that there must be some element of actual or potential prejudice imminent in 
the differentiation, otherwise there would be no discrimination. However they did not 
agree with his location of disadvantage within discrimination rather than unfairness. It 
is submitted that Sachs J was indeed correct. Under the discrimination enquiry of the 
Harksen test, burdens, disadvantages and obligations imposed by the discrimination 
are evaluated, whereas under the unfairness enquiry, patterns of disadvantage are 
looked into. 
The case is actually a demonstration of what Sachs J stated: “Just as the 
transformation of our harsh reality is by its very nature difficult to accomplish, so it is 
hard to develop a corresponding and appropriate jurisprudence of transition.”265
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5.4 Louw v Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) Ltd (1998) 19 ILJ 1173 (LC) 
 
The applicant, a coloured male, launched an application complaining that his 
employer had committed an unfair labour practice by discriminating against him on 
the grounds of his race. A white warehouse supervisor received a higher pay, 
allegedly on the basis of racial characteristics and contrary to the doctrine of equal 
pay for work of equal value.  
 
It was submitted that at all material times the work performed by the applicant and 
the white colleague was of equal value; that the difference in salaries was 
disproportionate to the difference in the value of the two jobs; that the difference in 
salaries constituted direct discrimination against the applicant on the grounds of race, 
colour or ethnic origin because there was no justification for the difference; that the 
difference in salaries constituted indirect discrimination against the applicant on the 
grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin because the respondent applied factors in its 
pay evaluation that had a disparate impact on black employees. The factors were 
performance, potential, responsibility, experience, education, attitude, skills, entry 
level and market forces. 
 
 At the hearing it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the respondent had 
“inherited racial discrimination in the past and that they have done nothing about it to 
date. … their failure and their unfair labour practice and their unfair discrimination 
may well be no more than not correcting an historical, inherited racial discrimination 
situation.”266
 
 
The Court made several important observations. 
 
It stated that intention was not relevant in the determination of whether there had 
been any unfair discrimination. However, intention or motive of the employer may 
however be relevant to the remedy which the court may impose.   
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The Court referred to an article “Developments in the Law: Employment 
Discrimination”267
 
 where it was stated: 
“There are two main types of discrimination cases: disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.  Disparate treatment cases concern employment practices or incidents that 
intentionally subject people to impermissible discrimination.  Disparate impact cases 
involve neutral employment policies, such as competency tests, that have the 
unintended effect of discriminating against individuals who belong to a protected 
class.”  
 
The Court held that in order to discover whether there has been an unfair labour 
practice involving unfair discrimination, the elements of item 2(1)(a) had to be proved. 
The approach of the Constitutional Court as set out in the Harksen test had to be 
followed. 
 
After considering the relevant factors, the Court concluded that it is not an unfair 
labour practice to pay different wages for equal work or for work of equal value. It is 
however an unfair labour practice to pay different wages for equal work or work of 
equal value if the reason or motive, being the cause for so doing, is direct or indirect 
discrimination on  arbitrary grounds or the listed grounds.    
 
The Court found that there had to be a clear distinction between discrimination on 
permissible grounds and impermissible grounds. The mere existence of disparate 
treatment of people of, for example, different races is not discrimination on the 
ground of race unless the difference in race is the reason for the disparate treatment.    
 
The Court proceeded to conduct an excellent analysis of pay discrimination case law 
and the opinions on the subject of authorities in the filed. Furthermore, it also 
discussed the vexed question of onus. 
 
In response to the proposed consideration of American approaches to the problem of 
pay discrimination, the Court held that it would not be helpful, especially because in 
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South Africa there was no requirement to prove intent. Furthermore, the onus  was 
dealt with differently and: “Our law appears, correctly, to have turned its back on 
piecemeal adjudication and the shifting sand of shifting onuses. As Hoffman and 
Zeffert point out at 520: “The only stage at which the court will give a ruling is after it 
has heard all the evidence, and then it will simply decide whether the party who bore 
the onus has discharged it.”  
 
The Court found that the pay differentials in casu were a result of a situation in which 
a number of factors played a role: performance, skills, potential, market factors, 
seniority position and even a steeper pay progression than the theoretical. 
 
The Court remarked however the applicant had been subjected to discrimination 
since an early stage of his career. The court stated that it could take judicial notice of 
a “system of institutionalised racial discrimination which also permeated the world of 
employment and influenced the levels of jobs and the rate of pay. The threshold 
salary, if there was discrimination, would dog an employee for years.” 
 
5.5 Kadiaka v ABI (1999) 20 ILJ 373 (LC) 
 
After the liquidation of New Age, the company which bottled and sold Pepsi, ABI, the 
distributors of Coca Cola,  took a decision at board level, not to employ any former 
New Age employees.  
 
This decision was allegedly motivated by the need to maintain the morale of those 
ABI employees who had remained loyal to ABI and who had not succumbed to 
lucrative offers by New Age to entice them away.  
 
Secondly, former New Age employees would not have the “passion for the Coca-
Cola brand” which had been integral to the success of ABI.  
 
Thirdly, ABI was shocked at the extent of fraud and theft prevalent throughout all staff 
levels at new Age prior to its closure. ABI felt that it could not trust ex-New Age 
employees.  
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Finally, there was also a reluctance to make use of the services of an employee of  “a 
poor performing competitor”. 
 
The applicant, a former new Age employee and a sales person, had applied for a 
position with the respondent, but had been unsuccessful. 
 
The Court held that two constitutional values were involved: The right to equality 
including the right not to be unfairly discriminated against, and the right to fair labour 
practices. It believed it imperative to consider how the Constitutional Court had dealt 
with alleged unfair discrimination, bearing in mind that there is a difference between 
testing a law for constitutionality and considering whether the practice of an employer 
constituted an unfair labour practice. 
 
Having stated that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence had to be considered in 
dealing with discrimination measures, the Court promptly utilized the test proposed 
by Bourne and Whitmore268
 
 for determining indirect discrimination: 
“1. Has a requirement or condition been applied equally to both sexes or all racial 
groups? 
 
2. Is that requirement or condition one with which a considerably small number of 
women (or men) or persons of the racial group in question can comply than 
those of the opposite sex or persons not of that racial group? 
 
3. Is the requirement or condition justifiable irrespective of the sex, colour, race, 
nationality, ethnic or national origins of the person in question? 
 
4. Has the imposition of the requirement or condition operated to the detriment of 
a person who could not comply with it?” 
 
The Court held that unfair discrimination on an arbitrary ground takes place where 
the discrimination is for no reason or is purposeless. Even if there were a reason, the 
                                                 
268 Bourne C and Whitmore J Race and Sex Discrimination 1993 at para 2.45. 
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discrimination could be viewed as arbitrary if the reason was not a commercial 
reason of sufficient magnitude. The discrimination had to be balanced against 
societal values, particularly the dignity of the complainant and a society based on 
equality and the absence of discrimination 
 
Ultimately, the court held that the respondent had made out a case that its refusal to 
hire former New Age employees “makes commercial sense. This is so because the 
ban is not vindictive. It is done to preserve the moral of ABI’s workforce, to 
discourage turncoats, to reward loyalty, to ensure commitment to the brand, to 
assure customers that ABI employees believe in Coke and all that it stands for and to 
avoid the taint of corruption. It is also for a limited period.”269
 
   
After commenting on the impact of the decision not to hire the applicant on him, the 
Court found that the “discrimination did not perpetuate any of the historical grounds 
of discrimination, it was not unfair or inamicable to the values of society as expressed 
in the Constitution. It does not infringe the dignity of the applicant to be told that his 
services are not required on account of his being an active member of a former rival, 
a rival which, I might add, had not been decisively vanquished at the stage the ban 
was imposed. The labour practice, although contrary to the interest of the applicant, 
is not grossly unfair towards him; he is a casualty of the commercial war. It is fair to 
the employer. It is not unfair to society at large.”270
 
 
This case really serves as an example of how easy it is to forget what discrimination 
is all about. The case served as an ideal one in which to apply the Harksen test, 
together with considerations appropriate to the employment context. However, apart 
from mentioning Constitutional Court jurisprudence in passing, the Court set about 
determining the matter in a very haphazard manner, first considering grounds for 
justification prior to establishing discrimination. 
 
 
 
                                                 
269  
270  
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5.6 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 
 
On 9 October 1998, the decision in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice271
 
 was handed down by the Constitutional Court. 
Ackermann J delivered the judgment, which was concurred with by all the other 
judges in the matter. 
In the case, section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act, 1957 was declared inconsistent 
with the Constitution and invalid. It concerned the constitutionality of a number of 
provisions criminalising gay sex and dealt with different types of disadvantage 
experienced by gay people including psychological harm. 
 
Several passages from the judgement are worth quoting for their encapsulation of the 
reality experienced not only by gay persons, but probably by all groups subject to 
discrimination in any form: 
 
“The desire for equality is not a hope for the elimination of all differences.”272
 
 
“The experience of subordination - of personal subordination, above all - lies behind 
the vision of equality.”273
 
 
“To understand ‘the other’ one must try, as far as is humanly possible, to place 
oneself in the position of ‘the other.’  It is easy to say that everyone who is just like 
‘us’ is entitled to equality.  Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those who are 
‘different’ from us in some way should have the same equality rights that we enjoy.  
Yet so soon as we say any . . . group is less deserving and unworthy of equal 
protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of . . . society are demeaned.  It 
is so deceptively simple and so devastatingly injurious to say that those who are 
                                                 
271 Hereinafter referred to as NCGLE 1. 
272 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice supra at para 22. 
273 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice supra at para 22. 
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handicapped or of a different race, or religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less 
worthy.”274
 
 
The Court held that the impact of discrimination on gays and lesbians was rendered 
more serious and their vulnerability increased by the fact that they are a political 
minority not able on their own to use political power to secure favourable legislation 
for themselves. They are accordingly almost exclusively reliant on the Bill of Rights 
for their protection. 
 
The Court held that the impugned discrimination was on a specified ground.  Gay 
men were a permanent minority in society and had suffered in the past from patterns 
of disadvantage.  The impact was severe, affecting the dignity, personhood and 
identity of gay men at a deep level.  It occurred at many levels and in many ways and 
was often difficult to eradicate. 
 
The nature of the power in question in the case, and its purpose, was to criminalise 
private conduct of consenting adults which caused no harm to anyone else.  It had no 
other purpose than to criminalise conduct which failed to conform with the moral or 
religious views of a section of society. 
 
The discrimination had, for the reasons already mentioned, gravely affected the 
rights and interests of gay men and deeply impaired their fundamental dignity. 
 
The Court confirmed that the discrimination was unfair and therefore in breach of 
section 9 of the Constitution. 
 
The Court explained that for example, black foreigners in South Africa might be 
subject to discrimination in a way that foreigners generally, and blacks as a rule, 
were not; it could in certain circumstances be a fatal combination.  A context- rather 
than category-based approach might suggest that overlapping vulnerability is 
capable of producing overlapping discrimination.  A notorious example, the court 
held, would be “African widows, who historically have suffered discrimination as 
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blacks, as Africans, as women, as African women, as widows and usually, as older 
people, intensified by the fact that they are frequently amongst the lowest paid 
workers.”275
 
 
Conversely, a single situation can give rise to multiple, overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing violations of constitutional rights.   
 
The Court held that it had on a number of occasions emphasised the centrality of the 
concept of dignity and self-worth to the idea of equality.   
 
The Court made reference specifically to what it called “an interesting argument.”276 
The Centre for Applied Legal Studies had argued that the equality clause was 
intended to advance equality, not dignity, and that the dignity provisions in the Bill of 
Rights should take care of protecting dignity.  The Court had been required to shift 
from what the Centre called “the defensive posture of reliance on unlawful 
discrimination under section 9(3)” to what it claimed to be an affirmative position of 
promoting equality under the broad provisions of section 9(1).  Section 9(1) it was 
argued, had been reduced from “that of the guarantor of substantive equality to that 
of a gatekeeper for claims of violation of dignity.”277
 
 
Contrary to the Centre’s argument, the violation of dignity and self-worth under the 
equality provisions can be distinguished from a violation of dignity under section 10 of 
the Bill of Rights.  The former is based on the impact that the measure has on a 
person because of membership of a historically vulnerable group that is identified 
and subjected to disadvantage by virtue of certain closely held personal 
characteristics of its members; it is the inequality of treatment that leads to and is 
proved by the indignity.  The violation of dignity under section 10, on the other hand, 
contemplates a much wider range of situations.  It offers protection to persons in their 
multiple identities and capacities.  This could be to individuals being disrespectfully 
treated, such as somebody being stopped at a roadblock.  It also could be to 
members of groups subject to systemic disadvantage, such as farm workers in 
                                                 
275 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice supra at para 113. 
276 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice supra at para 120. 
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certain areas, or prisoners in certain prisons, such groups not being identified 
because of closely held characteristics, but because of the situation they find 
themselves in.  These would be cases of indignity of treatment leading to inequality, 
rather than of inequality relating to closely held group characteristics producing 
indignity. 
 
The Court countered that the equality principle and the dignity principle should not be 
seen as competitive but rather as complementary.  “Inequality is established not 
simply through group-based differential treatment, but through differentiation which 
perpetuates disadvantage and leads to the scarring of the sense of dignity and self-
worth associated with membership of the group.  Conversely, an invasion of dignity is 
more easily established when there is an inequality of power and status between the 
violator and the victim… One of the great gains achieved by following a situation-
sensitive human rights approach is that analysis focuses not on abstract categories, 
but on the lives as lived and the injuries as experienced by different groups in our 
society.  The manner in which discrimination is experienced on grounds of race or 
sex or religion or disability varies considerably - there is difference in difference.  The 
commonality that unites them all is the injury to dignity imposed upon people as a 
consequence of their belonging to certain groups.  Dignity in the context of equality 
has to be understood in this light.  The focus on dignity results in emphasis being 
placed simultaneously on context, impact and the point of view of the affected 
persons.  Such focus is in fact the guarantor of substantive as opposed to formal 
equality.”278
 
 
In this case, the Court’s use of the term “disadvantage” had a wide and inclusive 
meaning. It also considered “vulnerability” of gays and lesbians as a “political 
minority.” It clearly demonstrated that there may be a close relationship or even an 
overlap between disadvantage and infringement of dignity, however it did not 
properly analyse the connection between the two concepts and the separate roles of 
those concepts and considerations in the Harksen test. 
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Clearly, the most important question raised by this case was: “What exactly is the 
relationship between disadvantage and vulnerability?” That question it appears, was 
answered in the following judgment of the Court. 
 
5.7 Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape) 
(1999) 20 ILJ 330 (LC) 
 
Shocking poorly worded and reasoned judgment. It appears that what it attempted to 
convey was that an applicant for employment derives no right from a contractual or 
negotiated affirmative action policy. The question therefore arises whether people 
from disadvantaged groups have a legal right to be preferred over others or 
conversely, whether employers are under a legal obligation to favour the formerly 
disadvantaged. 
 
“It was conceded by Mr Bozalek, in my opinion correctly in this case, that an 
applicant for employment derives no right from a contractual or negotiated affirmative 
action policy, as policies envisaged by this sub-item are called. It was however 
submitted that in assessing whether an applicant was a victim of a residual unfair 
labour practice the existence and scope of an affirmative action policy and the 
obligations which it placed on the employer are vital considerations. From an equity 
and labour relations point of view an employer should be bound by such a policy.”279
 
 
5.8 Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
 
The constitutionality of section 35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act280
                                                 
279 Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd supra at para 43. 
 was challenged on the ground that it violated the right to equality 
in section 8(1) of the interim Constitution. The applicant contended that employees, 
by being deprived of the common law right to claim damages against their 
employers, are placed at a disadvantage in relation to people who are not employees 
and who retain that right.  The equality challenge was not based on any of the 
specified grounds. The proposition was that section 35(1) was inconsistent with the 
interim Constitution in that its provisions violated the right to equality before the law 
280 Act 130 of 1993. 
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and to equal protection of the law and the right not to be unfairly discriminated 
against, the right of access to courts and the right to fair labour practices. 
 
 In dealing with these contentions in the court a quo Zietsman JP had said:  
 
“The question . . . is whether section 35 of the Act, which denies to employees the 
right to claim compensation from their employers, has a rational connection to the 
purpose of the Act.  If not it constitutes unfair discrimination against employees.”281
 
  
However, the Court in casu held that that approach was not consistent with the 
equality jurisprudence that had been developed by the Court in a series of cases 
over the preceding two years.  The correct approach to cases in which there was 
alleged to be an infringement of sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the interim Constitution (or 
sections 9(1) and 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution), but in which the alleged 
differentiation was not based on a specified ground, was that outlined in the Harksen 
test. 
 
The contention of the applicant was that the nature of the balance achieved by the 
legislature through the Compensation Act was in favour of the employer while the 
requirements of policy and the nature of the relationship between the employee and 
the employer indicated that a different balance would be appropriate.  It was 
contended that the object of the Act was to provide compensation for workers, not to 
benefit employers.  Section 35(1) benefited only employers.  It was therefore not 
rationally related to the purpose of the legislation. 
 
The Court, referring to its decision in Prinsloo282
                                                 
281 Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd supra at para 9. 
 held that that argument 
fundamentally misconceived the nature and purpose of rationality review and 
attempted an analysis of the import of the impugned section without reference to the 
Compensation Act as a whole. It was clear that “the only purpose of rationality review 
was an inquiry into whether the differentiation was arbitrary or irrational, or 
manifested naked preference and it was irrelevant to that inquiry whether the scheme 
chosen by the legislature could have been improved in one respect or another.”   
282 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra at para 36. 
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The Court also remarked quite vociferously that: “The contention represents an 
invitation to this Court to make a policy choice under the guise of rationality review; 
an invitation which is firmly declined.”283
   
 
The Court thus held that section 35(1) of the Compensation Act was logically and 
rationally connected to the legitimate purpose of the Compensation Act, namely, a 
comprehensive regulation of compensation for disablement caused by occupational 
injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the course of their 
employment. 
 
In so far as the attack on section 8(2) was concerned, it was held that there was no 
evidence of unfair discrimination, no contention in that regard and no apparent basis 
upon which unfair discrimination could have been said to exist.   
 
5.9 IMAWU v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local Council (2000) 21 ILJ 
1119 (LC) 
 
The post of Town Treasurer was externally advertised by the Respondent. 
Candidates had to have a relevant Bachelors degree or the equivalent qualification 
and at least a licentiate membership of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants.   
 
No appointment was made even though five candidates were short listed. The post 
was then re-advertised, a short list compiled and candidates subjected to an internal 
test drafted by the respondent’s Town Clerk, who was the previous Town Treasurer.  
A representative of the institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants evaluated 
both the test itself and the candidates. 
 
The test targeted the knowledge and experience of the candidates of local 
government, their merit and potential ability. After conducting the test, a further short 
list of three candidates was compiled consisting of Mr Van der Berg, Mr Kruger and 
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Mr Masengana. The Executive Committee could not make a decision regarding the 
appointment and the short list of three was referred to the full Council for a decision. 
 
The majority of the Council decided that affirmative action should be the only criteria 
and accordingly Masengana was appointed as Town Treasurer.  There was 
consequently no dispute that the only consideration in Masengana’s appointment 
was affirmative action.   
 
It was submitted that the respondent did not comply with the provisions of the 
collective agreement on Equal Employment Practice and Affirmative Action for local 
government in the selection and appointment of Masengana and it had failed to 
develop and implement an affirmative action programme. Only individuals who had 
the necessary proficiency to successfully perform the duties of the post could be 
considered. It was submitted that from Masengana’s CV it was clear that he did not 
possess the necessary experience in local government to qualify for appointment. It 
was submitted that he was appointed simply because he was black, thus ignoring 
merit and other requirements set out in the collective agreement. 
 
The Court held that unfair discrimination is outlawed but that an employer, especially 
in the public service was empowered to adopt employment practices and policies that 
were designed to achieve the adequate advancement of persons or groups 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
The Court held that affirmative action should not be applied in an arbitrary and unfair 
manner. It referred to comments by Cheadle284
 
 where, in relation to section 8(3) (a) 
of the Interim Constitution the following is said: 
“The interpretation  of s 8(1) apart, S 8(3)(a) is designed to insulate from judicial 
review those measures designed to benefit individuals or groups who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  Provided that the corrective measures 
comply with the internal requirements of section 8(3) (a), those measures will not be 
subjected to the rigours of section 33(1).   The clause does have internal 
                                                 
284 Cheadle H Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (Juta) 1st edition at 60. 
  
 
 
134 
requirements.   The use of the word “designed” clearly imports that there must be a 
rational connection between the means employed and the objects of the measures.  
The measures can only be directed to those groups or categories that are 
“disadvantaged” by unfair discrimination.” 
 
The Court also referred to Du Toit’s285
 
 echoing of the same sentiments:  
“Measures are permitted if they are ‘designed’ to achieve the purposes set out in item 
2(2)(b).  The word ‘designed’ suggests that more than mere intention is required, 
though not necessarily that the measures should be likely to achieve their purpose.  
Section 9(2) of the Constitution must be read as permitting only those corrective 
measures which do not unduly prejudice the individuals or groups who are 
disadvantaged as a result.” 
 
The Court therefore held that for affirmative action measures to survive judicial 
scrutiny, there had to be a policy or programme designed to achieve the adequate 
advancement or protection of certain categories of persons or groups disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination. 
 
The requirements ensured that there could be accountability and transparency.  They 
ensured that there would be a measure or standard against which the 
implementation of affirmative action could be measured or tested and that no 
arbitrary or unfair practices occurred under the mantle of affirmative action.   
 
The Court held that the Council’s collective agreement provided that local authorities 
and their employees had the right to determine their own affirmative action goals and 
time tables, suitable to their own circumstances. 
 
However, despite a laudable collective agreement to facilitate affirmative action 
within local authorities, the respondent had done nothing envisaged by that 
agreement.   
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The Court therefore held that the respondent could not consider affirmative action in 
appointments before it had complied with the agreement. As a consequence, in the 
absence of an affirmative action programme specifically designed in terms of the 
collective agreement, any appointment on purported affirmative action grounds would 
be illegitimate.   
 
The court therefore had to consider whether the appointment of Masengana could be 
justified on other grounds and whether it did not discriminate unfairly against other 
applicants. 
 
The Court found that the only consideration in the appointment of Masengana was 
the colour of his skin. The Court referred in this regard to the Harksen test in order to 
determine whether there was any unfair discrimination. It held that for affirmative 
action to succeed, merit and experience would remain relevant in so far as the 
applicants previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination were concerned in their 
own group.    
 
5.10 Hoffmann v SA Airways (2000) 21 ILJ 2357(CC) 
 
This matter concerned the constitutionality of South African Airways’ (“SAA”) practice 
of refusing to employ as cabin attendants people who are living with the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).   
 
The appellant had undergone a blood test as part of pre-employment testing and it 
had shown that he was HIV positive.  As a result, the medical report read that the 
appellant was “H.I.V. positive” and therefore “unsuitable” for employment. 
 
The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the refusal to employ him, alleging 
that the refusal constituted unfair discrimination, and violated his constitutional right 
to equality, human dignity and fair labour practices. 
 
The respondent asserted that the exclusion of the appellant from employment had 
been dictated by its employment practice, which required the exclusion from 
employment as cabin attendant of all persons who were HIV positive.  It justified this 
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practice on safety, medical and operational grounds.  It added that people who are 
HIV positive are also prone to contracting opportunistic diseases.  There was a risk, 
therefore, that they might contract those diseases and transmit them to others.  If 
they were ill with those diseases, they would not be able to perform the emergency 
and safety procedures that they were required to perform in the course of their duties 
as cabin attendants.   
 
SAA emphasized that its practice was directed at detecting all kinds of disability that 
made an individual unsuitable for employment as member of a flight crew.  However, 
the Court held that the assertions by SAA were inconsistent with the medical 
evidence tendered.  . 
 
The Court referred to the relevant provisions of the equality clause, contained in 
section 9 of the Constitution, and held that it had previously dealt with challenges to 
statutory provisions and government conduct alleged to infringe the right to equality.  
Its approach to such matters had been in accordance with the Harksen test which it 
proceeded to outline in the judgment. 
 
It held, with reference to the Hugo286
 
 case, that at the heart of the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination was the recognition that under our Constitution all human beings, 
regardless of their position in society, had to be accorded equal dignity.  That dignity 
was impaired when a person was unfairly discriminated against.  The determining 
factor, as stated in the Harksen test regarding the unfairness of the discrimination, 
was its impact on the person discriminated against.  
The Court stated that people living with HIV constituted a minority in our society.  
Society had, however, responded to their plight with intense prejudice and had 
subjected them to systemic disadvantage and discrimination.  People living with 
HIV/AIDS were one of the most vulnerable groups in society, notwithstanding the 
availability of compelling medical evidence as to how the disease was transmitted.   
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The Court opined that in view of the prevailing prejudice against HIV positive people, 
any discrimination against them could be interpreted as a fresh instance of 
stigmatization and it considered that to be an assault on their dignity.  The impact of 
discrimination on HIV positive people was devastating.  It was even more so when it 
occurred in the context of employment.  It denied them the right to earn a living.  For 
that reason, the Court stressed, they enjoyed special protection in law. 
 
The Court therefore held that there could be no doubt that SAA discriminated against 
the appellant because of his HIV status.  Neither the purpose of the discrimination 
nor the objective medical evidence justified such discrimination. 
 
The Court also emphasized in the judgment that HIV positive persons would be 
vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of prejudice and unfounded assumptions - 
precisely the type of injury the Constitution sought to prevent.  This was manifestly 
unfair. 
 
With regard to the respondent’s contention that its requirement was an inherent 
requirement for the job of cabin attendant and the High Court’s finding that the 
commercial operation of SAA, and therefore the public perception about it, would be 
undermined if the employment practices of SAA did not promote the health and 
safety of the crew and passengers, the Court held that legitimate commercial 
requirements were an important consideration in determining whether to employ an 
individual.  However, Courts had to guard against “allowing stereotyping and 
prejudice to creep in under the guise of commercial interests.  The greater interests 
of society required the recognition of the inherent dignity of every human being, and 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination. It referred to the judgment in S v 
Makwanyane: “Our Constitution protects the weak, the marginalized, the socially 
outcast, and the victims of prejudice and stereotyping.  It is only when these groups 
are protected that we can be secure that our own rights are protected.”287
 
 
The Court stressed that the fact that some people who were HIV positive might, 
under certain circumstances, be unsuitable for employment as cabin attendants did 
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not justify a blanket exclusion from the position of cabin attendant of all people who 
were HIV positive. 
 
The constitutional right of the appellant not to be unfairly discriminated against could 
not be determined by ill-informed public perception of persons with HIV. 
 
The Court stated emphatically that: “Our constitutional democracy has ushered in a 
new era - it is an era characterized by respect for human dignity for all human beings.  
In this era, prejudice and stereotyping have no place.  Indeed, if as a nation we are to 
achieve the goal of equality that we have fashioned in our Constitution we must 
never tolerate prejudice, either directly or indirectly.  SAA, as a state organ that has a 
constitutional duty to uphold the Constitution, may not avoid its constitutional duty by 
bowing to prejudice and stereotyping.”288
 
 
Finally, the Court held that in the circumstances, the denial of employment to the 
appellant because he was living with HIV impaired his dignity and constituted unfair 
discrimination.  That conclusion, according to the Court, made it unnecessary to 
consider whether the appellant was discriminated against on a listed ground of 
disability, as set out in section 9(3) of the Constitution, or, as it was contended, 
whether people who are living with HIV ought not to be regarded as having a 
disability. 
 
The Court made it clear that where health and safety were the justification for 
discrimination, objective medical evidence had to be provided as well as an 
individualized assessment of the individual concerned and his capacity to do the 
work. It stressed that HIV on its own was not sufficient to justify exclusion from 
employment. 
 
It is to be noted that although the Court referred to the Harksen test, it did so without 
actually following it because it found that denial of employment to Hoffmann because 
of HIV status impaired his dignity and constituted unfair discrimination. It was 
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therefore unnecessary for the Court to consider whether he had been discriminated 
against on the listed ground of disability as had been submitted.  
 
The decision of Ngcobo J in this matter was really based on the vulnerability of 
people living with HIV and the prevailing prejudice against people living with HIV 
which was an assault on their dignity.  
 
With regard to a defence against unfair discrimination, the Court held, as per the 
Harksen test, that the determining factor regarding unfairness was the impact of the 
conduct on the person discriminated against.   
 
 
5.11 McInnes v Technikon Natal (2000) 21 ILJ 1150 (LC) 
 
In 1995 the applicant was an employee of the Business Studies Unit of the 
respondent as its marketing manager. The renewal of the applicant’s post, which was 
to become permanent, was advertised in November 1997.  The applicant and a 
number of other candidates applied.  Three candidates were short-listed.  A selection 
committee interviewed the candidates.  After some debate, two of the candidates, the 
applicant and one Mpanza, were found to be “appointable.” By a majority the 
committee recommended the applicant.  This recommendation was then sent to the 
Vice Principal Academic for his approval and onward transmission to the Human 
Resources Department.  The Vice Principal however referred the recommendation 
back to the selection committee with a direction that it reconsider its recommendation 
in the light of the Technikon’s Affirmative Action Policy.  At the reconvened meeting 
the selection committee, although reaffirming its preference of the applicant, 
recommended Mpanza to the post.  He was then appointed. 
 
An agreement was then concluded with Mpanza in terms of which he was offered a 
salary much higher than the salary range for which the post had been advertised.    
This was done in order to get him to accept the post.  When this salary was 
implemented he became the highest paid member of the Department, earning even 
more than the Head of Department. 
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The applicant alleged that she was unfairly dismissed from her employment with the 
respondent on the basis of the non-renewal of her contract of employment. She also 
alleged that she was unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her race and/or 
sex. 
 
The Court stated that it had to conduct a two-stage enquiry.  The first stage was to 
determine what the applicant’s subjective expectation actually was in relation to 
renewal of her contract.  The Court’s conclusion was that the applicant reasonably 
expected to have her post renewed permanently.   
 
The Court then focussed on whether affirmative action could constitute a fair basis 
for dismissing, as opposed to appointing, an employee. It stated that It appears 
clearly from sections 187 and 188 of the LRA, items 2 (1)(a) and 2 (2)(a) and (b) of 
part B of schedule 7, that affirmative action could not constitute a fair basis for 
dismissing, as opposed to appointing, an employee.   
 
The Court held that it was clear that the applicant would have continued to be 
employed if she were Black rather than White and her dismissal was the result of the 
purported application by the respondent of Affirmative Action. 
 
The Court also stated that the applicant was discriminated against on the basis of her 
race.  The onus was therefore on the respondent to show that in preferring Mr 
Mpanza by reason of his race it was implementing its affirmative action policy. That 
would require an examination of the respondent’s affirmative action policy in order to 
evaluate compliance with it.   
 
The Court found that the fact that Mr Mpanza was Black gave him a distinct 
advantage.  That factor had, however, to be balanced against the need to provide the 
highest standard of tertiary service to students.  This could hardly have been 
achieved by appointing someone who had no previous teaching experience. 
 
The Court found too, that the policy did not regard race as the sole criteria where two 
persons were “appointable”.  It also had in mind all the relevant factors and required 
a reasoned and balanced decision. If that decision resulted in the selected candidate 
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not being from the targeted group, reasons had to be given.  The selection committee 
took into account the policy and weighed it against the respective merits of the two 
candidates.  Having done so, they selected the applicant.  However, their selection 
was not upheld subsequently. 
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that there was no policy that candidates from the 
targeted group be paid more than other applicants. The policy document actually 
required the creation of a corporate culture of mutual acceptance, understanding, 
trust and respect, as well as emphasising the need to promote transparency and 
integrity and to ensure that public funds were optimally and prudently used.  The 
agreement with Mr Mpanza to pay him more was thus in breach of the policy.   
 
The Court accordingly found that the appointment of Mpanza was not in accordance 
with the policy and that the respondent had failed to justify the discrimination against 
the applicant.  
 
This matter again demonstrated that where a plan is in effect, its terms should be 
followed. An employer could not go beyond its scope. Measures falling beyond the 
plan could not be considered. Furthermore, it was held that affirmative action 
discrimination cannot constitute a fair basis for dismissing, as opposed to appointing, 
employees. It was also found unfair for an employer not to implement and follow its 
own policy regarding affirmative action.  
 
5.12 Middleton v Industrial Chemical Carriers (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 472 (LC) 
 
In this matter, the failure by the respondent to pay the applicants, members of the 
salaried staff of the respondent, the same retrenchment packages and gratuities that 
were paid to the so-called payroll employees was alleged to be unfair discrimination.  
 
The two categories of employees had substantively different conditions of service. 
Union members who were payroll employees were to be paid a gratuity, being the 
equivalent of two extra months' salary, upon retrenchment. The applicants contended 
that they were discriminated against on arbitrary grounds by not being retrenched 
and paid a package and gratuity. 
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It was common cause that AECI and ICC, the respondent party, had differentiated 
between the payroll employees and the salaried staff.  The issue to be decided is 
whether the differentiation was unfair discrimination.   
 
The Court referred extensively to case law, including but not limited to the relevant 
Constitutional Court decisions and decided to follow the approach laid down in those 
decisions. It is one of the few decisions where the Court actually, in an exemplary 
step by step and methodical manner, utilized the guidelines set down in the 
authoritative Constitutional Court decisions that had been delivered up to that time to 
assist it in arriving at a decision. 
 
The Court held that this matter was clearly not a case where the impairment of the 
fundamental dignity of the applicants was in issue.  Whether the differentiation 
affected the applicants in a comparably serious manner would therefore have to be 
considered.   
 
The Court held that the differentiation between the conditions of service of the payroll 
and salaried staff employees was not arbitrary and unfair as the payroll employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment were determined through collective bargaining. 
In all the circumstances there was a pre-existing valid basis for the differentiation 
between the payroll employees and the salaried staff. 
 
The Court remarked that despite their complaint of being discriminated against, the 
applicants did not seek to be treated the same as the payroll employees in every 
respect.  They were selective about the way in which they wanted their treatment to 
be equal to that of the payroll employees.  In that regard, given the general inferiority 
of the payroll employees’ conditions, the court remarked that implicit in the notion of 
unfair discrimination was the requirement of disadvantage and prejudice. It held that 
the payroll employees were in a weaker and less advantaged position than the 
salaried staff.  The salaried staff was therefore not a “vulnerable group” and were not 
disadvantaged or prejudiced in relation to the payroll employees.  
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The Court found that it would be inappropriate to compare terms and conditions of 
employment of payroll and salaried employees without establishing a rationale as to 
why they should have been treated the same. 
 
The Court had clearly followed the correct approach in deciding the matter. It first 
established discrimination, then considered whether it may have been justified. 
 
5.13 Lagadien v UCT (2000) 21 ILJ 2469 (LC) 
 
In this case, it was alleged that the respondent had unfairly discriminated, directly or 
indirectly, against the applicant on the basis of a lack of academic or tertiary 
qualifications. 
 
The applicant had been appointed as Acting Co-Ordinator of the respondent's 
Disability Unit from 15 January 1998 to 14 April 1998.  The respondent invited 
applications for the position of Head: Disability Unit through an advertisement which 
stated that to be considered the candidate would need proven skills in the identified 
fields and tertiary-level education together with personal experience of disablement.  
It also stated that applications from previously disadvantaged South Africans would 
be particularly welcomed. 
 
The applicant, amongst others, applied for the post, but it was re-advertised. The 
applicant applied again but on this occasion was neither short-listed nor interviewed. 
The respondent appointed someone else to the post.   
 
The applicant thereafter alleged unfair discrimination.  She averred that her own 
competence for the position matched or exceeded that of Watermeyer, the initial 
successful candidate in all material respects save for his possession of tertiary 
academic qualifications.   
 
The applicant's contention that she was unfairly discriminated against solely on the 
basis of her lack of tertiary education, was vociferously denied by the respondent. A 
successful candidate was deemed to be clearly the best applicant in terms of 
qualifications, skills and appropriate work experience for what was a senior position. 
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The reasons for the applicant’s non-appointment was her lack of tertiary-level 
experience and that she was not the best applicant for the job.  
 
In the hearing, the respondent further justified its decision by arguing that whilst a 
tertiary level of education was perceived to be an advantage, it was not the sole 
criterion.  The critical issue was that of credibility with academic staff and counselling 
skills with students in an academic environment.  The applicant had not worked in 
that context in an academic environment and this was the critical factor negating her 
appointment.  She could not match the level of experience in that environment 
attained by Ms Magama, who was finally appointed to the position.  
 
It was furthermore contended that the applicant’s strengths and attributes were 
obvious and her candidacy was seriously and responsibly assessed.  The decision to 
reject her was neither arbitrary, frivolous nor unfairly discriminatory. 
 
The applicant contended that the discrimination was directed towards her, not in her 
individual capacity, but as a member of a class or group of persons who were 
disadvantaged, impliedly through circumstances beyond their control, by a lack of 
tertiary academic qualifications.  It was, by its nature, indirect and was unfair in that it 
was exercised arbitrarily and capriciously. 
 
The Court, with reference to numerous authorities, including the Harksen test, then 
dealt with the concept of indirect unfair discrimination, which could be brought about, 
inter alia, by a standard which could not be shown to be justifiable in the 
circumstances and which operated to the complainant's detriment because he or she 
could not comply with it." 
 
The Court stated that it understood that the applicant was aggrieved and 
disappointed that she was not successful, but that hat reaction did not render the 
conduct of the respondent unfair. 
 
In this case once again, the Court first considered the justification fir the alleged 
discrimination before considering whether discrimination had in fact occurred. 
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5.14 Ntai v SA Breweries (2001) 22 ILJ 214 (LC) 
 
The applicants who were black persons, alleged that the practice of paying them 
lower salaries compared to their white counterparts, constituted unfair racial 
discrimination, alternatively arbitrary discrimination and therefore an unfair labour 
practice. In essence, the applicants contended that discrimination on the grounds of 
race could be found in the fact that they were black but earned less than two white 
employees who performed the same work.  
 
The Court stated that the mere existence of disparate treatment of people of different 
race groups was not discrimination on the ground of race unless the difference in 
race was the reason for the disparate treatment. In referring to this principle, the 
Court again substantiated its reasoning through references to previous decisions. 
 
With regard to onus too, the Court extensively referred to case law, both South 
African and English, accepting that a court would not be remiss if it exercised its 
discretion in favour of the alleged victim to establish a prima facie case and calling 
upon the alleged perpetrator of racial discrimination to justify its actions. A common 
sense approach was required. 
 
The Court ultimately held that if an employer paid employees unequally on the basis 
of their race, it would clearly constitute discrimination on the grounds of race. 
However, it also meant that a mere differentiation in pay between employees who did 
similar work or work of equal value did not mean, in itself, that an act of 
discrimination was being perpetrated.  It was only when such differentiation was 
based on an unacceptable ground that it became discrimination within its pejorative 
meaning.   
 
The Court did remark, however, that the similarity of the jobs; the difference in race 
between the applicants and the two comparators; and the fact that the applicants 
were paid less than their comparators raised a very strong inference that race could 
very well be a probable explanation for the difference in remuneration. All of those 
facts were common cause.  
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On the basis of those common cause facts, a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
based upon unequal pay for similar work or work of equal value had been 
established by the applicants.  
 
The respondent admitted that the discrepancy or differential in pay between the 
applicants and the two comparators was too big. However, denying that such 
anomalous gap in pay was caused by race, the respondent relied upon essentially 
three factors to explain the difference: performance based pay increments, the 
greater experience of the comparators and seniority through long service. Extensive 
evidence was led to justify this. 
 
The Court noted that the respondent did not proffer those grounds of justification in 
order to justify a practice of racial discrimination. Operational requirements could 
namely never justify racial discrimination. The fact remained that the differential in 
pay was not caused by race.  
 
The applicants’ further contention that they were discriminated against upon arbitrary 
grounds was also dealt with by the Court with reference to the Harksen test. 
 
The Court found that the applicants had failed to identify the specific ground upon 
which they alleged that they had been discriminated against. Therefore, in the 
absence of an identified unlisted ground it was impossible to determine whether the 
ground that was relied upon was comparable to the listed grounds.  
 
With regard to the issue of indirect discrimination, especially in regard to the criterion 
of seniority, the Court stated that the overall onus to prove indirect discrimination lay 
with the applicants. It was not a burden of proof that could easily be complied with 
because evidence, usually of a statistical nature, would be required to show the 
disproportionate impact. However, it conceded, such impact might be more self-
evident in a country whose past history could assist the alleged victims of indirect 
discrimination to establish at least a prima facie case. 
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5.15 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
(Unreported – Case no: CCT 10/99)289
 
 
The question to be decided was whether it is unconstitutional for immigration law to 
facilitate the immigration into South Africa of the spouses of permanent South African 
residents but not to afford the same benefits to gays and lesbians in permanent 
same-sex life partnerships with permanent South African residents. 
 
The attack on the constitutional validity of the provision in question concentrated on 
the fact that it enabled preferential treatment to be given to a foreign national 
applying for an immigration permit who is the spouse of a person permanently and 
lawfully resident in the Republic, but not to a foreign national who, though similarly 
placed in all other respects, is in a same-sex life partnership with a person 
permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic. 
 
In dealing with the equality challenge the Court indicated that it would follow the 
approach laid down by it in various of its judgments as collated and summarised in 
Harksen290 and as applied to section 9 of the Constitution in NCGLE 1.291
   
 
In doing so, the court found that there was indeed differentiation and that it lay in the 
failure of the provision to extend to same-sex life partners the same advantages or 
benefits that it extended to spouses.  However, it added, the discrimination in the 
provision constituted overlapping or intersecting discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and marital status, both being specified in section 9(3) and 
presumed to constitute unfair discrimination by reason of the presumption contained 
in section 9(5) of the Constitution.  The Court referred to the dictum of Sachs J292
 
 in 
NCGLE 1 with approval: 
“One consequence of an approach based on context and impact would be the 
acknowledgement that grounds of unfair discrimination can intersect, so that the 
                                                 
289 For the purposes of referencing hereafter, in the footnotes the first National Coalition matter will be referred 
to as NCGLE 1 and the second, as NCGLE 2. 
290 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
291 NCGLE 1 supra. 
292 NCGLE 1 supra at para 113. 
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evaluation of discriminatory impact is done not according to one ground of 
discrimination or another, but on a combination of both, that is globally and 
contextually, not separately and abstractly.” 
 
The Court also agreed293 with the following observations by L’Heureux-Dubé J in 
Mossop:294
 
 
“This argument [of Lamer CJC] is based on an underlying assumption that the 
grounds of ‘family status’ and ‘sexual orientation’ are mutually exclusive.  However . . 
. [i]t is increasingly recognized that categories of discrimination may overlap and that 
individuals may suffer historical exclusion on the basis of both race and gender, age 
and physical handicap, or some other combination.  The situation of individuals who 
confront multiple grounds of disadvantage is particularly complex . . . Categorizing 
such discrimination as primarily racially oriented, or primarily gender-oriented, 
misconceives the reality of discrimination as it is experienced by individuals.  
Discrimination may be experienced on many grounds, and where this is the case, it is 
not really meaningful to assert that it is one or the other.  It may be more realistic to 
recognize that both forms of discrimination may be present and intersect.” 
 
As affirmed in NCGLE 1 “the determining factor regarding the unfairness of 
discrimination is, in the final analysis, the impact of the discrimination on the 
complainant or the members of the affected group.  The approach to this 
determination is a nuanced and comprehensive one in which various factors come 
into play which, when assessed cumulatively and objectively, will assist in elaborating 
and giving precision to the constitutional test of unfairness.295
 
 
The Court also stated that it has recognised that the more vulnerable the group 
adversely affected by the discrimination, the more likely the discrimination will be 
held to be unfair. Vulnerability in turn depended to a very significant extent on past 
patterns of disadvantage, stereotyping and the like.  This is why an enquiry into past 
                                                 
293 NCGLE 2 at para 40. 
294 Canada (Attorney-General) v Mossop (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 658 at 720 – 721. 
295 NCGLE 1 supra at para 19.  
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disadvantage was so important. In the present case there was significant pre-existing 
disadvantage and vulnerability. 
 
This judgment explicitly recognised that an approach which is substantive and 
contextual requires account to be taken of the interrelationship between grounds of 
discrimination and the full impact of the discrimination on multiple grounds. The 
determination of unfairness proceeded on the basis of an investigation of the effect of 
discrimination on the applicants, both in relation to sexual orientation and in relation 
to their relationships. It suggested a growing awareness on the part of the court of 
the problem of overlapping grounds. 
 
With regard to the relationship between disadvantage and vulnerability the court 
stated that disadvantage is an indicator of vulnerability which weighs in favour of a 
finding of unfairness. 
 
It is also clear from the judgment that vulnerability is not entirely dependent on past 
disadvantage and can be proved in other ways. 
 
The case also for the first time makes explicit the relevance of disadvantage to 
discrimination, holding, with reference to Canadian case law, that disadvantage is 
relevant because without an assessment of pre-existing disadvantage it is not 
possible for the Court to determine the full impact on the applicant of a measure 
subject to challenge. 
 
In addition, the judgment also raises the vexed question of the relationship between 
disadvantage and the impairment of dignity, an issue hotly debated by South African 
commentators. 
 
From the judgment it can be seen that the Court had begun to clarify the role and 
legal effect of disadvantage in determining unfairness, but the discussion in the case 
was very brief and the questions, such as the weight to be given to disadvantage in 
the Harksen test, and the exact nature of the relationship between disadvantage and 
the impairment of dignity, as separate elements of the test, remain.  
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5.16 Coetzer v Minister of Safety and Security (2003) 24 ILJ 163(LC) 
 
This case dealt with the first claim to be heard by the Labour Court under the EEA. At 
the time, there was no precedent as to how a court should handle situations in which 
an employer overlooked qualified and suitable persons from non-designated groups 
when there was no competition at all from people from designated groups. 
 
The Court held that the Constitution required efficiency from the SA Police Service.  
The question was whether efforts to promote representivity in the explosives unit 
were rationally balanced with efforts to change the demographics of the staff of the 
Unit.  
 
The Court found that the refusal of the respondent to appoint the applicants was 
irrational.  
 
The case confirmed that there are limits to which a plea of affirmative action can 
serve as a defence. 
 
The Court held that in the public service, the goal of representivity had to be pursued 
rationally. The irrational pursuit of representivity at the expense of the public, 
rendered the discrimination against the applicants unfair, 
 
The Court stressed that the circumstances of grievants were not the only factors to 
take into account. However, where unfair discrimination affected efficient service, the 
remedy had to be in the interests of and to the benefit of the South African public. 
 
Given that the respondent would have made no appointments if there were no 
candidates from the disadvantaged group to consider, it had created an absolute 
barrier to the appointment of the applicants. That was impermissible. 
 
The Court also found that If it has been agreed that an employment equity plan had 
to be drawn up and implemented, as it had been, that requirement had to be met 
where the employer wished to rely on the plan as a defence. 
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The Court stressed that there had to be a rational balance between remedial 
measures and efficiency in line with the constitutional requirement that the police 
services must discharge its duties effectively. Affirmative action in a case such as 
this, had to give way to efficiency.  
 
In this judgment, the principle established in PSA296
 
  was taken a step further. –I t 
was indicated that not only was affirmative action on its own presumptively unfair, but 
the absence of a plan also rendered the employment decision unfair. Furthermore, 
the Court stressed that the requirements of equality had to be balanced against the 
constitutional requirement of efficiency 
The Court remarked that the Constitution also requires that national legislation had to 
enable the police service to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The question 
was whether the SAPS’ efforts to promote representivity in the explosives unit were 
rationally balanced with efforts to change the demographics of its staff.  
 
The problem confronting the SAPS in the matter was that it had based its defence 
solely on its claim that it had conformed to the representivity requirements of the 
EEA. It did not address the efficiency requirement at all and therefore, its refusal to 
appoint the applicants was irrational. 
 
The case confirmed there are limits to the extent to which a plea of affirmative action 
can serve as a defence to an action for unfair discrimination against white male 
employees. In the public service the goal of representivity has to be pursued 
rationally. Rationality can never be served where a public authority fails to make 
appointments at all simply because there were no affirmative action candidates. That 
became unfair to members of non-designated groups and the employer actually 
disadvantaged them as well as the broader public in the name of affirmative action.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
296 Public Servants’ Association v Minister of Justice supra. 
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5.17 Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) 
 
In this important case, the Court held the following per Van der Westhuizen J: 
 
“ … Some tension may in certain situations exist between ideals such as efficiency 
and representivity, and a balance then has to be struck.  Efficiency and 
representivity, or equality, should, however, not be viewed as separate competing or 
even opposing arms.  They are linked and often independent.  To allow equality or 
affirmative action measures to play a role only where candidates otherwise have the 
same qualifications and merits, where there is virtually nothing to choose between 
them, will not advance the ideal of equality in the situation where a society emerges 
from a history of unfair discrimination.  The advancement of equality is integrally part 
of the consideration of merits in such decision-making processes.  The requirement 
of rationality remains, however, and the appointment of people who are wholly 
unqualified, or less than suitably qualified, or incapable, in responsible positions 
cannot be justified." 
 
The applicant in the case had not been appointed to the post of commanding officer 
of SANAB at the then Johannesburg International Airport, instead a black person was 
appointed. The applicant had achieved the highest percentage mark of all the 
candidates but was not appointed because the respondent averred that it had been 
obliged to give effect to the SAPS employment equity plan. 
 
The following are the most relevant points made by the Court in the very detailed and 
lengthy judgment: 
 
There is constitutional recognition of affirmative action measures aimed at groups or 
categories to which beneficiaries belonged. The fact that an individual had himself, at 
a personal level, not been disadvantaged, was irrelevant. The Court referred to the 
Motala297
                                                 
297 Motala v University of Natal supra. 
  case where it was concurred that the Indian population group had in fact 
been disadvantaged, but where it was held that the degree of disadvantage of 
African pupils who had been subjected to the four-tier education system at that time, 
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was significantly greater than that suffered by Indians. A selection system which 
therefore compensated for that did not run counter to the Constitution. 
 
In so far as the allegedly competing values of representivity and efficiency were 
concerned, the ideal of efficiency was not in opposition to the constitutional 
requirement of representivity. Representivity considerations did not only come into 
play where candidates had the same merits. Such a situation would be too restrictive. 
However, the rationality requirement was very important in this regard and the 
appointment of persons who were totally unqualified or less than “suitably” qualified 
could never be justified. The Court also warned against an assumption that 
experience equated to efficiency. A balance had to be struck between efficiency and 
representivity. They were not to be viewed as competing and opposing aims. They 
were in fact linked and interdependent. A representative public service was a good in 
itself. 
 
An equity plan had to be complaint with section 9(2) of the Constitution, There had to 
be a rational connection between the measures and the aim to be achieved. A 
“haphazard, random or overhasty” equity plan or policy could not constitute a 
“designed” measure. The Court pointed out the difference in wording between the 
interim and final Constitution where it now did not refer any longer to “adequate” 
protection and advancement of disadvantaged groups. The requirement therefore 
was no longer for a causal connection, but for a rational connection between the 
measures and the aim they sought to achieve. 
 
Equality as envisaged in the Constitution was more than just formal equality and 
more than mere non-discrimination. The reason for affirmative action measures and 
their facilitation in the Constitution was to address the country’s history of deep racial 
inequality and other forms of systemic and systematic discrimination. Past 
discrimination had ongoing negative consequences even if the initial causes were 
eliminated. Equality had a remedial and restitutionary purpose. The aim was not to 
reward a disadvantaged employee or to punish persons like the applicant, but to 
diminish over-representation that his group had enjoyed in the past. 
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An important question which arose in the case was whether the affirmative action 
policy of the respondent was justifiable and acceptable within the context and 
wording of the Constitution. It had to constitute a measure which would promote the 
achievement of equality and there had to be a rational connection between the 
measures and the aims it sought to achieve. The Court also held that measures were 
reviewable. Proper plans and programs were required. 
 
The Court found that the measures contained in the SAPS employment equity plan 
were bona fide. The procedure followed by the SAPS was however sloppy, but not so 
seriously so as to affect the legality of the process. 
 
An important issue which arises from the case is the question as to how far the skills, 
experience or qualifications gap must be extended before the appointment of a less 
qualified or experienced black candidate becomes irrational and impeachable. 
 
5.18 Harmse v City of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC) 
 
In this extremely important judgment about which we have probably not yet heard the 
last, the applicant alleged that the decision of the respondent not to shortlist him for 
any of the three posts for which he had applied constituted unfair discrimination on 
the grounds of race, political belief, lack of relevant experience and/or other arbitrary 
grounds. 
 
In the most controversial aspect of this judgment, the Court opined that if one were to 
have regard only to section 6 of the Act then one might be drawn to the conclusion 
that affirmative action was no more than a defence to a claim of unfair discrimination.  
Because of the controversial nature of the Court’s findings in this regard, a 
substantial part of the judgment will be repeated below: 
 
“Affirmative action is indeed a defence to be deployed by an employer against claims 
that it has discriminated unfairly against an employee.   However, from the reading of 
the Act it appears that affirmative action is more than just a ‘defence’ in the hands of 
an employer and should not be confined to so limited a role in the elimination of 
unfair discrimination in the workplace.  The definition of affirmative action in section 
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15 indicates a role for affirmative action that goes beyond the passivity of its status 
as a defence.  … It includes pro-activeness and self-activity on the part of the 
employer.  The Act obliges an employer to take measures to eliminate unfair 
discrimination in the workplace.”    
 
And further: 
 
“The real answer however lies in the determination of who is making the claim of 
affirmative action.  It may found a cause of action in the hands of one and defence in 
the hands of another. If one were to have regard only to section 6 of the Act then one 
might be drawn to the conclusion that affirmative action is no more than a defence to 
a claim of unfair discrimination.  Affirmative action is indeed a defence to be deployed 
by an employer against claims that it has discriminated unfairly against an employee.  
In this sense, it serves as a shield. However, having regard to the fact that the Act 
requires an employer to take measures to eliminate discrimination in the workplace it 
also serves as a sword.” 
 
The Court then expanded on the reasoning behind its statements: 
 
 “Affirmative action has its roots embedded firmly in the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (Act 108 of 19996) (“the Constitution”).  Under the Constitution 
equality is a fundamental human right.  Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides 
that”equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.”  In addition to this, section 9(4) of the Constitution 
provides that “national legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.”  The Employment Equity Act is borne of this constitutional imperative.  
The right to equality as elaborated in section 9 of the Constitution moves well beyond 
the mere formal equality. Our constitution embraces and promotes the more 
thoroughgoing and challenging concept of substantive equality.  In the absence of 
the full development of the concept of substantive equality our society will continue to 
be characterised by deep-rooted inequality and injustice. (In this regard see National 
Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & Others 1999 
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(1) SA 6 (CC) at 38H-39D and Stofman v Minister for Safety and Security and Others 
(2002) ILJ 1020 at 1029-1030.  See also President of the Republic of SA & Another v 
Hugo 
 
1997 (4) SA 1 (CC)).   The protection and advancement of persons or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, by legislative and other 
measures is recognised by the Constitution as part of the right to equality.  It is not 
fashioned as an exception to the right to equality. (In this regard see Du Toit et al in 
Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (3rd ed) at 457)  It is part of the 
fabric and woven into the texture of the fundamental right to equality in section 9 of 
the Constitution.  In this sense, ‘affirmative action’ is more than just a defence or 
shield.  If at all it be ‘shield’, it would be inconceivable that it is available only to those 
in our society who have power, namely employers.  If this were the case then 
employees would, in so far as their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms is concerned, be at the mercy of an employer with no or no real remedy 
should the employer fail to promote substantive equality. “ 
It is difficult to conceive that the reasoning of the Court in so far as the nature of 
affirmative action, its purposes and its place in the notion of equality is concerned. 
However, as made clear in the Dudley298
  
 judgment, the legal mechanism do not 
provide for affirmative action to be utilized as a sword in the hands of individual 
employees. It is submitted that it is merely a question of time before either at the 
instance of the Constitutional Court or at the initiative of the legislature, the law is in 
fact amended to permit the use of affirmative action as a sword. 
With regard to the matter at hand, the Court found that There is no doubt that an 
employer may not discriminate unfairly against an employee.  This right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against is an integral part of the right to equality and a 
necessary condition of the inherent right to dignity in section 10 of the Constitution.  
This right not to be unfairly discriminated against is a right enjoyed by all employees 
whether or not they fall within any of the designated groups as identified in the Act.  If 
an employer fails to promote the achievement of equality through taking affirmative 
action measures, then it may properly be said that the employer has violated the right 
of an employee who falls within one of the designated groups not to be unfairly 
                                                 
298 Dudley v City of Cape Town infra. 
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discriminated against.  Similarly, if an employer discriminates against an employee in 
the non-designated group by preferring an employee from the designated group who 
is not “suitably qualified” as contemplated in sections 20(3) to 20(5) of the Act, then 
the employer has violated the right of such an employee not to be discriminated 
against unfairly.  In either case, the issue is whether the employer has violated an 
employee’s right not to be discriminated against.  To this extent, affirmative action 
can found a basis for a cause of action.   
 
The Court held that if an employer adopted an employment equity plan that regulated 
appointments and promotions, then the employees might have a legitimate 
expectation that the respondent would act in accordance with the plan. 
 
It also held that on an analysis of the Constitution and the Act, the legislation did 
indeed provide for a right to affirmative action.  The exact scope or boundaries of 
such a right was a matter that the Court held would have to be developed out of the 
facts of each case. 
 
As stated, the judgment gave rise to a new debate as to whether or not an employee 
from a designated group could use the provisions of the EEA to support a claim for 
appointment in fulfilment of the objectives of the EEA.  
 
5.19 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2004) 25 ILJ 1593 (CC) 
 
In this case, the Constitutional Court departed from the established jurisprudence 
and set out a new approach to section 9(2). 
 
Moseneke J on behalf of the majority, rejected the approach advocated in the PSA299
                                                 
299 Public Servants’ Association v Minister of Justice supra. 
 
case and stated that affirmative action measures which properly fell within the 
requirements of section 9(2) of the Constitution were not presumptively unfair. Such 
remedial measures were not a derogation from, but a substantive and composite part 
of the equality protection envisaged by the provisions of section 9 and of the 
Constitution as a whole. The primary object was to promote the achievement of 
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equality and therefore differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination was warranted, provided the measures were 
shown to conform to the internal test set by section 9(2).300
 
 
The Court stressed that it could not accept that the Constitution authorized 
measures, but also labelled them as presumptively unfair. Presuming unfairness in 
connection with such measures would require that the judiciary second guess the 
legislature and executive concerning the appropriate measures to overcome the 
effect of unfair discrimination. The Court therefore held that the enquiry had to be 
limited to assessing whether a measure fell within the ambit of section 9(2) of the 
Constitution. 
 
The judgment dealt extensively with the content of the equality right and held that it 
included remedial or restitutionary equality. Therefore, measures taken under those 
notions were not a deviation from or invasive of the right to equality as guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
 
The Court held that the provisions of sections 9(1) and (2) were complementary and 
that measures falling under the section 9(2) requirement were not presumptively 
unfair and were not derogating from but forming a substantive and composite part of 
the equality protection envisaged by the provisions of section 9 and the Constitution 
as a whole. Differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons who had been 
disadvantaged warranted measures which could be shown to conform to the section 
9(2) test. 
 
It had to be shown, however, that measures purported to promote the achievement of 
equality had been designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. 
 
The Court firmly rejected the strict scrutiny standard as applied in the United States 
of America and which had appeared to be viewed as appropriate by certain 
                                                 
300 Section 9(2): “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.” 
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authorities and judges. It established a new standard for qualifying legitimate and 
constitutional restitutionary measures which favoured a standard of rationality over 
reasonableness. The requirement of justifiable affirmative action policies still 
remained, but whereas, for example the PSA301 case employed a standard of 
“reasonableness” to qualify a valid justification, in Van Heerden302
 
 the standard was 
shifted to one of rationality. 
The Court laid down a three fold enquiry303
  
 in order to deal with section 9(2) 
measures: 
Does the measure target persons or categories of persons who had been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination? With regard to this, the majority judgment 
confirmed that measures chosen had to favour a group or category designated in 
section 9(2), although, it conceded, it would not be possible to precisely demarcate 
such groups or categories. However, the Court held that exceptions were insufficient 
and that the appropriate test for the legal efficacy of the scheme was whether an 
overwhelming majority of members of the favoured class were persons designated 
as disadvantaged by unfair exclusion. 
 
Is the measure designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of 
persons? In this regard the Court held that remedial measures were directed at an 
envisaged future outcome and that therefore remedial measures must be reasonably 
capable of attaining that desired outcome. If the remedial measures could not qualify 
as being reasonably likely to achieve that outcome, then the measures would not 
satisfy the requirements of section 9(2) of the Constitution.  To require a sponsor of a 
remedial measure to establish a precise prediction of a future outcome would be to 
set a standard not required by section 9(2). Moseneke J held that section 9(2) did not 
set “a standard of necessity between the legislative choice and the governmental 
objective. Such a test would defeat the objective of s 9(2) of the Constitution, and 
render the remedial measure stillborn.”304
                                                 
301 Public Servants’ Association v Minister of Justice supra. 
 However, if the measures were “arbitrary, 
302 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
303 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra at para 37. 
304 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra at para 42. 
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capricious or displayed naked preference”305
 
 they could hardly be said to be 
designed to achieve the constitutionally authorized end. 
Does the measure promote the achievement of equality? This part of the enquiry 
required an appreciation of the effect of the measure in the context of the broader 
society. The constitutional vision on equality had to be borne in mind.  A measure 
should not constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and undue harm 
on those excluded from its benefits, to the extent that the long-term constitutional 
goal of equality would be threatened. The Court emphasized that a measure should 
not constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and undue harm that 
long-term constitutional goals would be threatened. 
 
Qualifying the measure under the threefold enquiry would constitute a complete 
defence against any challenge suggesting a violation of the constitutional equality 
provisions. 
 
The Court also held that it is not necessary to establish that there is no less onerous 
way in which the remedial objective may be achieved. 
 
In this case, the fact that rationality was used as a standard for establishing whether 
the measure promoted equality constitutes a clear departure from the approach 
advocated by Swart J in the PSA case. The Constitutional Court has now decided 
that the appropriate standard for testing the validity of a measure contemplated under 
section 9(2) of the Constitution is rationality, not reasonableness.  
 
As stated above, and as extensively dealt with by Baqwa,306
                                                 
305 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra at para 69. 
 the standard of 
reasonableness is typical of the strict scrutiny approach that has been used by 
American jurisprudence in the context of affirmative action disputes. The 
Constitutional Court appears to have rejected this approach “because of the 
differences between our society and American society - our equality jurisprudence 
differs substantively from the US approach to equality. Our respective histories, 
306 Baqwa D The Resolution of Affirmative Disputes in the light of Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2006) 27 
ILJ 67. 
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social context and constitutional design are incongruent and South African 
jurisprudence must be wary of importing inapt foreign equality jurisprudence. Another 
significant feature of American equality jurisprudence is the fact that it is founded on 
the values of formal rather than substantive equality.”307
 
 
In the context of mere differentiation, the Court held, the constitutional state had to 
guard against regulating in an arbitrary manner or displaying naked preferences 
which did not serve a legitimate governmental purpose. The object of this aspect of 
the equality guarantee was to ensure that the state functioned in a rational manner. 
Before mere differentiation infringed the right to equality, it had to be established that 
no rational relationship existed between the differentiation in question and the 
governmental purpose which was proffered to validate it. 
 
The equality jurisprudence developed in the Van Heerden308
 
 decision is clear in its 
rejection of the standard of reasonableness and the necessity for justifying legitimate 
constitutional restitutionary measures.  
Brickhill309 comments310 that an interesting aspect of the Van Heerden311
                                                 
307 Baqwa D (2006) 27 ILJ 67 supra at 72. 
 judgment 
was the composition of the group to be benefited by restitutionary measures. In the 
judgment, the majority approach required no more than an “overwhelming majority” 
of the benefited group to be persons disadvantaged by the unfair discrimination. The 
third leg of the test (i.e. the measure must promote the achievement of equality and 
therefore an appreciation of its effect in the context of our broader society) however 
required that the interest of the person or group excluded from the measure must 
come into play. He points out that it is important that this leg of the test protect such 
persons because if the measure meets section 9(2) then the enquiry ends there, 
without proceeding to section 9(3) to consider whether it discriminates unfairly. 
Clearly this step involves a weighing of interests (included v excluded groups), 
however it is not clear what the standard for this weighing is to be – the goal of 
308 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
309 Brickhill J “Testing Affirmative Action under the Constitution and the Equality Act: Comment on Du Preez v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (2006) 27 ILJ 1811 (E)” (2006) 27 ILJ 2004. 
310 Brickhill J (2006) 27 ILJ 2004 at 2011. 
311 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra 
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substantive equality would preclude a measure that creates new disadvantage with a 
potentially long term effect. 
 
5.20 Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape Department 
of Health (2005) 26 ILJ 765 (LC) 
 
In this case, the applicant’s claim arose out of his unsuccessful application for 
appointment to the post of Director: Engineering and Technical Support with the 
respondent. He alleged that his non-appointment to the post amounted to unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of race, his application having been turned down in 
favour of a coloured male. 
 
The Court firstly analyzed the applicable provisions in the EEA. It then referred to the 
Van Heerden312
 
 case extensively in so far as the Constitution’s vision of a concept of 
equality was concerned. Furthermore, The Court importantly pointed out what 
appears to be a general problem with discrimination matters referred to the Labour 
Court: "Although the present matter has been pleaded, constructed and argued 
within the parameters of the EEA, which has at its heart this conception of equality, 
an appreciation of the substantive and restitutionary notion mandated by the 
Constitution has been singularly absent in the parties’ presentation of their cases.”  
The basis of the applicant’s case was that by virtue of his experience and 
qualifications he was the most suitably qualified and skilled candidate for the post 
and was so far ahead of the successful candidate, Mathys, that the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn was that Mathys was appointed solely on the basis of his race 
and membership of a designated group. 
 
To the extent that affirmative action considerations played any role, the selection 
panel, according to the evidence presented, had regard to the numerical targets 
contained in the respondent’s employment equity plan in terms of which both white 
and coloured males were adequately represented, but considered the appointment of 
                                                 
312 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
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a coloured male as preferable to that of a white male, because white males were 
significantly over represented, whereas coloured males were not. 
 
The applicant, in giving evidence before the Court, made no bones about his distaste 
for the policy of employment equity, complaining that “White males have no future”. 
 
The Court found that racial considerations brought to bear on the decision making 
process  was to the effect that the appointment of a Coloured male would have a less 
negative impact on the numerical targets aiming at equitable representation of the 
designated groups. However, the figures also showed that in the White male 
category the target was significantly exceeded. Therefore, the conclusion by the 
respondent that the appointment of a Coloured male would have a less detrimental 
effect on targets was also correct.  This was entirely consistent with taking affirmative 
action measures consistent with the purpose of the EEA and thus in accordance with 
section 6(2)(a) of the EEA.  
 
The case again demonstrated that a complaint by a disappointed candidate could 
never be justified unless the affirmative action candidate was wholly or less than 
suitably qualified or demonstrably incapable. That being so, it in effect made the 
hurdle for any applicant so much more difficult to overcome. 
 
5.21 IMAWU v City of Cape Town (2005) 26 ILJ 1404 (LC) 
 
A blanket ban on the employment of diabetics as firemen was found by the Court to 
constitute unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA.  
 
The respondent’s refusal to employ persons belonging to a particular group, 
diabetics, was held to be outdated and based on irrational medical grounds. Such 
refusal was held by the Court to be enough to demean the dignity of members of that 
group. 
The Court also held that the specific methodology to determine unfair discrimination 
as laid down in the Harksen test had to be followed in such enquiries under the EEA. 
 
 
  
 
 
164 
5.22 PSA obo Karriem v SAPS (2007) 28 ILJ 158 (LC) 
 
In this matter it was alleged that the SAPS discriminated unfairly against Ms Karriem 
on the basis of race, alternatively relevant experience, when it failed to appoint her in 
the position of Chief Administration Clerk and appointed a Ms Kotze instead.   
 
In a lengthy judgment, the Court made extensive reference to relevant authorities as 
well as applicable case law and concluded that no evidence was adduced by the that 
the SAPS had in fact appointed Ms Kotze by reason of the fact that she was a white 
female.  The Court did not agree either, that in appointing a white as opposed to a 
coloured female by itself amounted to differentiation and explained the concept of 
differentiation. It stated that where two applicants competed for a position, the mere 
fact that the one was white and the other coloured, and the white person was 
appointed, could not amount to differentiation, nor to discrimination. What would 
required was evidence of conduct which constituted a difference in or between the 
two parties being made. Or a demonstration that no objective justification existed for 
the appointment of the one rather than the other. 
 
The Court explained further that once differentiation had been shown, the two stage 
analysis as laid down in the Harksen test should follow to determine whether the 
conduct constituted unfair discrimination. 
 
In the present case, the SAPS, through a process of assessment of the applications 
had not treated the two applicants for the particular position differently.  It excluded 
Ms Karriem, or preferred Ms Kotze, because of the inherent requirements of the job. 
No evidence was presented by the applicant to show that the SAPS discriminated 
against Ms Karriem on the basis of her race. 
 
The evidence that was adduced on behalf of the SAPS disclosed, in the view of the 
Court, an objective assessment and awarding of points under various topics to the 
respective candidates for the position.  There was a proper weighing up of the skills 
the applicants had to do the job. There was a consideration of the formal 
qualifications, prior learning, relevant experience as well as the capacity of the 
applicants to acquire the ability to do the job within a reasonable time. Operational 
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requirements too, dictated that the person who would be appointed should 
immediately be able to do the job.  
 
The Court had regard to what Trengrove AJ said in the Mafomane313
 
 matter:  
"An allegation that an employer unfairly discriminated against an employer on the 
ground of race, involves at least three components.  The first is that the employer 
differentiated by treating the particular employee less favourably than other 
employees.  The second is that the employer made the differentiation on the ground 
of race.  The third is that it was unfair for the employer to do so."  
 
The Court finally held that there was no differentiation amounting to discrimination on 
the grounds of race.  
 
In so doing, the Court cited with approval a passage from an article by Carole 
Cooper:314
 
  
"It is not just any person from a designated group who may be the recipient of 
affirmative action measures relating to appointment or promotion, the person must be 
'suitably qualified'. … The 'suitably qualified' requirement should stand as an answer 
to those critics who hold that affirmative action necessarily means that individuals will 
be preferred because of their race, gender or disability per se, without an 
assessment of their competencies.  It is clear that the Act does not support tokenism 
– indeed the code says as much – but requires that the appointee has the requisite 
skills, knowledge and qualifications to do the job or could acquire these in a 
reasonable period.  Nowhere does the Act state that persons from designated groups 
have a pre-emptive right to appointment merely because they are so designated.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
313 Mafomane v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd  [2003] 10 BLLR 997 (LC) at para 56. 
314 Cooper C (2003) 24 ILJ i1307 at page 840 – 841. 
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5.23 Du Preez v Minister of Justice 2006 9 BCLR 1094 (SE) 
 
This case was the first reasoned judgment of a High Court sitting as an Equality 
Court and reflects the problems to be encountered when required to deal with a claim 
of unfair discrimination based on implementation of an affirmative action policy 
instituted in terms of section 4 of PEPUDA.  
 
The crisp issue was whether the short-listing criteria for appointments utilized by the 
respondent constituted unfair discrimination. The applicant in the matter was a 
magistrate who alleged that the criteria utilized were irrational, discriminatory and 
inequitable and in effect, constituted an absolute barrier to his appointment.  
 
The Court pointed out that equality was at the heart of the Constitution. Unfair 
discrimination was indeed unequivocally proscribed in PEPUDA and also in the 
Constitution. However, the provisions of PEPUDA and the prescribed considerations 
therein, did not supplant test for constitutionality of an affirmative action measure, but 
gave substance to it. 
 
The Court found that the short-listing formula of the respondent indeed raised an 
insurmountable obstacle for the complainant and as such constituted an absolute 
barrier to his appointment. In addition, since the discrimination was built into a 
departmental policy it was systemic in nature. 
 
The Court remarked that the difference in wording between section 9(2) of the 
Constitution and section 14(1) of PEPUDA had to be reconciled, but held that 
PEPUDA and EEA were “sufficiently close for authority on the one to be of 
assistance in the interpretation and application of the other.” 
 
Importantly, the Court adopted the Harksen test for unfair discrimination.  
 
Erasmus J adopted the approach that differentiation on the prohibited grounds of 
race and gender attracted a presumption of unfairness in terms of section 13 of 
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PEPUDA even if the measure was being defended as one of affirmative action. In so 
doing, according to Brickhill, he erred.315
 
  
In the light of Van Heerden,316 this approach would be incorrect. Although the 
presumption of unfairness does not apply. that does not immunise restitutionary 
measures from constitutional review. Any such affirmative action measure still has to 
pass muster under section 9(2) as per the three stage enquiry envisaged in Van 
Heerden.317
 
 
However, it is submitted by Van der Walt and Kituri,318
 
 that substantive equality 
recognises that systemic disadvantage still persists. In the light of the Van Heerden 
case the taking of restitutionary measures did not necessarily establish prima facie 
unfair discrimination. It was further submitted that the criteria did not necessarily 
establish a general absolute barrier – the purpose of the discrimination was 
legitimate and the goal of representivity was pursued in a rational manner. The short-
listed candidates were not unsuitable and the respondent would not have made no 
appointment at all if there were no candidates from a designated group. 
Tensions between Constitutional rights ought to be resolved using value judgments. 
 
The Court also noted need to interpret PEPUDA’s section 14(1) with sensitivity to 
constitutional values and objectives. Affirmative action measures had to be seen as 
essential and integral to the goal of equality and not as limitations of and exceptions 
thereto.  
 
The Court found that there was unarguably a need for transformation in the judiciary 
and therefore that the discrimination had a legitimate purpose, but, it concluded, the 
short listing criteria involved the establishment of an absolute barrier. 
 
                                                 
315 Brickhill J (2006) 27 ILJ 2004 at page 2010. 
316 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
317 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
318 Van der Walt A and Kituri P “The Equality Court’s View on Affirmative Action and Unfair Discrimination “ 
2006 Obiter 674 at 679 
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One difficulty with the judgment was its failure to locate the right to equality in its 
proper place. The jurisprudence of Constitutional Court clearly states that equality 
must be determined by reference to history and the underlying values of the 
constitution. 
 
5.24 Dlamini v Green Four Security (2006) 27 ILJ 2098 (LC) 
 
The applicants in this matter were dismissed for their refusal to shave or trim their 
beards because of their religious beliefs. 
 
The Court concluded that the applicants bore the onus of proving that the prohibition 
against trimming of beards was an essential tenet of faith in order to prove it was a 
violation of their right to religious freedom. If they were able to establish such indirect 
discrimination, the onus would shift to the respondent to justify its policy. 
 
The applicants failed to prove that having a beard was an essential tenet of their faith 
and therefore failed to prove discrimination. 
 
It was held that the company policy requiring security officers to be clean shaven 
indeed constituted an inherent requirement of the job. Security officers throughout 
the industry were required to be clean shaven. 
The Court found that the requirement constituted a standard of neatness and was 
therefore not irrational. 
 
5.25 Baxter v National Commissioner Correctional Services (2006) 27 ILJ 1833 
(LC) 
 
This matter confirmed that employers may take into account relative disadvantage of 
disadvantaged groups or the spread of employees from such groups in the 
workplace. It was found that the National Commissioner of the respondent had not 
properly applied his mind to merits of case and had failed to comply with the 
regulations governing promotion. He had also failed to record the reason for his 
decision, which, in itself, constituted a gross irregularity. When reasons were 
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ultimately given, they did not match up with the selection committee’s 
recommendations. 
 
5.26 Stojce v University of KZN (2006) 27 ILJ 2696 (LC) 
 
The applicant's claim was brought in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA.  He alleged 
that he was discriminated against when the respondents failed to appoint him to the 
post of lecturer in the engineering faculty. 
  
The grounds on which he relied were, firstly, that he was discriminated against on the 
basis of his race.  He was white and he alleged that the respondents preferred 
candidates of African, not necessarily South African, origin.   
 
Secondly, he alleged that he was discriminated against on the grounds of language, 
because English was not his first language.  
 
Thirdly, he was discriminated against on the unlisted ground of his qualification and 
tertiary teaching and research experience, which had not been taken into account or 
seriously and responsibly assessed. 
 
After considering the evidence before it, the Court held that the respondent was 
entirely justified in refusing to appoint the applicant to the post of lecturer. 
  
During the hearing, the applicant’s representative persisted with the third unlisted 
ground of discrimination.  The Court invited him to produce authority for his 
propositions.  Apart from informing the Court that the authority was to be found in 
Hugo,319
 
 he was unable to assist the Court. 
The respondent’s representative submitted that a claim for unfair discrimination arose 
when two or more similarly-situated employees were treated differently.  There was 
no other employee against whom the applicant compared himself. He conceded, 
                                                 
319 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo supra. 
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however, that racism or any of the grounds of discrimination could still be proved if 
there were a subversive reason for prejudicial action against an employee. 
  
The Court then referred to numerous Constitutional Court and Labour Court cases 
where unlisted grounds were considered as acts of discrimination if they were 
analogous to the listed grounds. It concluded that the test was that the differentiation 
had to impair the fundamental dignity of people as human beings because of 
attributes or characteristics attached to them. Not every attribute or characteristic 
qualified for protection against discrimination. The Court quoted Cooper:320
  
 
“Smokers, thugs, rapists, hunters of endangered wildlife and millionaires, as a class, 
do not qualify for protection. What distinguishes these groups from those who 
deserve protection? The element of injustice arising from oppression, exploitation, 
marginalisation, powerless, cultural imperialism, violence and harm endured by 
particular groups or the worth and value of their attributes are qualifying 
characteristics that distinguish differentiation from unfair discrimination.” 
The Court stated that an employee who relied on an unlisted ground as being 
discriminatory had to establish the differentiation, show that it defined a group or a 
class of persons. To warrant protection, the applicant had to show that the conduct 
complained of impacted on him as member of a class or group of vulnerable persons. 
  
In this case, it was found, the applicant’s defining characteristics did not classify him 
as a member of a group. He simply did not satisfy the requirements for the post and 
the respondents were simply doing their job of evaluating him.   
 
In the circumstances, the applicant failed to prove that his non-appointment was 
discriminatory on any of the grounds alleged.  If there was any differentiation at all, it 
was to compare the requirements of the jobs with the suitability of the applicant to 
fulfil them. “That is the essence of the process of filling posts. Without such a process 
suitable candidates cannot be sifted from unsuitable candidates.” 
 
 
                                                 
320 Cooper D Challenging Diversity 2004 at 3. 
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 5.27 Thekiso v IBM South Africa (PTY) Ltd (2007) 28 ILJ 177 (LC) 
 
In this matter, the Court considered whether the employer’s failure to consider 
specific affirmative action measures to retain a black female breached the general 
obligation on employers to implement affirmative action measures. 
 
The applicant relied on section 15(2)(d) of the EEA which provides that affirmative 
action measures implemented by a designated employer must include measures to 
retain previously disadvantaged employees. The applicant argued that the employer 
was obliged to retain her in preference to whites, provided she was suitably qualified 
as envisaged in section 20(3) of the EEA. 
 
Court viewed the applicant’s argument as incompatible with the earlier Dudley 
judgment, in which it was held that section 3 of EEA did not bring about an individual 
right to affirmative action. Chapter 3 EEA could only be brought into operation in a 
collective environment. 
 
The Court traversed earlier case law and rejected the Harmse321
Rycroft comments that: “Law makers may need to consider whether EEA needs 
rethinking.”
 approach. 
Affirmative action was not an enforceable right. The logic of the Dudley decision was 
viewed as inescapable. The Court accordingly held that the failure to retain 
employees from designated groups can only be dealt with systematically and not on 
behalf of an aggrieved individual in a court. 
322
 
 
5.28 Mothoa v SAPS (2007) 28 ILJ 2019 (LC) 
 
In this matter, the SAPS had advertised a newly created post for a Divisional 
Commissioner: Criminal Record and Forensic Sciences Services.  
 
In response to the advertisement the applicant and seven others applied for the post. 
The selection committee met to consider the applications of the eight candidates. 
                                                 
321 Harmse v City of Cape Town supra. 
322 Rycroft Affirmative Action in retrenchment at page 85 
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However, it was resolved to re-advertise the post due to the fact that not enough 
candidates with appropriate managerial experience applied. The committee also 
resolved to restructure the advertisement to ensure a large pool of candidates.  
 
The post was re-advertised and fifteen people applied including the applicant. A 
panel, consisting of the National Commissioner and four of the Deputy National 
Commissioners, met thereafter to screen the applications. The minutes of the 
meeting record that all applications were considered by the panel. A shortlist was 
then compiled. From the shortlist two white males and two African males were short 
listed for interviews, but not the applicant. 
  
The minute of the meeting of the panel identified the reason for the requirements of 
the position in clear and unambiguous terms. The SAPS were looking to recruit a 
person with appropriate material experience. 
 
The shortlist of candidates were interviewed and scored. It was decided to 
recommend the appointment of Assistant Commissioner Du Toit. He was chosen 
specially because he was the most knowledgeable, displayed good performance in 
the environment, was very experienced and was thought to strategically be the best 
candidate for the post. It was also believed that he would be a strong and decisive 
manager that could effectively address and improve service delivery at the new 
division. 
 
The committee approved the appointment of Du Toit. The National Commissioner 
also approved the appointment. 
 
The Court noted that the applicant did not persist with the initial allegation that there 
was discrimination based on racial grounds in the appointment. It actually became 
his contention that the type of unfair discrimination he was complaining about did not 
fall within the listed grounds in terms of the EEA but fell within grounds which were 
not listed.  
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The Court therefore had to decide whether there was discrimination and more 
particularly whether the setting of a minimum requirement that the prospective 
applicant for a post be on level 14 was discriminatory. 
 
The Court ultimately found that the applicant had failed to aver sufficient facts to 
indicate a basis for discrimination in terms of Employment Equity Act. Insofar as an 
applicant for employment relied on grounds not listed, it required proof of sufficient 
facts that the inconsistency complained of was indeed discriminatory in a pejorative 
sense. 
 
 Having analysed the facts at its disposal, the Court concluded that there was nothing 
discriminatory in the advertisement, nor was there any basis for the Court to interfere 
with the criteria set out by the SAPS for the position and advertisement.  
 
The Court nevertheless dealt with the applicant’s case premised on unlisted grounds 
of discrimination. In doing so it referred to Prinsloo323
 
 where the Court stated the 
following: 
“The proscribed activity is not stated to be unfair “differentiation” but stated to be 
“unfair discrimination”. Given the history of this country we are of the view that 
discrimination has acquired a particular pejorative meaning in relation to the unequal 
treatment of people based on the attributes and characteristics attaching to them”.  
 
It held that the applicant had not satisfied the Court as to why the fact that the 
minimum requirement was level 14 affected his human dignity.  
 
The Court also stated that it agreed with Waglay J when he said the following in the 
Ntai 324
 
matter: 
“Where the differential treatment is not based on a listed ground, it is not sufficient 
merely to allege that the employment policy or practice in question is arbitrary; the 
complainant must allege and prove that the policy and practice is based on an 
                                                 
323 Prinsloo v Van der Linde supra at para 31. 
324 Ntai v SA Breweries supra at para 44. 
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analogous ground to the listed ground. What therefore is required is that a 
complainant must clearly identify the ground relied upon and illustrate that it shares 
the common form of listed grounds, namely that it is based on attributes or 
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons 
as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparable manner”. 
 
On the issue of discrimination, it is not sufficient for a litigant to just allege 
discrimination. It is required of a litigant to substantiate that, that which he or she 
sees as treating him different from others amounts to discrimination legally defined.” 
 
The Court remarked that although section 6 of the Employment Equity Act did not 
provide a closed list of grounds, that was not a licence to bring in all and everything 
that appears to be different from the other. There was nothing wrong in an employer 
requiring proven managerial experience in the filling of senior posts. For as long as 
that practice was not capricious, all it would be in order.  
 
5.29 McPherson v University of KwaZulu-Natal 2008 2 BLLR 170 (LC) 
 
This matter concerned a claim about alleged unfair discrimination the applicant was 
subjected to when the first respondent failed to consider his application for the 
position of Head of its School of Physics. There had been a merger of three 
campuses of the university and as a result there would be one Head for three 
campuses. All staff members of the three campuses were taken into the newly 
formed body, including staff who were on contract, similar to that of the applicant. 
 
Subsequent to the merger, the respondent internally advertised some posts which 
included that of the Head of School of Physics. The advertisement for the Head of 
School of Physics had an eligibility requirement that any permanent academic 
member of staff of the first respondent, at the level of senior lecturer or above, was 
eligible for appointment. The consequence of the eligibility requirement was that it 
excluded any staff member who was not on a permanent appointment. The applicant 
who was on a fixed term contract was naturally excluded as an applicant for the post.  
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The applicant regarded the respondent’s policy of exclusion as unfairly discriminatory 
and unjustifiable.  
 
The respondent argued that the alleged discrimination did not fall within one of the 
prohibited grounds mentioned in section 6 of the EEA; that it was not in any sense 
designed, or likely to impair dignity and self respect; that it was not arbitrary and that 
there was a commercial rationale and need for the discrimination. Furthermore, it 
was argued that the provisions of the policy were to be measured against the 
operational requirements of the respondent, in the general situation and not to 
against its effect on individual cases. The policy had not been targeted at the 
applicant personally. 
 
The applicant argued that the appointment was to be made in terms of the 
University’s Employment Equity Policy which did not differentiate between contract 
and permanent employees. It furthermore defined “appointable” as a person who not 
only met the minimum requirements of the job, but who was likely to be successful in 
the job. It endorsed the principle of equal opportunity for all and prescribed that 
appointments were to be based on individual merit. 
 
The respondent had made a generalised assumption that permanent employees 
were more likely to remain as functionaries within their respective departments after 
their tenure as Heads of School. A further assumption that followed was that contract 
staff would, by choice, not remain within their departments. However, the respondent 
produced no statistics justifying its assumptions.  
 
In its analysis of the case, the Court held that the words “any permanent academic” 
constituted the basis for the claim premised on unfair discrimination or unfair labour 
practice. 
 
The Court referred to sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution which prohibits 
discrimination anyone and which accords everyone inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected. While the applicant had not sought to 
place reliance on any ground listed in section 9 of the Constitution, the Court stated 
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that it remained important to keep in mind the constitutional imperative against 
discrimination. 
 
The Court then proceeded to deal with the matter by setting out the relevant factors 
to be taken into account in that process. As well as referring to South African case 
law extensive reference was also made to international law and relevant international 
guidelines and conventions. 
 
It found the eligibility requirement discriminatory to the temporary staff members of 
the respondent and constituting an impairment of their dignity. The principle of 
continuity proffered by the respondent was, found by the Court, in any view, not 
convincing.  
 
The Court held that it could conceive of no bar against a temporary staff member and 
especially the applicant who had achieved academic excellence and through 
extensive research work, had earned the respect of his peers. He was both an 
academic leader and a manager. 
 
Upon consideration of the reasons proffered for the inherent operational 
requirements of the first respondent, the Court found none that it could regard as 
permanent attributes forming an essential element of such requirements. The 
reasons given, in the Court’s view, came across as requirements based on the 
preferences of respondent’s senior employees. 
 
5.30 Strydom v Chiloane (2008) 29 ILJ 607 (T) 
 
In this matter, the jurisdictions of the Labour Court and the Equity Court constituted a 
problem. The matter concerned racially discriminatory conduct and hate speech in 
the workplace arising from an altercation between two employees – the parties to the 
dispute. 
 
The respondent instituted action against the appellant in the Equality Court for the 
district of Praktiseer in terms of section 20 of PEPUDA. He was allegedly offended 
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and insulted by the harsh words used with reference to him by the appellant and 
considered them to be discriminatory.   
 
He contended that section 4(1) of the EEA provided that the EEA applied to all 
employees and employers. He therefore relied on section 5(3) of PEPUDA which 
provides: “This Act does not apply to any person to whom and to the extent to which 
the Employment Equity Act applies.” 
 
This aspect was argued before the magistrate. He held that indeed there were 
matters which had been reserved for decision by the Labour Court in terms of the 
EEA and not by the Equality Court.  He found that what was complained of in this 
matter was "hate speech" and that the EEA did not provide for determination of such 
issues. 
 
The appellant, however, argued on appeal, that the provisions of section 6 of the 
EEA are wide enough to allow the Labour Court to deal with the matter because it 
has to do with racial discrimination in the workplace.   
 
The Court held that both the PEPUDA and the EEA were enacted because of the 
provisions of sections 9(3) and 9(4) of the Constitution. 
   
The claim of the respondent in the Equality Court was not against the employer but 
against his co-employee, the appellant.  In the Equality Court the relief to which he 
would be entitled was contained in section 21 of PEPUDA.  He was clearly not 
entitled to an order, and the Equality Court was not empowered to make such an 
order against the employer, who was not a party to the proceedings, to dismiss or to 
take other action against the appellant. 
 
The Court held that the magistrate was not wrong to find that the words complained 
of fell within the definition of “hate speech” as defined in section 10 of PEPUDA.  The 
question however was whether he was right to conclude that, as a result, it fell 
outside the scope of matters that had to be dealt with by the Labour Court in terms of 
the EEA.   
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The words complained of were racially discriminatory and there was therefore no 
reason why the respondent could not institute action against the appellant in the 
Labour Court.  There did not seem to be a reason why he could not have instituted 
proceedings against both the employer and the appellant, claiming different relief 
against the two defendants in the same action.  
 
It is anticipated that in future, similar cases may arise where the incorrect forum is 
approached by applicants. It is an issue that, as pointed out in the Du Preez325
  
 case 
requires clarification. 
5.31 Dudley v City of Cape Town [2008] 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC) 
 
The question for determination by the Court was whether an applicant for 
employment who is a member of “the designated group” as defined in section 1 of 
the EEA, who complains that a designated employer to whom such applicant for 
employment had made an application for employment has failed to comply with its 
obligations relating to affirmative action under Chapter III of the EEA may institute  
court proceedings to enforce such obligations prior to the exhaustion of the 
monitoring and enforcement procedure provided for in Chapter V of the EEA. The 
obligations referred to in this regard are a designated employer’s obligations to 
prepare an employment equity plan and/or to adhere to employment equity principles 
and/or to comply with its other specific obligations in terms of Chapter III of the EEA.  
 
Another question to be decided was whether or not a designated employer’s failure 
to accord such applicant for employment preference in the filling of a vacant position 
constituted unfair discrimination.  
  
The applicant believed she should have been given preference in the appointment 
because she was black and a woman and that in failing to give her preference, the 
respondent had breached its obligation to implement affirmative action. Its failure to 
apply affirmative action in her favour amounted to discrimination on the basis of race 
and/or gender in breach of section 6 of the EEA.  
                                                 
325 Du Preez v Minister of Justice supra. 
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Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the respondent, both in respect of her 
appointment and generally, failed to prepare a proper employment equity plan and/or 
to adhere to employment equity principles and/or to comply with its obligations in 
terms of Chapter III of the EEA.  
 
The Court held that if the drafters of the EEA had intended that anyone who believed 
that a designated employer was failing to comply with its obligations under Chapter III 
could approach the Labour Court, prior to the exhaustion of the enforcement 
procedure provided for in Chapter V of the EEA, they would have provided a dispute 
resolution procedure in Part A of Chapter III in the same way that they provided such 
a procedure in Chapter II. The drafters of the EEA decided that, for non-compliance 
with a designated employer’s obligations under Chapter III, the enforcement 
procedure set out in Chapter V would have to be exhausted first, thereafter leading to 
an adjudication process by the Labour Court if it became necessary. 
 
The Court concluded that it was not competent for anyone to institute proceedings in 
the Labour Court in respect of an alleged breach of any obligation under chapter III of 
the EEA, prior to the exhaustion of the enforcement procedure provided for in 
Chapter V of the EEA. 
 
 With regard to the question as to whether a designated employer’s breach of its 
obligation either under its own selection or affirmative action policy or under the 
affirmative action provisions of Chapter III of the EEA in filling a vacant post, for 
example in failing to prefer a black woman candidate to a white male candidate, 
constituted unfair discrimination, the Court held that the appellant was in effect 
saying that the respondent’s failure to prefer her ahead of white male candidates 
constituted unfair discrimination. The Court stated that the purpose of affirmative 
action was inter alia to achieve employment equity in the workplace. The fact that the 
employer’s failure to give an employee preference in the filling of a position did not 
constitute unfair discrimination, did not mean that such employee would have no 
cause of action at all. If, for example, such employee’s employer was obliged to give 
him or her preference in terms of a collective agreement, the failure to give him or her 
preference would constitute a breach of such agreement even though it would not 
constitute unfair discrimination.  
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The Court stressed that the judgement did not affect her claim that the first 
respondent unfairly discriminated against her on grounds of race or colour or gender 
in that the only reason why she was not appointed to the position in question was 
that she was black or was a woman or both. However, that was not an issue for it to 
decide. Nor was the Court required to decide whether an individual had an 
enforceable right to affirmative action. 
 
This rambling and repetitive judgment was a disappointing one – not so much in what 
the Court said, but more in respect of what it did not say. It left one with a sense that the 
Dudley matter has not yet been put to bed and that it will remain in the domain of the 
Courts, with the Constitutional Court possibly having the last word. It was probably in 
anticipation of this that the Appeal Court remained silent on the critical issues the matter 
raised and which remain in the forefront of legal debate. 
 
5.32 Chizunza v MTN (Pty) Ltd [2008] 10 BLLR 940 (LC) 
 
In this matter, a Zimbabwean employee was dismissed after having been charged and 
found guilty in a properly constituted and conducted disciplinary enquiry on charges of 
dishonesty and fraud. 
 
After his dismissal he referred a dispute to the CCMA and subsequently to the Labour 
Court. In his statement of claim he raised, for the very first time, the allegation that his 
dismissal was arbitrary and based on victimization. 
 
After dealing with jurisdictional matters which were also material to the matter, the Court, 
in the interests of justice, dealt with applicant’s spurious claims of having been indirectly 
discriminated against on the basis of an unlisted and arbitrary ground. 
 
The Court went to great pains to explain in detail and with reference to relevant 
Constitutional Court decisions, including the Harksen test, the difference between 
differentiation and discrimination and the stages of the enquiry to determine unfair 
discrimination on an unlisted ground. 
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The Court however held, at the end of its lengthy exposition of the law and the 
application thereof to the very scanty evidence at its disposal, that the applicant had not 
at all placed any evidence before it to substantiate a claim that the dismissal was 
discriminatory or that a discriminatory motive had played any roll in the dismissal at all. It 
held that the charges of fraud against the applicant found a basis in the evidence before 
the Court and that having considered that aspect of the matter, there was no basis to 
find that the procedure and decision to dismiss the applicant was based on any 
xenophobic motive. 
 
In this matter once more, the representative of the applicant appeared totally ignorant of 
the applicable legislation in respect of every issue the Court had to deal with. It is 
evident that the very lengthy judgment which emanated from the hearing was directly an 
attempt by the Court to play the role of educator of those who appear before it. In itself, 
that is very laudable and commendable, however, it is once again a demonstration of 
the fact complained about by Pillay J, as mentioned earlier, that practitioners should 
assist the Court in coming to a finding through the submission of helpful argument which 
would contribute to the pool of knowledge to be applied in matters. 
 
5.33 Gordon v Department of Health: KwaZulu-Natal [2008] 11 BLLR 1023 (SCA) 
 
This matter concerns an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
The appellant had applied for the post of Deputy Director of Administration of the Grey’s 
Hospital. He was found to be the most suitable applicant for appointment, but the 
Provincial Public Service Commission directed the respondent to appoint a black 
candidate instead, the appellant then instituted proceedings, alleging that he had been 
discriminated against on the basis of his race. 
 
The Court, in a very well reasoned and detailed judgment, determined the first question 
– whether the appointment of a black candidate contrary to the recommendation by the 
selection panel – was immunised from judicial scrutiny merely by the respondent’s say 
so that it was an affirmative action appointment in furtherance of the constitutional goal 
of employment equity. The respondent had argued that it was not obligatory to have a 
programme or policy or plan in place by means of which to advance those imperatives. 
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The Court traversed the provisions of the LRA, the interim Constitution as well as the 
Public Service Act, 1994. It also quoted appropriate sections from the Van Heerden,326 
Bato Star Fishing,327ESKOM v Hiemstra,328 Shabalala,329 Stoman,330 Motala,331 PSA,332  
IMAWU v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local Council333 and Zuma334
 
  judgments 
prior to arriving at its judgment and in setting out its reasoning. 
The Court held that on the basis of all the authorities referred to, our Courts have 
consistently focused on the question as to whether policies, plans or programmes put up 
as measures designed to promote equality were indeed capable of achieving that object. 
He referred to Moseneke J’s judgment in the Van Heerden335
 
 where it was held that 
measures were directed at an envisaged future outcome. Such measures had to be 
reasonably capable of attaining the desired outcome. If the remedial measures were 
arbitrary, capricious or displayed naked preferences they could hardly be said to be 
designed to achieve the constitutionally authorized end.  
The Court also referred to the PSA336
 
  judgement in so far as it held that remedial 
measures had to be designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of 
disadvantaged groups which was entirely different to haphazard and random action. 
The Court therefore held that it cannot be disputed those measures found to pass 
judicial scrutiny were found to have been rationally connected to their objective. Plans 
and policies were subjected to scrutiny to determine if they were rationally connected 
with the constitutional imperative. Random action was not found capable of achieving 
the objective. Properly formulated plans, the Court stated, go a long way to satisfying 
the requirement of rationality and provide a basis upon which they could be measured. 
 
                                                 
326 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
327 Bato Star Fishing(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism supra. 
328 Hiemstra v City of Cape Town supra. 
329 Shabalala v Attorney-Genera, Transvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC). 
330 Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security supra. 
331 Motala v University of Kwa-Zulu Natal supra. 
332 PSA v Minister of Justice supra. 
333 IMAWU v Greater Louis TrichardtLocal Council supra. 
334  State v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
335 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden supra. 
336 PSA v Minister of Justice supra. 
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In so far as the merits of the matter were concerned, the court held that the appellant 
had been the victim of unfair discrimination in that the successful candidate had been 
appointed solely on the basis of his race without any policy or overarching plan of 
affirmative action in place and despite the recommendation of the selection panel. 
 
The Court held that suitability had to be the criterion in appointment. 
 
The appellant had shown that the failure to appoint him was inherently arbitrary and 
amounted to unfair discrimination. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Harksen337
 
 judgment represented an attempt by the Constitutional Court to lay 
down principles, in the format of a comprehensive test, which were viewed as 
consistent with the overall purpose of the equality provision contained in the 
Constitution, against a backdrop of all the pervasive values of freedom, dignity and 
equality – values which cement the foundations of our Constitution and our nation. 
The consideration and application of the value laden test to matters where breaches 
of the equality clause are alleged, it was hoped, would guide judges and the broader 
community, in a structured and systematic manner, to evaluate, in each individual 
context, such disputes against relevant factors. 
This was essential at the time as the concept of substantive equality was a notion 
which, it seems, was generally not familiar to our judges in the Eighties. That era, as 
shown through the case law, dealt with formal equality and a mere balancing of the 
scales between disputing employers and employees. There was no application of the 
notions of substantive equality or even of indirect discrimination. Furthermore, the 
Constitutional fabric required teasing out after the dawn of the new democracy in 
order that the provisions could be consistently applied. 
 
Harksen338 is certainly still regarded as the authoritative guideline in so far as unfair 
discrimination matters are concerned. However, it is apparent that not all judges and 
practitioners actually apply the test in circumstances where it would have provided 
the ideal framework for analysis of the issues in dispute – a case in point was 
Langemaat339
                                                 
337 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
.. In many cases, where it does appear, it is used inappropriately, out of 
sequence or merely just referred to in passing and then not touched upon again. The 
only conclusion to draw from this is that practitioners and some judges find it too 
tedious and drawn out to apply or that they are simply unable to apply it due to its 
complexity and value-laden approach, requiring an often complex untangling of the 
338 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
339 Langemaat v Ministerof Safety and Security supra. 
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positions of the parties and an analysis of context which might not be readily 
apparent from the evidence led. 
 
Given the critical role our courts have to fulfil in respect of transformative 
adjudication, the application of a test such as Harksen340 provides the ideal 
opportunity for our judges in their judgments to make relevant to ordinary people the 
very Constitutional values our nation holds dear and to show how they are 
interpreted and then applied to their lives. The Harksen341
 
 test facilitates such 
analysis and reflection, providing a backdrop of critical facets of the right to equality 
which can only enrich and deepen the quality of judgments relating to unfair 
discrimination matters structured and dealt with in accordance therewith. 
It is however to be expected in a system such as ours, where lay persons have the 
right to appear on behalf of parties in certain circumstances. Clearly, they could not 
be expected to deal with their matters on that basis. The absence in many matters of 
representatives who are even aware of and familiar with e.g. the Harksen342 test, is a 
matter alluded to by Judge Pillay, who remarked extremely aptly, that practitioners in 
their submissions have a duty to assist the Courts by means of well-researched and 
presented argument. It is clear from the reported cases that when certain 
practitioners appear, the quality of the ensuing judgment is at a much higher level 
than if the parties are not well represented. Where skilled practitioners have 
appeared in discrimination matters, the judgments have more normally referred to 
Harksen343 and other relevant authorities. However, there are exceptions. In the 
Chizunza 344matter – a case where the applicant’s representative was clearly a lay 
person, the judge took the trouble to draft a very extensive judgment, explaining in 
great detail how he had arrived at his decision, together with explanations of all the 
applicable principles and relevant case law, including the Harksen345
 
 test. 
                                                 
340 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
341 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
342 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
343 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
344 Chizunza v MTN (Pty) Ltd supra 
345 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
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The test is of course not unproblematic. The large number of factors to take into 
account renders it vulnerable to criticism as being over inclusive and imprecise, 
However, it undoubtedly, through its application helps the avoidance of pitfalls. 
 
It appears therefore that despite the fact that in very many judgments, the Harksen346
 
 
test is not applied or even mentioned, it still remains the authority and is utilized by 
Courts where the judge and / or practitioners appear to be more intent on applying 
the law to the facts rather than comparing versions to arrive at a decision. 
As has been shown through the cases traversed, the questions of whether equality 
can and should be linked to concepts such as dignity, vulnerability and disadvantage, 
as well as the weight to be attached to such notions in arriving at a decision, are 
problematic. However, as the Constitutional Court has stated on many occasions, 
these issues will be clarified and crystalized through case by case analysis over a 
period of time. It is not possible, in a new and unique democracy such as ours, within 
a few years to come up with a clearly conceptualized statement of what constitutes 
the right to equality. Cases will continue to grapple with the content, depth and 
boundaries of the right through the passage of time. 
 
The development of such a conceptualized “statement” has also not been facilitated 
by persistent problems relating to the availability and quality of evidence produced by 
parties in Court, by the relative inexperience of many laypersons who have the right 
to appear but who do not have the requisite skills or abilities to contribute 
meaningfully to a developing jurisprudence as remarked by Pillay J. 
 
In so far as the subject matter of disputes is concerned, some issues, from a survey 
of the cases, will continue to remain on the forefront of legal debate and will continue 
to bedevil clarity when attempting to dispense justice in unfair discrimination matters. 
 
The first issue relates to whether an individual employee has a right to affirmative 
action. Despite the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, it is submitted that 
Dudley347
                                                 
346 Harksen v Lane NO supra. 
 is not dead. 
347 Dudley v City of Cape Town supra. 
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In South Africa, it appears, matters dealing with indirect discrimination will be very 
difficult to deal with due to a lack of precedent, general unavailability of statistics to 
employees who have the onus in such matters to prove that there is differentiation 
and that the differentiation amounts to indirect discrimination. The Kadiaka348- and 
Harmse349
 
 cases demonstrate that all too readily.  Sometimes, employers have 
access to statistics, skills, specialists and other sources of evidence which applicants 
simply cannot match in order to prove a claim of indirect discrimination. Again, the 
Courts will be in the middle of that foray. 
The general lack of expertise concerning equality and discrimination matters have 
often resulted in parties arriving at Court with absolutely no basis for a claim at all. 
The fact that they managed to get into Court reflects that at the level of institutions 
such as the CCMA, there is also a lack of experience and knowledge about such 
disputes and parties are simply “processed” in order rather to present their facts to 
the Court. The Alexandre350, Stojce351 and Dlamini352
 
 cases are examples of the 
problem. 
In so far as affirmative action is concerned, it is increasingly the case that employers 
have reached their representivity targets, but nevertheless persist in applying policies 
to advance previously disadvantaged employees, at the expense of other applicants. 
It is submitted that in especially the Public Service sector, these situations will 
become more prevalent. 
 
Despite the recent Gordon353
                                                 
348 Kadiaka v ABI supra. 
 decision, it is submitted that the rationality and 
efficiency considerations will still persistently bedevil us, together with uncertainty as 
to the exact parameters of the meaning of “not wholly or totally unsuitable” as 
opposed to “suitable.” Until we have a definitive judgment from the Constitutional 
Court, incidents of “naked” preference and absolute barriers at the expense of 
efficiency will not taper off. It is submitted that such a definitive judgment is 
desperately needed as the implications of jettisoning efficiency are all too plainly to 
349  Harmse v City of Cape Town supra. 
350  Alexandre v Provincial Admin of the Western Cape Department of Health supra. 
351  Stojce v University of KZN supra. 
352 Dlamini v Green Four Security supra. 
353 Gordon v Department of Health: Kwa-Zulu Natal supra. 
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be seen in the lack of service delivery – an issue which threatens the very basis of 
our democracy. 
 
Despite the findings in Hoffmann354(concerning HIV positive cabin attendants) and 
the IMATU355
 
 cases concerning diabetics in the Fire Service, incidents of “blanket 
bans” will increasingly be brought to the Courts, living as we do in a society where, 
as Sachs J put it, we are still deeply suspect of any disabled group simply because 
they are unlike us. The Courts have, in this regard, a major role to play in helping our 
society to transform itself. 
Despite its seemingly slow and hesitant development, our jurisprudence on the right 
to equality and unfair discrimination has certainly made its mark in the last decade. 
 
                                                 
354 Hoffmann v SAA supra. 
355 IMATU v City of Cape Town supra. 
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